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ABSTRACT
This thesis research examines the impact of child support enforcement
on the welfare dependency of female-headed families in the low-income
region of New Bedford, Massachusetts. Few absent fathers were able to
pay support amounts in excess of their families' AFDC grant amount,
thereby forcing their families' ineligibility for continued assistance.
Support levels are determined by: (a) the willingness of the courts and
enforcement workers to adhere to HEW minimum support guidelines; (b) the
ability of fathers to pay support; and (c) the willingness of fathers to
comply with support orders established. The relative contribution of
each factor to the overall reduction in New Bedford support levels was
estimated. HEW support guidelines were applied regressively in New Bed-
ford: standards were relaxed for high-earning fathers, while support de-
manded from low-earning fathers was actually in excess of HEW guideline
levels. Assuming strict adherence to HEW guidelines and full compliance
by fathers, we showed that only fathers earning in excess of $175 net per
week could pay support amounts higher than average AFDC grant levels for
a family of two dependents. However, in Louisiana and Texas, where AFDC
grant levels are relatively low, substantial numbers of families may be
3forced off welfare through the enforcement of child support. Chances of
a similar result in areas with high unemployment were remote.
Few patterns of support delinquent behavior were in evidence, al-
though payment levels increased slightly with earnings. We examined pay-
ment compliance responses to alternate modes and levels of enforcement.
Compliance levels were significantly higher only among fathers against
whom criminal action for nonsupport had been taken. Enforcement mode
changes from all non-probate to probate actions for support (legal sepa-
rations and divorces) resulted in significantly lower compliance levels.
Higher-earning fathers tended overall to pay higher percentages of sup-
port order levels established. If we assume HEW support standards, how-
ever, low-earning fathers appear the least delinquent.
Enforcement of support appeared to have substantial indirect impact
on welfare dependency, however, by discouraging dependency among marginal
welfare families. One-third of parents in the New Bedford IV-D program
reconciled during the study period. A majority of reconciliations oc-
curred within a few months subsequent to the establishment of a support
order against the father. The fact that four-fifths of reconciled couples
later re-separated, the family re-applying for AFDC, suggests that few
couples are able to maintain themselves in the absence of some form of
public assistance.
We therefore cannot consider the problem of nonsupport in isolation
from the problem of poverty and unemployment among welfare families. One-
third of New Bedford fathers were marginally-employed, unemployed, or had
been on public assistance themselves. To view nonsupport solely in terms
of welfare dependency is to take a very limited view of children's rights
to support. We must turn to more fundamental reasons for economic depen-
dency among women rather than restrict our approach to remedial enforcement.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE
Outline
This thesis research examines the impact of child support enforce-
ment on welfare dependency. More specifically, we are concerned with
establishing a direct link between the enforcement of paternal support
obligations and changes in the welfare status of AFDC families. There
are two ways in which this might occur: (a) directly, that is, the
amount of child support paid by the father exceeds the family's AFDC
grant amount, thereby forcing their ineligibility for continued assis-
tance; and (b) indirectly, by discouraging welfare dependency among
marginal welfare couples.
Dimensions of Nonsupport
In spite of several legislative efforts since the 1940's to develop
a comprehensive program of child support enforcement in the U. S., by
1973 only 34% of fathers associated with families on AFDC who were ab-
sent from the home had court-orders or voluntary agreements for support
of their families. Of these families, less than one-fifth were receiving
full support payments from the absent parent, while more than half
15
received no payment at all. For the non-welfare family, the development
of remedies for nonsupport at common law has been slow. Support law varies
considerably by state, while the application of enforcement measures is
often the sole prerogative of the individual judge. The high cost of en-
forcement services, overcrowded courts, and the low priority often afford-
ed support enforcement actions, all contribute to reduce the likelihood
of successful recovery.
A continuing problem in our research on family poverty is that we
know little about the real causes of support delinquency. It has been
generally assumed that the application of strict enforcement measures
will result in non-delinquent behavior on the part of the absent parent.
There is little indication, and much evidence to the contrary, however,
that the courts and enforcement officials have been effective in altering
the delinquent behavior of nonsupporting parents. Preliminary evidence
suggests that willingness-to-pay support may be equally as important as
ability-to-pay support in determining the future status of AFDC families.
Legislative Background
In January of 1975, comprehensive child support enforcement legis-
lation was passed (Public Law 93-647), forming a new Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act. The new law mandated more aggressive enforcement at
various government levels, introducing a system of penalties and incentives
to insure program development by states and localities. A nationwide,
computerized Parent Locator Service (PLS) was established, and Federal
agencies, including the IRS and SSA, were to provide any information re-
garding the location and income of absent parents. By 1977, programs had
been established in all states, significant numbers of fathers associated
with both AFDC and non-welfare families had been located, and support
16
orders established. In spite of these efforts, however, nonsupport or
inadequate support by absent parents remains a major cause of poverty
in female-headed families in the U. S. In recognition of this fact, the
new Administration has placed child support enforcement at the forefront
of the Carter Welfare Reform package.
Paternal Support
Welfare dependency among female-headed families has increased sub-
stantially in recent decades. The number of AFDC children eligible due
to parent absence (generally the father) doubled in just five years to
6.2 million in 1973. Although welfare population increases have only
been slight relative tQ overall population increases, the absolute numbers
of recipient families has soared, and welfare costs have followed.
Public interest in the Child Support Enforcement Program has been generated
primarily by a desire to minimize the taxpayer's welfare burden. It is not
surprising that legislators have focused on the most visible and immediate
cause of welfare dependency -- paternal economic desertion.
Unfortunately, this approach is too simplistic. Paternal nonsupport
is itself often the result of poverty and unemployment. Moreover, many
fathers of families on welfare do contribute toward their families, al-
though amounts may be inadequate. Where a low-earning father has re-
married, enforcing support obligations for the first family may place the
second family in danger of welfare dependency. From the point of view
of the family on welfare, the advantages of enforcement may be few. No
payments collected from the father go to the family, but to the State
Treasury. The action at law is between the Welfare Department and the
father, effectively excluding the family from proceedings. Amounts de-
termined as support are based on the father's ability-to-pay, rather than
17
the family's level of need. The welfare status of the family is thereby
conditional upon the father's earnings, so that we would expect only high-
earning fathers to be able to pay amounts sufficient to get families off
welfara. In essence, this institutionalizes the poverty and welfare
dependency of the poorest families. Where the family does manage to
get off welfare, fathers may become delinquent again in the absence
of state involvement in enforcement. At best, the family faces an
uncertain economic future.
In focusing on paternal nonsupport, legislators have not only
ignored the relation between poverty and nonsupport among poor fathers,
but more importantly, they have ignored the more fundamental reasons
for dependency among women. Instead of guaranteeing financial security
to women within intact marriages, a remedial approach has been used
in enforcing support obligations only after marital break-up has occurred.
Welfare Dependency
Achieving welfare independence among AFDC families has become one
of the major goals of the Child Support Enforcement Program. We stress,
however, that the attainment of welfare independence may not herald a new
state of economic security for the family. The pattern of dependency on
a provider (viz. father, husband, or the state) will not change with wel-
fare status. Moreover, the level of welfare benefits received by a family
will vary by state and by individual circumstances. Therefore, the
amount of support required from the father to exceed that grant amount,
and thereby force the family's ineligibility for continued assistance,
will vary accordingly. As the AFDC grant level changes, so too does the
relative importance of paternal support payments in determining the future
welfare status of the family. We use "welfare independence' as a measure
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of legislative success in the knowledge that such a goal may be in-
feasible, particularly in areas with high unemployment where AFDC grant
levels are high and the ability of fathers to pay amounts in excess of
grant levels is relatively low.
We do not argue against support enforcement against any parent un-
willing to provide for his or her child, but rather we suggest that an
exclusive program of enforcement against predominently poor fathers con-
stitutes a very limited view of child support and parental support obli-
gations. Not only does it perpetuate the notion that the primary cause
of family poverty is paternal nonsupport, but it also serves to establish
state rights to recovery, rather than children's rights to support, as
paramount in the enforcement effort,
B. DISCLAIMER
In this research, we do not deal with the problem of potential de-
pendency among non-welfare families resulting from paternal nonsupport.
Nor do we evaluate the relative "adequacy" or "appropriateness" of exist-
ing support level standards. Guidelines for support proposed by HEW are
assumed to provide at least minimum levels of "appropriate" support. In-
stead, our efforts are concentrated on evaluating the relative contribution
of lax enforcement of these standards by enforcement officials and the
courts, as well as unwillingness-to-comply on the part of fathers, on
overall levels of support.
Overall levels of support determine how many families manage to get
off welfare through enforcement. In a low-income region, we would expect
AFDC grant levels to exceed child support orders by such a wide margin
that few families are made ineligible through strict application of en-
forcement measures, reflecting the low ability of fathers to pay support.
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However, the AFDC grant levels of families, and earnings levels of fathers,
change considerably over time. Detailed data on these changes was not
recorded for this research. We therefore do not attempt to evaluate the
impact of support enforcement in a dynamic framework, relating changes in
grant levels to changes in support levels within the family budget.
In the foregoing analysis, we also examine the relationship between
enforcement and family structure. The inadequacy of basic terminology
used to describe marital status changes (e.g. separations, reconciliations)
will no doubt introduce some error into our measurements. The plethora
of states described by these terms, that is, the realities of the marital
relationship, are not considered. These terms merely offer a convenient way
of describing changes that affect the welfare status of the family. We
do not attempt to construct a model of family structural change relating
to the enforcement.of support. Nor do we assign weights to the various
factors involved in the decision to separate or reconcile. However, we
do assume the decision is closely related to the couple's perception of
economic opportunities.
Support levels are determined by enforcement policies, as well as
the ability and willingness of the father to comply with a support order.
In examining reasons for low support levels, we have assumed that dis-
crepancies between HEW and support order levels established by local
officials describe lax enforcement rather than a real inability of fathers
to comply with HEW minimum recommended levels. We also assume that dis-
crepancies observed between support order and support payment levels are
due to unwillingness-to-comply on the part of the father, and that they
do not reflect inability-to-comply. Our assumptions appear justified by the
fact that many low-wage fathers are able to pay relatively high percentages
of their earnings toward support.
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Finally, we do not attempt to establish the determinants of willing-
ness-to-pay, although we do provide evidence of support payment responses
to various modes and levels of enforcement. We caution the reader against
assuming that support delinquency is a problem exclusive to poor families.
The fact is that economic desertion occurs with great frequency among
both poor and non-poor families. The difference is that desertion, non-
support, and marital dissolution, in the poor family almost invariably
result in welfare dependency. In this thesis, we focus exclusively on
families which are welfare-dependent. Since non-welfare families are
excluded from participating in the Massachusetts Child Support Enforcement
Program, no data was available on these families, If we assume, however,
that payment levels are relatively independent of the welfare status of
the family, then many of our conclusions regarding support delinquency
may be extended to include fathers of non-welfare families against whom
enforcement antion is taken.
This thesis represents one of the first efforts to examine data on
fathers and families participating in the enforcement program. The over-
whelming amount of data obtained provides a new resource for those under-
taking research on support delinquency and enforcement. This thesis rep-
resents a first cut only. We have restricted our focus to illustrating
just one aspect of the support problem. Several sweeping assumptions are
made in our effort to clarify and simplify. The issues are complicated,
and a real resolution of them would require a data-intensive effort which
is beyond the scope of this thesis research.
Much computer work has been done in generating the results presented
in this thesis. Results obtained were, for the most part, suggestive,
although in some cases compelling. Certainly, however, none of the re-
sults of this research attempt to answer these questions once and for all.
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More definitive answers must be sought through direct interviews with
those persons participating directly in the program, the fathers and
their families. Although we have presented a number of interesting
results concerning support enforcement and delinquency behavior, we have
also made a concerted effort to raise the dust a little on several of
the more fundamental issues concerning support enforcement.
C. RESEARCH DESIGN :
We examine the impact of child support enforcement on welfare de-
pendency in two ways: (a) directly, by measuring the levels of support
paid with AFDC grant amounts and by noting the numbers of families who
are forced off welfare as a result of support payments exceeding the
welfare grant amount; (b) by documenting the incidence of AFDC case
closures due to the "reconciliation" of the couple immediately following
support enforcement action against the father. We chose to study these
effects in a low-income region of Massachusetts, New Bedford, where we
would expect the average ability of fathers to pay support amounts in
excess of their families' grant levels to be low, given high local un-
employment levels.
In particular, we focused on the reasons why support levels fall
significantly below minimum levels recommended by HEW for support.
Support levels are primarily determined by three factors: (i) the
willingness of courts and enforcement officials to adhere to HEW guide-
lines; (ii) the ability of fathers to comply with support orders estab-
lished; and (iii) their relative willingness-to-pay support. We examined
each of these factors, estimating the contribution of each to overall
reductions in support payment levels obtained in New Bedford. HEW levels
were assumed commensurate with minimum ability-to-pay support. Where
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discrepancies occurred between HEW. and support order levels established
in New Bedford, these were assumed to reflect a laxity in enforcement on
the part of local enforcement workers and the courts. Where discrepancies
were found to exist between support order and support payment levels,
we assumed they were due to an unwillingness-to-pay on the part of New
Bedford fathers.
A primary assumption held by many proponents of child support enforce-
ment is that the strict application of enforcement measures against non-
supporting fathers will result in immediate, and often long-term, non-
delinquent behavior, To date, however, there is little evidence that
support delinquent behavior follows any pattern among fathers. We still
know very little about the determinants of this behavior. In order to
illuminate some of the issues associated with support delinquency, we
ask several questions. First, does support delinquency vary according
to the mode or level of enforcement applied against the father? That is,
do fathers paying support under informal, voluntary agreements tend to
be more, or less, compliant than those under civil or criminal court
orders for support? Does a change in mode from non-court to court action
effect any change in- the level of payments made? Finally, what is the
evidence that long-term support compliance is secured, particularly in
the event that a family exits from welfare? In the absence of state in-
volvement in the enforcement process, does the father become delinquent
again? And what implications does this have for the future welfare status
of the family?
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Almost without exception, the earnings levels of New Redford fathers
were so low that the chances of effecting their families' release from
23
welfare solely through- the enforcement of paternal support payments were
very remote. Invariably, AFDC cases which were closed did so because
the AFDC grant level of the family was sufficiently lower than average
(e.g. because of maternal earnings) so that paternal support payments
could more easily exceed the family's grant level. In examining the
reasons why so few families were able to exit from welfare, we found that
lax enforcement was equally as important as support delinquency in ex-
plaining low support levels. And in the case of high-earning fathers,
the establishment of support orders substantially below HEW recommended
levels was even more important than delinquency in explaining the in-
adequacy of support payment levels. On the other hand, we noted that
support order levels established for poorest fathers were in many cases
higher than HEW recommended levels. Although HEW guidelines prescribe,
somewhat progressive support levels across levels of paternal earnings,
the application of support standards in New Bedford was found to be
decidedly regressive. Slightly higher levels of delinquency found among
poorest fathers may well be a function of the relatively high levels of
support required of these fathers.
Results obtained from our analysis of support payment responses to
alternate modes and levels of enforcement were as follows: (1) the only
mode which showed substantially higher levels of payment compliance were
those involving criminal court action, resulting in an average payment
that was 15% higher than for allother modes; (2) a change in mode from
non-probate to probate (legal separation or divorce) court action result-
ed in significantly lower levels of compliance, while the reverse was
true in the case of criminal court action; (3) fathers who had been pay-
ing support under a court order who subsequently set up a voluntary agree-
ment with the Welfare Department tended to become delinquent in payments;
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C41 strictest levels of enforcement, defined as the number of support
actions brought against fathers, were applied against those fathers who
were least able to pay, as well as those who showed the highest initial
levels of compliance; (5) fathers tended on average to become more de-
linquent in support payments with the initiation of subsequent support
actions; (6) although fathers tended to respond to criminal enforcement
actions with higher levels of compliance, levels dropped with each suc-
cessive enforcement action on average. Much of the evidence suggests
that a conscious policy of enforcement exists to pursue those fathers
who appear more "accessible". Overriding this seems to be a policy of
stricter enforcement against those fathers who appear to have higher
support payment potential. This may not necessarily refer to a higher
potential for paying larger dollar amounts, otherwise we would find sub-
stantially higher support orders established for high-earning fathers.
Instead, payment potential refers to the apparent willingness, at least
initially, of fathers to pay support. This might explain why there is
no discernible difference between enforcement measures taken against
employed versus marginally-employed fathers. Our results show that rela-
tive willingness-to-pay support is somewhat independent of ability-to-
pay. Employed and marginally-employed fathers respond with similar in-
creases in payment levels following stricter enforcement measures, al-
though overall payment levels will be lower among marginally-employed
fathers.
We also examined the impact of support enforcement on family struc-
ture. Specifically, we documented the "discouragement" effects of en-
forcement on the continuing welfare dependency of marginal welfare
families, particularly those involving informally-separated couples.
Almost 30% of couples in New Bedford requested AFDC case closure during
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the study period because they had "reconciled". A high proportion of
reconciliations occurred immediately following the establishment of a
support order against the father, suggesting that these couples may have
separated in order to obtain welfare benefits, and that the enforcement
of support has effectively lowered their perceived net benefits from
the AFDC grant. However, four-fifths of couples who did reconcile
subsequently re-applied for welfare. These findings suggested that few
families are able to maintain themselves in the absence of some form of
public assistance. We concluded that the "discouragement" effects associ-
ated with support enforcement were short-lived at best. For the family
which cannot subsist without public aid, support enforcement will not
permanently discourage welfare re-application.
We also discovered disturbing new evidence suggesting that child
support enforcement may actually be encouraging informally-separated
couples toward final marital dissolution. We observed that 17% of all
couples (35% of all mutually-separated couples) in New Bedford underwent
multiple separations and reconciliations prior to the establishment of the
first support order against the father. Subsequent to the first support
order, however, they remained separated. Willingness to reconcile may
be discouraged among couples experiencing genuine marital difficulties
against whom enforcement action is taken.
We have noted here only those results pertaining to our original
research question: what is the impact of enforcement on welfare dependency?
The New Bedford data was also analyzed to reveal a wealth of other inf or-
mation on fathers and families participating in the New Bedford IV-D
Program. We refer the reader to Chapter IV for a full account of these
findings.
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E. OUTLINE OF CONTENTS
In Chapter II of this thesis, we provide a detailed history of
legislation pertaining to parental support obligations and the support
rights of children in Massachusetts from early colonial days up to the
present. In particular, we show how and why the enforcement of support
has developed as a law governing poor families only. In Chapter III,
we continue these arguments, showing how most recent legislation, P.L.
93-647, distinguishes carefully between fathers associated with families
on welfare and those whose families are independent of welfare. Specific
provisions are included in the law for incentives to states and localities
in the pursuit of fathers of AFDC-dependent families. We provide evi-
dence which strongly suggests that the major objective of the current
Child Support Enforcement Program has been to reduce welfare expenditures
by maximizing recovery payments from fathers in AFDC cases and by forcing
the ineligibility of many families for continued assistance. Twenty-nine
states have effected an overall AFDC population rollback of 29,000 cases
since the inception of the IV-D Program. Our conclusions appear justified
also by the recent House rejection of a Senate amendment providing for
continued funding of non-AFDC cases under the IV-D Program.
In Section B of Chapter III, we trace the historical development of
Child Support Enforcement Program in the United States. We provide a de-
tailed outline of the provisions of P.L. 93-647, noting those which have
served to bias enforcement efforts in the direction of AFDC cases.
Specific reference will be made to the program developed in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts since 1967, The administration of Federal, state, and
local programs will be presented in capsule in Section D. In section E,
current methods of enforcement employed in the New Bedford region will be
used as a case study of local procedure.
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In Chapter IV, we introduce the data on fathers and families parti-
cipating in the New Bedford IV-D program. For each of the 682 cases on
the study file, we obtained the age and birthplace of the father, the
total number of AFDC families and AFDC children associated with the
father in the New Bedford region, and the number of children in this
particular AFDC family. We also listed the age and sex of all children
in the family. We then constructed a complete marital history of the
parents, including marriages, reconciliation, separations, legal sepa-
ration, divorces, and so on. Each entry included the date of the event,
so that a chronological listing could be made. Similarly, we constructed
full AFDC histories for each family, including dates and reasons for
AFDC case openings and closures. Changes in the occupation and level
of earnings of each father in the study file were obtained, as well as
data on unemployment experience and receipt of public assistance by the
father. Finally, we obtained full support histories for each father,
noting the type and date of each order for support established, together
with a coded assessment of the father's level of payment compliance with
each order. Basic cross-tabulations and frequency distributions of data
appearing on the study file are provided in Chapter IV.
In Chapter V, we examine the impact of support enforcement on the
welfare dependency of female-headed families in the New Bedford region
of Massachusetts. In Section B, we compare support order levels esta-
blished in New Bedford with HEW levels of recommended support, noting
patterns of differences where these occur. In Section C, we compare
support order levels with levels of payments actually made by New Bedford
fathers. We then analyze the payment levels of fathers in compliance
with alternate modes and levels of enforcement. Analyses of variance
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were applied to test for significant differences in support order, support
payment, and delinquency levels, among fathers of different earnings
levels and family sizes. In Section D, we examine the relative contri-
bution of lax enforcement and paternal support delinquency toward the
reduction of support levels in New Bedford. We then hypothesize the
potential impact of enforcement on welfare dependency in states with low
relative AFDC grant levels, assuming strict application of HEW support
guidelines and full compliance by fathers. Projections are then compared
with those for Massachusetts where the average level of AFDC grants is high.
In Section E, we examine the indirect impact of enforcement on the
welfare dependency of marginal families. We document the high rates of
reconciliation among these couples immediately following enforcement
actions, suggesting a substantial "discouragement" effect. The duration
of welfare independence among these families is also noted. Finally,
we present new evidence of a second, quite different impact on family
structure: enforcement of support may be encouraging couples to final
marital dissolution.
In Chapter VI, we summarize our research findings. The implications
of our results for the development of future child support enforcement
programs is discussed. Several policy recommendations are made. For
example, we propose stricter adherence to HEW minimdm guidelines for
support, re-orienting local enforcement toward more progressive standards.
New criteria for case prioritizing are also discussed. We also sug-
gest the expansion of IV-D enforcement efforts to include non-welfare
families and the maintenance of state services in AFDC cases where the
family becomes welfare-independent, given high rates of recidivism among
fathers in the absence of state involvement. Finally, we make several
recommendations on the direction of future research in this. field.
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CHAPTER II
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CHILD SUPPORT IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1620-1977
A. INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter, we discuss how and why the.enforcement of support
became embedded in the welfare system of law, that law which governs poor
families only. Over three and one half centuries, Massachusetts
child support laws, and legal remedies for nonsupport or support delin-
quency,.have developed along two distinct paths, representing two systems
of family law, one for the poor, and one for the non-poor. The law of
the poor, predominantly welfare legislation, was derived from the
Elizabethan Poor Laws2 in England, while family law for the non-poor has
developed from common law tradition, generally in the courts. In this
Chapter, I will show how child support laws in Massachusetts followed this
pattern of dual development, and in particular, how and why the enforce-
ment of support obligations -- or legal remedy for nonsupport -- is em-
bedded in the welfare tradition, or law of the poor.
1. This theme was introduced by Jacobus tenBroek, "Family Law. California's
Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status",
Parts I through III, Stanford Law Review, vol.16 (July 1964) pp.257-317,
pp.900-981, and vol.17 (April 1965) pp.614-682. Many of the views expressed
in the following Chapter originated with tenBroek.
2. 43 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 2: An Acte For the Reliefe of the Poore (1601).
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Modern laws establishing the parental duty to support have been
drawn from both Poor Law tradition and the precedents of common law.
However, while the non-poor were expected to exercise this support res-
ponsibility according to the laws of "natural affection"' for their off.-
spring, poor parents were obliged by law to support their children as
well as all other "descendants from their loins" In sum, non-poor
parents were bound only by moral responsibility, while poor parents were
bound by legal obligation. Distinctions were carefully drawn between
the poor and non-poor to be governed by child support laws: the poor were
those dependent on public relief. The strict application of support laws
against poor parents on relief thereby allowed exemption of the non-poor
as well as those poor who had been fortunate enough to maintain their
independence from relief.
Historically, the dual theory of development in family law can be
traced from earliest colonial days to the present. Many features of child
support, and support enforcement, legislation exhibit this dual nature.
For example, the strict liability of relatives through the principle of
consanguinity was not held at common law; only under the law of the poor
could relatives be held liable for the support of their poor kin. Similarly,
the support obligation of unwed parents for their (so-called illegitimate)
children was not held at common law; only under the law of the poor was
the father held liable for the support of his illegitimate child.
1. W.Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Cooley Ed. 1889),
note 137 at 447.
2. Ibid. note 82 at 447-449, 454.
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Actions to enforce support at common law have been largely unsuccess-
ful. In part this has been due to the slow development of women's
rights in the courts. Women have traditionally had little control over
property, particularly if married,2 and in the case of marital dissolution,
a mother (and her children) stand in peril of pauperism. Inequality be-
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tween married persons was thus perpetuated by the courts. The husband
was usually favored in court rulings, particularly in the matter of
family support, and although not destitute, few women have had the finan-
cial independence to pursue private court actions for support. In fact,
numerous laws exist which either directly or indirectly guarantee the
dependency of mothers and their children on a provider (husband, father,
relatives, or the state).4 Social, religious, political, and economic
mores all combined to institutionalize the economic dependency of women,
1. The slow development of remedy for nonsupport at common law in Massa-
chusetts is witnessed by rulings made (see Appendix A). The costs of
private pursuit have always been high-, while chances of successful
recovery are generally slim.
2. For example, property acquired by a woman while married automatically
became the property of her husband in the event of separation or divorce.
3. Where the courts did entertain applications for support orders,
judgements were generally in favor of the husband. Either no award
was made at all, or the court order for support was inadequate. More
women were unable to leave their husbands without "just cause", a widely-
used justification in the courts for absolving the husband of support
responsibilities.
4. Examples of laws which have discriminated against women are provided
in Barbara A. Brown et al., "The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis For Equal Rights For Women", 80 Yale Law Journal (April 1971), p. 871.
Following the passage of the ERA in Massachusetts, a thorough review was
made of State laws which discriminated against women. To date, several
steps have been taken to alter existing laws in compliance with ERA direc-
tives. Laws governing the child support obligations of parents, for
example, were amended in 1977 so as to extend full support liability to
the mother, as well as father, of the child (Massachusetts Statutes of
1977, Ch. 848 amending Ch. 273A, #1 of the General Laws of Massachusetts).
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and the assumption of motherhood generally insured that dependency.
The persistence of societal notions about appropriate family roles for
both men and women have also perpetuated this pattern of dependency.
Meanwhile, children had even fewer rights than their mothers under
the law, a situation exacerbated by their dependence on the mother as
provider in the event of marital dissolution. Until this century, fathers
were automatically granted custody of children1 in the event of a sepa-
ration or divorce, although not in cases involving illegitimate children.2
Consequently, nonsupport did not develop as an issue at common law until
mothers were granted custody of their children. Children themselves did
not have, as minors, the legal right to sue for neglect to support in
their own behalf. In fact, only where a father neglected his child to
the point where he or she was in danger of becoming, or had become, de-
3-
pendent on public relief was enforcement action taken. Thus, a child's
right to parental support existed under the law only where the child was
a pauper, and in such cases the child's rights and interests were invested
in the state.4
1. Taunton v. Plymouth (1818), 15 Mass. 203.
2. The Massachusetts Statutes of 1789, and later 1794 (Ch.34) provided
that illegitimate children only would follow the legal settlement of their
mother. Although this law was later amended, the custom of maternal
custody of illegitimate children has been retained. On the other hand,
until this century legitimate children almost invariably followed the
legal settlement of the father, as did a wife her husband's.
3. Records of Plymouth Colony, "Court Orders" (circa 1625), Ed. by
Nathaniel Shurtleff (Boston 1855), vol. 5, pp. 35, 116.
4. Once the state assumed the responsibility of supporting the poor and
their families, the primary public concern became that of minimizing the
costs of that relief to the town, taxpayers, and state.
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The lack of representation in litigation for children has persisted
until recent decades. Support laws protecting children suffered a neg-
lect similar to that of alimony laws. In fact, the political and legis-
lative environment did not favor the development of children's rights
until women began their road to emancipation in the early 1900s. By
this time, the abolition of juvenile labor, changes in custody rulings,
and new legislation providing mothers with aid in child care, all paved
the way for the development of child support enforcement rights. Following
decades produced no real changes, however, in the support rights of
children at common law because remedy for nonsupport (or the enforce-
ability of those rights) remained the almost exclusive concern of welfare
legislation. Until the passage of Public Law 93-647 in 1975, child
support enforcement legislation in the United States governed poor parents
only. This law explicitly extended enforcement services to non-welfare
applicants. However, inertia within State legislative and welfare ad-
ministrations insured that child support enforcement has remained a law
of the poor.
While social, political, and economic traditions governing the
family discouraged the development of nonsupport remedy at common law,
at the same time very stringent remedies were established within the
realm of poor law. Child support laws governing the poor became closely
allied with most other laws governing the poor and their families. For
1. It was considered sound state policy to invest public funds in those
places where public control could follow (Constitution of Massachusetts,
Amendments of 1916, Article XLVI). Poor families in Massachusetts were
effectively controlled by laws which governed their place of settlement,
employment and occupation, various family relationships, and the personal
and civil rights of family members. In effect, public support of poor
families insured public control over the unemployed.
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example., eligibility for public assistance and for legal town residency
were conditional upon the prior fulfilment of parental support obligations,
as well as the employment of both parents and children in- the poor family.1
In many cases, parents were also required to provide some guarantee of
their willingness and ability to support their family or repay the town
fbr support of their family. Sureties were often required of parents
against the possible future dependency of their children on public relief.
Where a family was forced onto public relief, strict penalties were
applied. As the state assumed parental support obligations, the interests
of the children themselves were subordinated to those of the state.
Children of the poor could be bid for at local "charitable" auctions, and
indentured until majority. Their wages were applied to support of family
members on relief. In a real sense, taking children of the poor out of
the home for purposes of indenturing them constituted a penalty for
relief dependency.3 The threat of indenture was also used to encourage
the provision of adequate parental support among the marginally poor.
1. Mandatory indenture was required of all children of poor, and non-
poor, parents where such parents were deemed unable or unwilling to
support their children by the local town Overseers of the Poor in
Massachusetts (Massachusetts Acts of 1703, Ch. XIV; Laws of the Province
of Massachusetts, 1722, Ch. II).
2. A Massachusetts decree of 1672 ordered poor citizens to indenture
their children or the town would do it for them by way of auction or
appointment (Boston Town Records, 2 Rep. Rec. Com. Boston, p. 107; Idem
3 Rep. Rec. Com. Boston, p. 55). Public auctioning continued through to
the 20th century in Massachusetts (see Old Records of the Town of Fitchburg,
vol. 5, Selectmen's Report for March, 1920).
3. In 1658, the public response to the problem of poverty and nonsupport
was to direct towns to appoint two or three men as Officials of the Poor,
who were to determine the futures of unsupported children as follows:
"[the children were] to be disposed of ,.. as they [the Officials] shall
see meet" (Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England, "Laws"
(1623-1682), Ed. by David Pulsifer (Boston 1861), p. 111).
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The efforts of the early colonists of Massachusetts to enforce the
support obligations of parents were largely motivated by a desire to
lessen local poor relief burdens, and where possible, to recover some of
those costs. Local town accounts could be cleared by the long-term
indenture of poor children and by the forced labor of their parents.2
Local employers were required to accept pauper children as apprentices.3
The poor or potentially poor could be denied legal residence in a town,
thereby denying them access to local poor relief. Moreover, local resi-
dents could be prevented from encouraging non-resident dependency by the
private dispensing of local charity. And finally, relatives of the poor
could be made liable for costs incurred by towns in support of poor
families.
Although enforcement of child support obligations was applied only
in cases involving relief-dependent families, we do not wish to imply
that poor families themselves had ready access to nonsupport remedy. In
fact, the family itself had no rights to enforcement action in the sense
that it could recover child support costs from the delinquent parent
while on relief. In keeping with the notion that enforcement constituted
1. This theme has been dominant throughout the entire history of welfare
legislation in the United States. Current cost recovery practices have
been analyzed by David C. Baldus, "Welfare As A Loan: An Empiricial
Study of the Recovery of Public Assistance Payments in the United States",
25 Stanford Law Review (January 1973), p. 123.
2. The requirement that fathers be employed in order to be eligible for
relief is still maintained under many State welfare laws. Children not
in school may also be required to register in WIN (Work Incentive) or other
programs in order to continue receiving aid under AFDC (Aid To Families
With Dependent Children).
3. Local landowners, trade and service employers, were under legal obli-
gation to support local poor by accepting apprentices in a manner similar
to that of the English feudal lords, although more flexibility for employers
existed in the auction system of indenture.
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a means by which relief costs could be recovered, the action at law was
not between the family and the deserting father, but between the public
officials responsible for the family's maintenance, acting on behalf of
the town or state, and the father or other relatives liable for support.
As long as the family stayed on relief, support payments exacted from
2the father went directly to the town. These features of enforcement
have remained intact under current child support laws in Massachusetts. 3
Support enforcement has thereby become synonymous with welfare cost
recovery by the State, the rights of children to support being protected
only where these State interests were involved. Moreover, the tendency
for nonsupport remedy to remain exclusively within the domain of poor
law, wherein litigation occurred between the State and the father, further
undermined any potential remedy sought at common law by the deserted
family. Until this century, there was almost no precedence'for successful
recovery of support costs through private court action by mothers of
deserted families.4
1. Although support enforcement laws originally provided for cost re-
covery by the wife and relatives of the destitute family, these rights
were gradually assumed by the State. Enforcement was carefully res-
tricted to those cases involving relief-dependent families, in which the
State could hope to recover some of its costs incurred in support of the
family.
2. These payments were later made to the State Relief Board, and today
are channeled into the Massachusetts State Treasury.
3. In Section D of this Chapter, we detail the development of child
support laws in Massachusetts from 1620 to 1977.
4. In Appendix A, we have provided a brief list of major case rulings
applying to child support and remedy for nonsupport in Massachusetts.
For the most part we have included only those rulings which relate to the
enforceability of the parental support obligation.
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In the following Sections of this Chapter, we will illustrate the
reliance of child support legislation in Massachusetts on the earlier
laws developed in feudal England, primarily the Elizabethan Poor Laws.
The dual development of family law which resulted in the legislation of
child support enforcement is particularly evident in the Commonwealth,
where support enforcement is still restricted to cases involving families
on relief. For the most part, child support laws therefore govern poor
families only. In Section B, we refer briefly to English Poor Law and
common law traditions as they relate to the matter of child support and
its enforcement. In Section C, we summarize the dual development of
child support laws in Massachusetts, providing an example from laws
relating to the support of illegitimate children. In Section D, we
trace in detail the developments which occurred in Massachusetts poor
law, demonstrating how and why the etforcement of support became em-
bedded in the welfare system of law. The close association and inter-
dependence of support laws and other laws governing the poor and their
families will also be shown.
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B.. THE LEGISLATIVE INHERITANCE FROM ENGLAND
Elizabethan Poor Laws
In 16th century England, the maintenance of the family unit was not
regarded as a matter of highest priority. Under the Elizabethan Poor
Laws, while parental desertion was established as a criminal offense,
nevertheless unsupported children could be taken from their parents,
generally to be indentured. Even where the mother (or both parents)
were on relief, this could occur, since mother's aid was not included in
relief.2 In fact, all children of the working classes were required to
be apprenticed, whether they or their parents were on relief or not.3
State support of children from poor families was assisted by the child
labor system, which also ensured that children were trained in a craft
or employable skill as well as in the general work ethic. Children
could be assigned to masters whether the latter want-ed apprentices or
not, 5 and the statute was silent about the rights of parents.6
1. 43 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 2 (1601).
2. Where the parents were unable to provide adequate support for their
children, the discretion exercised by the church and state over the lives
of family members was greatly increased.
3. tenBroek, og.cit., Part I, pp. 270-279, states that "any [viz. the
Elizabethan Poor Law] welfare system primarily operates upon and is for
the benefit of the working classes of the nation and must be regarded as an
indispensible. part of the overall system of labor legislation ... The
paternal, custodial, coercive, and punitive attitudes of the poor law
existed throughout the whole system of labor control".
4. 18 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 3, #IV (1575-1576).
5. 43 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 2, #111 (1601).
6. E. Barry, The Present Practice of a Justice of the Peace, note 80 at
81-82, 88. It was later decreed that children could not be separated from
their mothers for purposes of being supported by the parish (Regina v.
Clarke, 7 Ell. & Bl. 119, Eng. Rep. 1217/0.B. 1857).
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The state assumption of responsibility for ensuring child support
grew- from the premise that employable persons, including childrem,
should be encouraged and even coerced, if unwilling, into becoming part
of the economi-c system. On these grounds, the state could justify
forcing apprenticeship on both the child and the employer. Similar argu-
ments could not be used, however, in cases where pauperism resulted from
disability, because these poor could not support themselves by their labor.
As a consequence, the doctrine of liability of relatives was first intro-
duced as a legal tool for the support of unemployables. In this way,
responsibility for the support of the poor was extended beyond the state
to both propertied (employers) and non-propertied (relatives) classes
under the Poor Laws, with substantial penalties for nonsupport.2
Refering to Poor Law provisions for support, Blackstone writes
that "it is a principle of law that there is an obligation on every man
to provide for those descended from his loins". This legal obligation
extended, through the principle of consanguinity, in an ascending as
well as descending direct line of a family. The parental support obli-
gration was independent of any property rights in the child, of parental
rights to the services and earnings of the child, and of parental rights
to custody.4 Given that the legal liability of relatives had been
1. First introduced in 1597 (see 39 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 3, #VII), this
doctrine was adopted as a permanent provision of the Elizabethan Poor
Laws in 1601 (43 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 2, #VI).
2. 43 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 2, #VI (1601).
3. Blackstone, op. cit., note 82 at 447-449, 454.
4. tenBroek, op.cit., Part I, p. 234.
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conceived as a means of supporting unemployables, thereby exempting the
state of support responsibilities and costs, the extension of that
liability to the widest possible circle of relatives was to be expected.
In the case of illegitimate children, both parents were included in
the support obligation toward the child under the Poor Laws, but in
keeping with poor law tradition, only the mother was penalized by incar-
ceration if she came to be on relief.2 Advancement in the status of the
illigitimate child in both Anglo and American legal history can be traced
to this Poor Law provision of 1575. The same law addressed the issue of
support of one class of legitimate children as well, those which were
dependent on public relief. In the case of the destitute, their labor
could be extracted in exchange for public relief.3 Desertion by either
parent of a family was punishable by incarceration to discourage all but
the most destitute from abandoning their children to the care of state
relief. Penalties for family desertion, for illegitimacy, and for poverty,
were applied with greatest force against those who became relief dependent,
often those who could not provide. support beyond their own labor.
Although the parental support responsibility carried with it no re-
ciprocal rights to the child's custody or services, it is ironic that
the state's assumption of support responsibility was also equated with a
right of the state to the relief recipient's labor, both parents and
1- 18 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 3, #1 (1575-1576), although liability extended
only to the mother and putative father, not to other relatives.
2. 7 Jacobean 1, Ch. 4, #VII (1609-1610) provided for punishment of one
year in the house of correction for mothers who bore illegitimate children
if the mother was herself a public charge (i.e. on relief).
3. Ibid, #VIII.
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children, as well as a right of the. state to remove the child out of the
home in exercise of state custody rights. The laws governing the poor
on relief further extended to state control over the family's living
arrangements, rights to travel and to settle, occupation choice and
even that of their children. The Poor Laws thereby created a complete
system of law- governing the poor family rooted in the support obligation
and state enforcement of that obligation. The Poor Laws set a strong
precedence for state interference in the personal and family relationships
of those receiving public assistance, a precedence which was maintained
in the transference of English legislative tradition to the colony of
Massachusetts.
In summary, the Elizabethan Poor Laws relating to child support and
support enforcement suggest that remedy for nonsupport was founded in the
state's need to curtail public expenditures in its support of poor families.
A child's welfare was not considered in isolation from the value of his
or her labor, or that of the parents. Indeed, the parental duty to
support was upheld, and enforced, only in those cases where a child was
dependent for support on the state, at which time severe penalties for
nonsupport were applied. The Poor Laws were therefore not designed to
reduce the dependency of the welfare class Der se by spreading the wealth
or access to wealth from propertied to non-propertied classes. Rather,
they were designed to minimize public relief costs by spreading the res-
ponsibility for the poor and their families among liable relatives, and
by requiring the poor to exchange their labor for support provided by the
state. The net result was the spread of poverty and the creation of a
whole class of poor. The adoption of the poor law tradition by the early
colonists of Massachusetts ensured the continuation of support enforcement
as a law of the poor.
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English. Common Law
While the Elizabethan Poor Laws established a complex system for
governing and controlling the poor and working classes, as well as their
family and work relationships, the common law, developed primarily in
the courts, established a vastly different system for the non-poor.
In the absence of public expenditure and cost recovery incentives, the
strict doctrine of relatives' liability, including that of parents for
their children, did not find favor with the judges. As under the Poor
Laws, however, the family unit was not sacrosanct. Although non-poor
families were rarely broken up in the application of sanctions (for non-
support. etc.), the work ethic and labor themes of the poor law were
nonetheless visible at common law. In feudal times, the property relation-
ship dominated personal and family ties, families were not recognized as
such, and family members had no rights as a direct result of their member-
ship.2
As a consequence of this feudal theme, the parental support duty,
and rights to support of children, were not assigned at common law. In
fact, the only privileges the courts would enforce among family members
were property rights between fathers and eldest son, and between husbands
and wives. Other children were propertyless and considered in the status
of servants. Even a century after feudal tenures were abolished, and
1. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th Ed. 1956) p. 545;
F. PoIlock-and F.W. Maitland, History of English Law Before the Time of
Edward I (1895) Ch. 7; M.. Radin, Anglo-American Legal History (1936), Ch.35.
2. tenBroek, o.cit., Part 1, p. 287ff.
3. Wardship or guardian rights existed for fathers over -all other children.
At his death, these rights passed not to the mother but to the natural
male heir or, where the child was a minor, to the lord of the heir's land.
The child was thus treated as "an adjunct to his lands" (Plucknett, op.cit.,
note 129 at 545).
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guardianship and protection of children firmly established, the status
of the minor child as servant continued to shape the course of child
support at common law.1 While servants, however, had certain rights to
claim maintenance and support from a master,2 between father and child
there were no enforceable rights. The child was not entitled to the
father's care, protection, or support, and could not sue for negligence
on the part of his or her parent.3  Unlike the situation where a wife was
permitted to pledge her husband's credit for necessaries, children held no
such rights or privileges to support at common law, except where expressly
authorized by the father. In fact, a third party providing a child with
necessaries had no cause of action for recovery against a negligent parent.
The notion of property rights in the master-servant relationship
existed in the father-child relationship only insofar as either could
"maintain each other's lawsuits and might justify defense of each other's
persons. The parent was liable for the torts of the child only if the
child was acting as the father's servant in the discharge of some employ-
ment".4 The father could also obtain damages against a third party for
loss or impairment of his child's services.5
1. Blackstone, op. cit., note 137 at 453.
2. Radin, og.cit., note 129 at 503.
3. tenBroek, 6_g.cit., Part I, p. 283) notes that the child had fewer
rights at common law than even the servant. Further, in the development
of guardianship, the guardian rights extended to the property, person, and
even marriage of the child heir. The net effect of such laws was the main-
tenance of privilege. among the propertied classes and their heir;-. The ex-
clusion of non-heirs from inheritance served to contain feudal privilege
within fewer hands (1 Pollock and Maitland, op.cit., note 129 at 303).
4. E.Coke, Institutes of the Law of England (1642) p. 564; W. Hawkins,
Pleas of the Crown (Curwood ed. 1824) p.458-459; M. Hale, History of the
Common Law of England (London, 1713) note 136 at 32.
5. J. Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations (1931) p. 399.
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The development of child support obligations at common law was slow
in comparison to their development in the Poor Laws. At common law,
parental duties were defined as protection, maintenence, and education,1
which were based on the "natural obligation of the father to provide for
his children"2 springing from "natural parent affection" which resulted
from the act of begetting itself. This principle of support obligation
was, however, regarded in the courts as purely moral responsibility, and
not as legal obligation. Having therefore no legal remedy at common law,
action to enforce support was impotent in the courts. No doubt there
was some pressure from the church (and ecclesiastical courts) in the dis-
charge of support duties, but the matter was clearly regarded as a private
one governed by the individual conscience.
Thus, English common law avoided the creation of general liability
of parents in support of their minor children, far less their adult chil-
dren or other relatiVes. The only common law remedy provided by civil law
was that derived from the Elizabethan Poor Laws permitting the parish or
town to recover for relief extended to the poor family from both parents
and from other liable relatives.5 The non-poor father would only be com-
pelled to support his child in the event that the child became a public
1. Blackstone, op. cit., note 137 at 451.
2. Ibid at 447.
3. Nevertheless Blackstone states that mothers are less liable in that
they are faced with the "constraint of [their] sex, and the rigour of laws,
that stifle [their] inclinations to perform this duty; and besides, [they
are] generally wanting in ability" (Ibid).
4. The courts continued to find that parents were under a natural duty
and a moral responsibility, but not a legal obligation, in the matter of
child support.
5. 43 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 2, ##1-2 (1601).
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charge so that the parish provided for his or her maintenance. The
parallel development of both alimony and child support was not incidental.
The only remedy for nonsupport available to either child or wife was
through the application of the Poor Laws. And consequently, only when
the mother and child were pauperized and had become relief-dependent, did
the enforcement of support become a reality.2 Thus, the Elizabethan Poor
Laws alone stood as legal provisions on the subject of child support,
providing the only precedence for enforcement statutes developed in the
United States.
1. Shelton v. Springett, 11 C.B. 452, 456, 138 Eng. Rep. 549, 550 (1851)
ruled that the father's support and maintenance of his son was outside
the jurisdiction of the court, and that the exclusive remedy of the law
was to apply to the parish poor law authorities to "compel the father,
if of ability, to pay for his son's support". A similar ruling is found
in Mortimer v. Wright, 151 Eng. Rep. 502 (1820).
2. Manby and Richards v. Scott, 83 Eng. Rep. 268, K.B. (1793) provided
for unexpected precedent in nonsupport cases. The wife had left her
husband for 12 years, then returned and was denied support, maintenance,
and residence in his home. The court ruled that the wife's absence con-
stituted abandonment and provided "reasonable cause" for denial of her
support.
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C. THE DUAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT LAWS IN MASSACHUSETTS
Summary
During the three and one half centuries of Massachusetts history,
child support, and remedy for nonsupport, developed along the two distinct
paths created under English feudal law. Similarly, the laws in Massa-
chusetts represented two systems of family law, one for the poor, and one
for the non-poor. The law of, the poor was founded in the Elizabethan
Poor Laws tradition; the law governing non-poor families was derived from
English common law and precedents established in the courts. Few states
provide a more clear example of this dual development in family law than
2
Massachusetts. The earliest legislation in the colony included the almost
wholesale adoption of the Elizabethan Poor Law tradition regarding duties
of child support and the enforcement of support obligations.
Although modern laws in Massachusetts which establish the parental
support duty are founded in both traditions, nevertheless the remedy for
nonsupport is based almost exclusively on Elizabethan Poor Laws. The duty
to support offspring differed under the poor and non-poor systems of family
law, as has been demonstrated in the English tradition, the non-poor
bound by moral responsibility, the poor by legal obligation. Similarly,
the courts were reluctant. to intervene in family matters and relationships,
so that it was difficult, if not impossible, for a mother to bring a
1. tenBroek, og.cit., discusses the dual development of family laws in
California and New York State. A general overview of the dual system in
various States is provided by Thomas Willging and John Ellsmore, "The
'Dual System' in Action: Jail For Nonsupport", U. Toledo Law Rev. (Spring
1969) pp. 348-394.
2. For the most part, support laws developed in the early colonial days
of Massachusetts were to become prototypes for future colonial settlements
elsewhere in the country. The adoption of the Poor Laws thus insured an
unbroken line of tradition from England through colonial legislation to
the present day.
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complaint into court against her husband, even for her own support, far
less that of her children. Moreover, the courts varied substantially in
their application of existing support laws. The slow development of
remedies for nonsupport at common law is evidenced by the fact that, even
today, a majority of nonsupport complaints are brought into Massachusetts
courts by welfare officials supporting the family, not by the mother her-
self.
The language of modern support laws, firmly rooted in poor law tra-
dition, continue to reflect common notions about the social responsibi-
lities of the poor and non-poor. A strict differentiation between working
and non-working poor was one way in which these notions were institutiona-
lized. The establishment of an entirely separate system of laws governing
poor families served to create a class of poor, while the spread of poverty
among this class was insured by the extension of support responsibility
to liable relatives. One result of dual development of the laws governing
families was that various solutions to the problem of poverty tended to
"reflect views about the relative roles of personal and nonpersonal causes
of poverty, and the degree to which poverty was morally reprehensible,
related to correctable traits of character, and [therefore] subject to
1. Courts typically ruled in favor of husbands in cases brought forward
for consideration, by either refusing to allow the complaint into court,
or by granting the family a support order substantially lower than re-
quired for its maintenance. Even today, court orders are established on
the basis of the father's income rather than on the family's need. For
further discussion of the arbitrary levels of support ruled by courts, see
Marion P. Winston and Trude Forsher, "Nonsupport of Legitimate Children by
Affluent Fathers as a Cause of Poverty and Welfare Dependence", Working
Paper No. P-4665, The Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, December 1971).
2. Variations in court rulings in Massachusetts are discussed in "Family
Support Laws. An Enquiry Into Enforcement of Non-Support", The Advisory
Council on Home and Family, Commonwealth of Massachusetts (May 1972).
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control by penal sanctions".
The development of the Massachusetts welfare system, one of the most
comprehensive in the nation, brought with it a keen legislative interest
in laws which guaranteed tighter public control over the expanding welfare
budget and its growing population of relief recipients.2 The various
statutes governing support enforcement reflect this concern. In general*,
amendments to relief laws involved the tightening of public reins of con-
trol over the disbursement of public funds. Meanwhile, there developed
a complex system of penalties and sanctions (stricter conditions for eligi-
bility, closer monitoring of relief recipients, etc.) governing the relief
3
population itself. Consider, for example, the development of laws gover-
ning the support obligations of parents of illegitimate children. Although
the obligation to support illegitimate children was not held at common
law, the obligation was established under the law of the poor. The reason
for this was that large numbers of such children, as well as their mothers,
inevitably became dependent on public relief for their support. Ironically,
the rights to support of illegitimate children developed directly out of
public concern for the costs of desertion of illegitimates to the public.
1. tenBroek, o.cit., Part I, p. 270.
2. In 1913, the Massachusetts legislature amended the Constitution as
follows: "No grant ... shall be made for the purpose of any charitable
undertaking which is not publicly owned and under the exclusive control
of public officers ... authorized by the Commonwealth" (Constitution of
Massachusetts, Article XLVI).
3. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating The Poor: The
Functions of Public Welfare (New York 1971), p. 22: "Any institution
that distributes the resources men and women depend upon for survival
can readily exert control over them: the occasion of giving vitally needed
assistance can easily become the occasion of inculcating the work ethic,
for example, and of enforcing work itself, for those who resist the with-
drawal of that assistance".
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One consequence of this overriding public concern has been the al-
most exclusive enforcement of child support to cases involving relief-
dependent families, those which have the potential for some sort of cost
recovery to the Commonwealth, to the virtual exclusion of non-welfare
cases.1 Although courts have been used in establishing support orders,
the administration of enforcement remains within the Department of Public
Welfare.2 In addition to the reluctance of courts to entertain private
nonsupport actions until fairly recently,3 the existing administrative
machinery for child support enforcement available in the Department
provided a convenient vehicle for the expansion of enforcement services
in the State. It also guaranteed stricter control over the disbursement
of welfare (AFDC) funds to families through closer monitoring of both
the delinquent and non-delinquent parent. The close alliance of the
Child Support Enforcement Program in Massachusetts with the existing
welfare system has ensured that child support enforcement lawqs continue
to govern poor parents only. How and why the enforcement of support
became embedded in the welfare system of law -- the law governing poor
families -- is discussed in greater detail below.
1. Support recovery by the State is not restricted to current costs in-
curred in the State's maintenance of the family. The State is also em-
powered to recover past relief costs, so-called "arrears". The financial
incentives associated with enforcement in relief cases are considerable.
2. The administration and procedures of the program are outlined in
Chapter III.
3. Only in recent decades have the courts tended to rule in favor of
unsupported families (see Appendix A for a list of major case rulings
on tha- matter of child support obligations).
4. Until the 1880s, child support laws had been appended to various
other laws governing poor families: settlement laws, labor laws, etc.
By the late 19th century, nonsupport had become an important enough issue
to warrant the drafting of a whole new piece of legislation governing the
parental support obligations. The language of the law, however, leaves
little doubt that it is intended for poor families only.
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Dual Family Support Laws and Illegitimacy
The dfstinction created under the child support laws between poor
and non-poor parents has nowhere been more apparent than in the laws
governing the support of illegitimate children. The support rights of
illegitimate children were not founded in the common law tradition of
parental moral responsibility derived from a law of "natural affection".1
Even today there is no obligation at common law on a putative father to
support his illegitimate child.2 Rather, these support rights were founded
directly on the tradition established under the Elizabethan Poor Laws.3
Given the high probability of lifetime pauperism4 of illigitimate children
in early colonial days, the State was able to justify a commensurately
strict level of enforcement of support against parents involved.
As early as 1576 in England, both parents of illegitimate children
were required to make payments to the local parish toward their mainte-
nance. However, only those children who became public charges were in-
cluded in this law.5 Similarly, only mothers of relief-dependent illegiti-
mates were committed to a house of correction.6 In feudal England, support
1. Blackstone, o2.cit., note 137 at 447.
2. Commonwealth v. Dornes (1921) 132 N.E. 363, 239 Mass. 592.
3. 18 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 3, #1 (1575-1576).
4. This was no doubt due in part to the stigma of bastardy which followed
the child of unwed parents through. life, but also to the fact that parents
of illegitimates were generally poor themselves. Fathers were not required
to take custody, which also reduced the child's chances of being supported.
5. 7 Jacobean 1, Ch. 4, #VII (1609-1610).
6. The majority of illegitimate children were condemned to the almshouse
with their mothers. Indeed, they almost invariably appeared in the house
of corrections or almshouse.
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enforcement thus applied only to parents who had been forced to abandon
their illegitimate child to relief.
In spite of the assumption of Elizabethan Poor Law tradition in the
Commonwealth, the early Massachusetts laws dealt gently with the putative
father. Illegitimate children were required by law to follow their
mother's legal settlement, freeing the father from the stigma associated
with bastardy.1 It also often resulted in his freedom from support duties.
If a mother had been convicted of a crime, her testimony against the
father of her child would not be accepted in court.2 Although this pro-
vision was apparently designed to protect non-poor fathers from the
accusations of "wanton" women, it also had the effect of reducing the
child's chances of obtaining paternal support. The father was effectively
freed from both the stigma and responsibilities associated with an illegi-
timate child. The putative father might be pursued for support, but that
undertaking generally depended on the mother and was often futile as a
means of gaining support. Until the 20th century, these children were
also unable to inherit from their fathers, only from their mothers, so
that the father was not only free from prosecution under the law, but
also from future support claims on his property.
1. Legitimate children always followed the legal settlement of their
father, as did wives their husbands. However, illegitimate children
were required to follow their mother's residency (Massachusetts Statutes
of 1789). Thus, the full support responsibility most commonly fell on
the mother of the child. Although this residency requirement was re-
pealed in the late 18th century (Massachusetts Statutes of 1794, Ch. XXIV),
the custom remained for these children to reside with their mothers.
2. Province Laws of 1735, Ch. LXVI, Section 2.
3. Revised Laws of Massachusetts, Ch. LXXXII.
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The earliest development in the legal status of the illegitimate
child occurred as a result of a desire to lessen the public burden of
support of these children and their mothers. Once a child became relief-
dependent, the enforcement of support was relentless. As in feudal
England, both parents were charged with. the maintenance of the child,
a provision which did not apply to the mother, however, unless she was
on relief. Thus, the support obligation existed at law for poor mothers
only. Given the church and public attitudes toward disgraceful illegiti-
macy, where even the separation of mother and child had been encouraged
to avoid scandal and disgrace, it was natural that the law should seek
to adjust the mother's grievance against the father. Therefore, the
primary responsibility for the child's support was placed with the father,2
although the mother was required by law to "assist" in that effort.3
If the child was on relief, the father was charged with "giving bond
... to perform the order (for support] to indemnify and save harmless
against all charges of maintenance any town which might be chargeable with
the maintenance of such child", and he could be sentenced to prison for
non-compliance with any court order for support of the child. If he
claimed extreme poverty, the mother or the town of the child's legal
1. Vivori v. Fourth District Court of Berkshire (1948) 28 N.E. 2d. 9,
323 Mass. 336.
2. Until 1913, when both parents were charged with support responsibility.
3. Massachusetts Statutes of 1785, Ch. LXVI, Section 2. This provision
remained in all future laws governin2 the maintenance. of bastard children:
Acts of 1825, Ch. CLXXIII; Acts of 1836, Ch. XLIX, Section 4; Acts of
1360, Ch. LXXII, Section 7; Acts of 1382, Ch. LXXXV, Section 15; and
Acts of 1902, Ch. LXXXII, Section 15.
4. Province Laws of 1785 Ch. LXVI, Section 2.
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settlement could, after his liberation from prison, recover by action
of debt any sum of money which ought to have been paid by the father to
them under a prior court order. In general, a father could settle his
liability for an illegitimate child by payment of a lump sum, after which
he would be free from all future liability.
The control of the relief agency bringing the action against the
father was further sealed by the fact that a mother could be forced to
testify against a father.2 Moreover, no complaint brought before the
court could be "withdrawn, dismissed, or settled by agreement of the
mother and putative father without consent of the Overseers of the Town
unless provision was made to the court's satisfaction to relieve and
indemnify any parent, guardian, town, city, or the state, from all
charges that [had] or might accrue for the maintenance of the child". 3
The court could waiver penalties in cases where the father had sufficient
income to maintain the illegitimate child to the court's satisfaction.
A second provision in the 1860 law ensured that "no [money] settlement
made by the mother and father [for child support] ... shall relieve the
father from liability to any town, city, or the state, for support of the
4
bastard child". Although these provisions gave some measure of protection
1. Added by amendment to Massachusetts Statutes of 1825, Ch. CLXXIII,
Section 6.
2. Acts of 1860, Ch. LXXII, Section 8.
3. Ibid. Section 9.
4. Ibid. Section 10 re-affirmed by Acts of 1882, Ch. LXXXV, and Acts of
1902, Ch. LXXXII.
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to the mother and child, the fact that penal sanctions were applied in
relief cases only suggests that the protection of the taxpayer was of
paramount importance. Further support is lent to this theory by the
fact that where a mother refused to testify against the putative father,
another person was entitled to do so. In fact, by 1902 the only parties
to be safeguarded against future maintenance costs for the illegitimate
child were to be the mother's parents (not the mother herself) and the
2
state or relief agency supporting the child. Gradually, the state pre-
empted the mother's right to bring complaint into court against the father.
She may still do so, but her efforts would probably be unsuccessful in
obtaining support from the father unless the state were party to the
action. In summary, the mother required state assistance in the recovery
effort, while the state itself did not even need the mother in order to
recover from a putative father.
In 1913, the court judges of Massachusetts joined in drafting new
legislation governing the maintenance of bastard children.3 The thrust of
the new law was to strengthen the support provisions exercised by the public
on behalf of the child. As a result, we find the extension of support
liability to both parents of an illegitimate child, although penalties
for nonsupport continued to be applied to the father only. The prior
1. Acts of 1960, Ch. LXXII, Section 2. Prior to this time, the state
had been relatively unsuccessful in recovery of support costs from the
putative father because they were forced to rely on the mother's testimony.
2. Acts of 1902, Ch. LXXXII.
3. Acts of 1913, CG. 563.
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emphasis on the mother's damages against the father have shifted to a
new emphasis on the state's damages against both parents. Remedy for
nonsupport of illegitimates was thereby restricted to cases involving
children on relief. A parallel development was occurring at this time
in the case of support liability for legitimate children also: both
parents were now held liable in the event the child became relief-dependent.
In both support laws, the parties at interest in the action were the public
and the delinquent parent, rather than the deserted family and the delin-
quent parent. The state had gained full control over the process of
enforcement. It is not surprising to find that these laws of 1913 in no
way extended the actual support "rights" of the illegitimate child;2 the
only extension of rights was to state powers of enforcement.
1. Acts of 1902, Ch. LXXXI, Section 10: "The mother shall be under
the same obligation as the father, but she shall not be liable to
criminal prosecution for the enforcement of such obligation". Full
criminal liability would only be extended to both parents in 1977,
following the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (Massachusetts
Statutes of 1977, Ch. 848, #2, Amending Ch. 273A, Section 1, of the
General Laws.)
2. At common law, the putative father was under no obligation to sup-
port his illegitimate child (Commonwealth v. Dornes (1921), 132 N.E.
363/ 239 Mass. 592) until 1948, when a court ruling established this
duty at common law in a case involving an illegitimate child on relief
(Vivor.i v. Fourth District Court of Berkshire, 28 N.E. 2d, 9/323 Mass.
336).
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D. CHILD SUPPORT LEGISLATION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1620-1977
The Family
In contrast to the feudal system of England, the early colonial
system in Massachusetts gave far more emphasis in its laws to the main-
tenance of the family unit. The early structure of government consisted
of grouping the entire society into family units. No single person
could remain detached, and if the person was a minor, there had to be
some sort of sponsor for it. In the Bay Colony, the attachment of each
child to some family, and his or her continuance there in an occupation
which would later become self-sustaining, was sought by compulsion of
statute as early as 1642.2 In 1645, there appears a case in which it
was ruled that the child should be placed in a home, attached properly to
a respectable family, and should also have some form of occupation.3
By 1720, it was required that all single persons "under the age of twenty-
one years [shall not] be suffered to live at their own hand, but under
some orderly family government" . This emphasis on the family unit,
however, was not founded in a concern for the family per se, but reflected
the concern of the early colonists for the public costs of family neglect
1. Although the emphasis in both cases was founded on the same precept:
the family was viewed as the unit responsible for its members and their
welfare.
2. Charters and Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts,
Published by Order of the General Court (Boston 1814), Ch. XXII, p. 73.
Hereafter, this publication will be known as either Colony Laws (prior
to 1690) or Province Laws (post-1690); Records of the Plymouth Colony,
op.cit., "Court Orders" (circa 1625).
3. Records of Plymouth Colony, op.cit., vol. II, p. 86. This cases is
the first in which a father is forced to pay child support by order of a
Massachusetts court. Having left his child with a family, the father is
ordered to pay "all past board bills", setting a precedence for arrears.
4. Province Laws of 1720, Ch. CXXXV, Section 2 (p. 429).
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and abandonment. If the family was not held responsible for its own
members, for their maintenance and welfare, the responsibility and costs
of support would have to be assumed by the town in which the family re-
sided. In the following subsections of this Chapter, we will show how
the support rights of children, and support obligations of parents, were
closely tied to state interests in reducing local relief burdens in the
support of poor families. We find that enforcement of parental support
obligations occurs only when the family has become relief-dependent. We
also find that development of the support rights of children has been both
assisted, and restricted, by the discriminatory application of enforcement.
First we will examine the system of public relief, and how laws
for legal settlement, indenture of poor families, and liability of relatives
provided the means by which the state could reduce local relief burdens.
The uneasy alliance of children's support rights with state rights of
enforcement and cost recovery are discussed. We then trace the de-
velopment of parental support obligations under the law, demonstrating
how the enforcement of these obligations was restricted to poor parents
only, a bias which has persisted in the laws of Massachusetts to the pre-
sent day.
Public Relief and Settlement Laws
Although the poor family or individual has never had the right to be
supported by the community, in the sense that they might recover such
support by action at law, the English. system of public responsibility
for the support of the poor had been re-affirmed as a local responsibility
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within the Commonwealth. Towns and districts were empowered to raise
monies and to vote for alternate methods of raising the capital necessary
for this support. As the colony grew, each town became responsible for
its own poor exclusively. An almost immediate result of local relief res-
ponsibility was the development of a stringent system of settlement laws
in Massachusetts. 2
In 1639, only nine years after the founding of the Bay settlement,
the court had empowered "any shire court, or any two magistrates out of
court ... to determine all differences about the lawful settling and pro-
viding for poor persons; and to dispose of all unsettled persons [i.e.
those without legal settlement status] into such towns as they shall judge
to be most fit for the maintenance and employment of such persons and
families, for the ease of the countrr".3 A section added in 1675 further
empowered officials to "carefully provide that such men or women may be so
employed, and their children disposed of, [so] that the publick [sic.]
charge may be avoided". Thus, while the sole object of the first Plymouth
authorities may have been to secure correct family surroundings, and to
educate the child in the work ethic, there can be little doubt that in the
minds of the local town Selectmen the enforcement of child support and
1. Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, November 28, 1780 - February
28, 1807, vols. I-III, Acts of 1794 (February 26): An Act Providing For the
Relief and Support, Employment and Removal of the Poor: "Every town and
district in the Commonwealth shall ... relieve and support all poor and
indigent persons lawfully settled therein" (Section 1, p. 619).
2. In 1639, security was taken to protect local towns from relief costs by
prohibiting local residents from entertaining strangers or non-local resi-
dents without prior notification of a town Official of the Poor (Boston
Town Records, 2 Rep. Rec. Com. (1382) vol. I, pp.37, 95).
3. Colony Laws of 1639, Ch. LXXV, Section 1 (p. 173).
4. Ibid. Section 4 (p. 175).
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family obligations by town officials had their birth in the "underlying
intent to free the [local] settlement of the burden of support".
In order to avoid this burden, it was decreed in 1675 that towns
supporting a poor person who did not have local residency status could
collect damages from the pauper's town of legal residence, or else be sub-
2
sidized by the public treasury. In 1767, another law provided for the
defrayment of costs incurred in the removal of poor persons to their town
of legal residence. The costs were to be paid by the poor themselves,
or by the local constabulary (who would be reimbursed by the town), or by
3the Treasury of the Province of Massachusetts. Moreover, it was decreed
that poor persons could be denied relief if they did not have legal resi-
dency status within a town.4  The comprehensive settlement laws of 1794
would establish more stringent eligibility rules for the attainment of
legal residen'y status. Settlement status depended not only on the age,
1. Robert W. Kelso, The History of Public Poor Relief in Massachusetts,
1620-1920 (Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston, 1922), p.168.
2. Under the 1672 Articles of Confederacy (Article 13), a three-month rule
of inhabitancy was established as prerequisite for legal settlement in a
town. Laws would tighten as waves of new immigrants reached Massachusetts
(Province Laws of 1692, Ch. LXXXVI, Section 9). In 1791, new town arrivals
were being banned, see A. P. Marvin, History~of Lancaster (Boston 1879) p.346.
3. Province Laws of 1767, Ch. CCCVI, Sections 1 and 2 (pp. 662-663). Then
in Colony Laws of 1675, Ch. LXXV, Section 4: "Considering the inconveni-
ence and damage which may arise to particular towns ... forced to support
poor persons [from other towns], where necessary they shall be suplied out
of the Publick [sic.] Treasury" (pp. 174-175). In 1794, it was decreed
that: "In the case of strangers, the Overseers of the Poor in the town
shall provide for their immediate comfort and relief until their removal
to their place of lawful settlement ... Expenses incurred by the town
may be sued for and recovered, either in a civil action against the town.
[of lawful residency] or by complaint [criminal action] brought within two
years of incurring the expenses" (Acts of-1794, Section 9).
4. Province Laws of 1767, Ch. CCCVT, Section 4 (~p. 664): "No town shall be
obliged to be at charge for the relief and support of any person residing in
such town ... incorrectly settled". In 1772, the power to evict poor persons
was extended to all justices of the peace in the Commonwealth (Province Laws
of 1772, Ch. CCCXV, Section 1, pp. 674-675).
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citizenry, and religion, of a person, but also on their tax payment record,
and level of income.1 Persons of religion, as well as estated citizenry
and those persons successfully employed, were given preference in the dis-
pensing of legal residency status.2 Family background (i.e. the legal
residency of other family members) was also a consideration, particularly
where children were to be placed in the custody of one parent only.3
In addition, it was required that a person have remained independent of
public relief for a certain period of time. In later years, one would also
be required to have successfully supported one's family (i.e. no family
member on relief) in order to obtain legal settlement in a town.
Throughout the first two centuries of Massachusetts history, settle-
ment laws continued to reflect the concern to minimize local relief burdens.
Relief remained conditional upon the successful attainment of legal re-
sidency status in a town. No person could gain settlement in a town
while on relief, unless the person reimbursed the town for support costs
incurred in his or her behalf.5 In the 19th century a new prerequisite
for residency was introduced: the applicant was required to show evidence
1. Acts of 1794; An Act Ascertaining What Shall Constitute a Legal Settle-
ment of any Person in any Town or District of the Commonwealth So As To
Entitle Him to Support Therein in Case He Becomes Poor and Stands in Need
of Relief (Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, vol. II, pp. 606-607).
2. Employed adults were required to have been successfully employed for
three years in a town, minors for five years, in order to gain residency.
3. Legitimate children followed their father's legal settlement, as did
wives their husband's. Illegitimate children were. required to follow
their mother's legal settlement.
4. Although a wife was generally required to follow her husband's legal
settlement, where the husband was on relief, he was to follow the wifers
legal settlement (Acts of 1794, Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
vol. II, Section 2 (1), p. 606).
5. Massachusetts Statutes of 1879, Ch. CCXLII.
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that he could "support both himself and his dependents".1 Children of
unsettled poor were considered a major problem at this time.2 Where a
child was receiving relief, this was considered just as potent in pre-
venting the legal settlement of the parents as would be their own receipt
of public aid.3 The basis for this prohibition lay in the fact that the
father was legally bound to support his children,4 and one means of en-
forcing that obligation was the strict application of settlement rules for
eligibility.5
The first axiom of public relief in Massachusetts, then, was that the
responsibilitywas local. When public relief did become necessary, the
chief aim was to dispose of the poor as cheaply as possible. To be re-
lieved at all, the needy had to be in direct want for the necessities of
life, and such relief as was given was enough merely to sustain life. 6
In order to avoid high relief costs, not only were strict settlement
1. Massachusetts Statutes of 1825, Ch. XLIX.
2. In 1821, almost half the children on relief in Massachusetts were of
foreign birth or parentage.
3. Taunton v. Middleborough (1346), 53 Mass. 35.
4. Through the principles of consanguinity derived from the Elizabethan
Poor Laws.
5. Although it appears that settlement laws were strictly enforced only
in those cases involving persons on relief, where the granting of legal
residency could result in higher relief costs to the town.
6. Pauperism in the early days of the colony was often unavoidable. There
was little public outcry at the time over improper use of relief funds or
the funding of relief ineligibles. According to Piven and Cloward, OD.
cit., "the penalties of pauperism reinforced the coercive structure of
labor law" (p. 25). Relief payments were deliberately kept below market
wage levels to induce relief recipients to seek employment if they were
able to work, and to reduce the likelihood of creating a viable alter-
native in relief to wage work.
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laws in effect, but towns were also empowered by the legislature to
force poor parents to work in support of their children, and to indenture
the children themselves. They were also empowered to demand security
from a father against his later abandonment of his children to poverty
and to relief dependency. This applied also to security for the spouse
of a child who had come to reside in the town and who might be in need
of relief. Furthermore, all relatives of poor persons in both an ascen-
ding and descending line of consanguinity were liable for compensatory
payments to the town supporting the poor person(s). Amendments to these
laws generally expanded the support liability of relatives, increased
penal sanctions against nonsupporting parents of families on relief,
and provided for more effective control of enforcement and cost recovery
processes by the state.
The Support Liability of Relatives
The indenturing of poor children, and the use of bonds against
future poverty, were not the only means by which towns could recover
part of their relief costs. Towns were also able to recover payments
from relatives of the poor. In 1692, it was decreed that: "relations
of such poor impotent person(sl, in the line of father or grandfather,
mother or grandmother, children or grandchildren, [who] be of sufficient
1. The present system in Massachusetts providing poor relief to destitute
families (Aid To Families With Dependent Children) inherited many of its
features from early colonial relief legislation. This included provisions
for the pursuit of liable relatives, settlement eligibility rules, and
even the prerequisite of employment for a male parent who, together with
his family, is receiving relief.
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ability ... shall relieve such poor person[s]" in accordance with pro-
cedures established by local magistrates.1 In 1793, an amendment to this
law reduced the list of liable relatives to those "residing in the state
[of Massachusetts]". The liability of relatives was not held at common
law; only the relatives of poor persons on relief could be held liable.
By 1794, cost recovery through the provision for relatives' liability
could be initiated not only by a town, but also by any individual who had
supported a poor relative prior to their dependency on relief. Once the
person became relief-dependent, action to recover damages could begin.
Expanding the list of parties able to seek compensatory payments for
support costs3 was thus seen as one way in which poverty and relief de-
pendency among the marginally poor might be reduced. The 1793 amend-
ment was specifically designed to encourage support from relatives
before being compelled to do so by the town after the poor famil.y or the
1. Province Laws of 1692, Ch. XV, Section 9 (p. 251) was adopted from
43 Elizabeth 1, Ch. 2, with only the addition of a descending line of
consanguine liability. In 1675, the simple provision in the law for
the relief of poor persons was amended to include: "where necessity re-
quires, by reason of inability of relations, [poor persons] shall be
supplied out of the publick treasury" (Province Laws of 1675, Ch. LXXV,
Section 4, p. 174).
2. Province Laws of 1793, Ch. LIX, Section 3. The incentive for liable
relatives to escape their support responsibilities by fleeing the state
would remain in the law until the passage of the URESA (Uniform Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Support Act) provisions of 1951 which enabled the
interstate. enforcement of support obligations of parents.
3. Province Laws of 1764, Ch. CCCIII, Section 1 (p. 660). Care was
taken to avoid favoring particular relatives in the reimbursement of
support by placing a two-year limit on -the support period for which
relatives could recover. This period was later reduced to six months
(Acts of 1794, Section 2, p. 619).
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poor person had become relief-dependent. Supporting relatives could recover
costs and not be pursued for support, while nonsupporting relatives were pena-
lized. It was hoped also that the availability of some remedy to suppor-
ting relatives would equalize the burden of support among all liable re-
latives, even induce some spirit of cooperation through fear of future
penalty into nonsupporting relatives. However, the law worked primarily
to reduce, not the probability of poverty itself, but the chances that
poverty would lead to higher public relief costs.
It is interesting to note that persons who voluntarily elected to
support a pauper were not able to recover for expenses incurred unless
related to the pauper, although such support might reduce future relief
costs to the state. Just as a parent's support of a child, however, did
not guarantee automatic rights to the child's services, similarly support
2
of paupers did not automatically guarantee the right to cost recovery. In
one respect, this emphasized the support responsibility as primarily a
family one. But extending recovery rights to unrelated individuals would
undoubtedly have weakened the notion of relatives' liability under the
law. And for three centuries, the most common mode of child support en-
forcement would be the pursuit of relatives under the liability provision
3
of the law. The restriction of recovery rights to the state and liable
relatives ensured the reinstatement of public control over the disbursement
1. Voluntary charity was not recoverable at law on the grounds that it
was not authorized by poor law officials and did not result from their
negligence (tenBroek, op.cit., Part 1, p. 303).
2. The chances of fraudulent claims would probably be higher among non-
relatives.
3. tenBroek, op.cit., Part I, p. 283.
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of public relief funds.1 It also ensured that child support enforcement
remained a part of the family law of the poor, and that enforcement pro-
cedures would develop almost exclusively under the control of local ad-
ministrators of poor relief.
The Indenture System
Another means by which the state could relieve local burdens of
support of the poor was through the system of indenture or apprentice-
ship. Although the support duty of parents was in no way reciprocal
to a parent's rights to the services of a child, it is ironic that the
state did exercise such rights to services when it was supporting an in-
dividual on relief. The poor relief statutes of 16922 provided that the
Overseers of the Poor in each town would "take effectual care that all
children, youth, and other persons of able body within the town, not having
1. It has been argued that the restriction of recovery rights to re-
latives, and of support responsibility to relatives, insured the
spread of poverty among families of the poor. If the primary intention
of the law was to guarantee state control over the process of enforce-
ment and recovery, it succeeded to the extent that future child support
enforcement in the courts in Massachusetts has been primarily a matter
involving the state and delinquent parent. In this way, the law inhibited
the development of private enforcement rights at common law.
2. Province Laws of 1692, Ch. XV, Section 7 (p. 251).
66
estates to maintain themselves, do not live idly, but that they be em-
ployed in some honest calling, which may be profitable to themselves and
to the publick [sic.], or otherwise to bind out any poor children belonging
to the town".
The decrees of 1692 made careful distinction between poor and non-
poor parents in the application of sanctions for nonsupport. The parents
of poor children (those who had no estates or who were unemployed) were re-
quired to indenture their children or the town would do it for them. 2
A long-term indenture was thus one way of clearing off the town account
for a poor family's support. Either the employment of all family members
would ensure that they did not become relief-dependent, or, in the case of
the dependent poor, the town might recover some of its relief costs from
wages earned.
In 1703, these provisions were extended to include the children of
potentially poor persons in the town. Indenturing thus became a sort of
bond to save the town against the 'possible' relief dependency of the family.
Essentially, this broadened the definition of the class of poor to include
the potentially poor. The statute declared that town Overseers should
also indenture "all such children whose parents shall be thought by the
Selectmen ... unable to maintain them, whether they receive almes or are
1. Province Laws of 1692, Ch. XV, Section 7 (p. 251).
2. In 43 Elizabeth 1, Ch_ 2, #VI (1601), support responsibility for the
poor was extended to both propertied and non-propertied classes, with
substantial penalties for nonsupport. All children were required to be
indentured in England. In Massachusetts, however, uniform indenturing of
all children was not required by the statutes, and penalties applied only
to parents whose children were in danger of becoming relief-dependent.
Nevertheless, in the event of poverty, penalties in Massachusetts re-
sembled those of England: children would be sent to the house of correction
with their parent (usually the motherl if too young to be indentured
(Province Laws of 1720. Ch.-CXXV, Section 2, p. 429).
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chargeable to the town or not, so as they be not sessed [sic.] to publick
taxes or assessments, for the town or province charges". 1 By 1722, the
discretion of local officials had been broadened to allow demands for
security and the indenture of children of non-poor parents as well.
Overseers were empowered to deal with the idle who had estates in the same
way as the idle who were indigent, viz. to "put out into orderly families
their children, and to improve their estates, and to apply the produce
and income toward the support of them and their families".2  For the most
part, this sanction related to non-payment of taxes and other assessments
made by towns of its residents. The law was rarely employed for the en-
forcement of support of children of the estated, only where their children
had become relief-dependent. By 1794, the provision had been deleted from
the lawu. Specific groups of persons were to be included under the pro-
visions of indenture, but estated persons were not among them: unsettled
persons (i.e. those without legal residency in a town), unemployed persons,
persons without visible means of support, idle persons, and lewd persons
were required to indenture their children or show cause why they need not
do so.3 Non-poor or estated parents were thereby explicitly excluded from
support obligations toward their children by this law.
1. Province Laws of 1703, Ch. XIV, Section 1 (p. 429).
2. Province Laws of 1722, Ch. II.
3. Acts of 1794, Laws of the Commonwealth, o2.cit.: Persons bound out
"shall receive and apply their earnings, deducting reasonable charges
[for town expenses incurred] to the support of them and their families"
(Section 7, p. 623).
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By the 19th century, we find that the system of indenturing has be-
come a virtual slave trade for the poor and their children. In England,
employers had been forced to accept poor children as apprentices, accepting
it as their share of the local.burden of poor relief. In Massachusetts,
however, a more democratic system was quickly instituted. The custom in
most towns was to bid off the support of the town's poor at public auction.
Employers thereby had access to a convenient and cheap labor source through
the auction system. It was always understood that a contractor could get
as much labor out of the pauper or pauper's children as possible for his
2
money.
While the system certainly allowed more flexibility in the appor-
tioning of poor relief costs among local employers, it allowed no flexi-
bility whatsoever for the poor. Furthermore, the auction system indirectly
affected the employment prospects and long-term welfare independence of
workers not on relief, the marginal poor. The marginal poor were not
guaranteed employment during periods when the demand for labor was low.
As demand for labor rose, they now also faced fierce competition from low-
wage indigents who could be obtained through the auction system. One re-
sult of this may have been a greater incentive among marginal poor families
to 'abandon' their children to relief and the possible better care of the
state. Relief dependency might have been the only alternative to desti-
tution. Where a father found himself unable to provide adequate support
1. Old Records of the Town of Fitchburg. vol. 5, Selectmen's Report for
March, 1820.
2. Kelso, oD.cit., p. 107.
3. In feudal England, poor relief officials could force the apprenticeship
of local poor and their children on unwilling landowners (tenBroek, o_.cit_.,
Part I, pp. 280-231, notes- 109, 110).
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for himself and his family, he might be tempted to choose the in-
denture of his -children however meager its rewards, rather than endure
prolonged pauperism.
The Support Rights of Children
During the first two centuries of Massachusetts history, from 1-620
to 1820, there was no attempt to specify the parental duty to support
children as a legal obligation at common law, although the notion of
parental "moral responsibility" of English common law tradition was
assumed. The only laws which spoke of support as a duty were those which
dealt specifically with the poor, laws founded directly on the Elizabethan
Poor Laws. Enforcement of the support obligation, rather than the esta-
blishment of support rights, dominated the language of these laws. In
fact, virtually nothing was said on the matter of children's rights. If
there were assumed to be any such rights, they were clearly differentiated
from the parental support obligation under the law. The reason for this
was that the obligation was not based on the reciprocal rights of the
child, but on the well-documented rights of the state to tax liable rela-
tives in order to subsidize state support of poor children.
Throughout most of the 19th century, there was little change in the
support rights of children. At a time when U. S. Federal and State laws
were affirming the rights of the individual in most areas of the law,
relief legislation continued to embody the traditions of the Elizbethan
Poor Law, with its- restrictive practices subjecting the poor and their
families to public control. In the case of poor children rights, the
period was almost retrogressive. State control over support enforcement
1. Blackstone, op..cit., note 137 at 447.
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guaranteed full state discretion over the children of the poor. They
were adopted out, indentured, auctioned, and even incarcerated. In sum,
the support rights of the poor child had been subrogated to the support
enforcement and recovery rights of the state.
All neglected children, or children of poor parents, regardless of
their lawful settlement, were committed to the care and control of the
State Board of Relief by the courts. Under the state system of poor
relief, the child of a poor family, if not successfully indentured, was
automatically sent to an almshouse, most often together with the mother
of the child, where the poor kept company with criminals and other social
misfits. Children who were successfully indentured were able to support
themselves; those too young or unable to work were held in almshouses.
Illegitimates might be sent with their mothers to a house of correction
(i.e. jail). Such placements of poor children meant that there was no
pressure on the state to establish a formal system of adoption for the
poor. However, the growing numbers of children dumped in almshouses
began to cause public outcry.1
2
In 1820, the Quincy Report was presented to the Massachusetts legis-
lature, deploring the almshousing of neglected children and advocating
greater public supervision of poor and other disadvantaged children:
"Those who are poor and in infancy or childhood ... have a right to re-
quire from society a distinct attention and more scrupulous and precise
supervision. They may become blessings or scourges to society, their
course may be happy or miserable, honourable or disgraceful, according to
1. According to a report published in 1867, between 80% and 90% of all
children sent to almshouses died there, an atrocity which continued
throughout the century (Third Report of the Board of State Charity (1367),
p. lxix).
2. House Documents (Boston 1820) No. 46.
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the specific nature of the provision made for their support and
education". Thus, for the first time in Massachusetts, poor children
are assumed to have a right to support by the state.2 In addition,
Quincy suggests that state negligence, rather than some inherent pathology
in the poor child, may well be responsible for the childt s future mal-
adjustment to society. .The view was clearly ahead of the legislators of
the time. Alsmhousing, the indenture system, and the social alientation
of poor children continued.3
In the absence of a state adoption agency, the State Relief Board
began a program of subsidizing women who took in state wards or other
children dependent on the state for their support.4 If the town Overseers
of the Poor failed to place poor children in private homes, the State
Board of Charity would place the children in private homes at the town's
expense. Previous efforts to place children had had mixed success. Towns
eager to defray local relief costs preferred to indenture children in
order to obtain the auction bid for the local coffers. Moreover, there
was little incentive until the act of 1882 for respectable families to
assume responsibility for the children of poor parents. In most cases,
the children had been exposed to the worst elements of society within
the almshouses and jails. In 1889, another law was passed granting
1. House Documents (Boston 1820) No. 46.
2. We might question whether this so-called "right" was not in fact a
perversion of the assumed right of the state to interfere and control the
lives of poor families. The language of the Report suggests this may be
true: the right to state support was conditional upon the right of the
state to "supervise" and control the lives of poor children.
3. The only positive response to the Quincy Report was the segregation
of poor children from other almshouse inmates, with the exception of
"stubborn children" who would be placed together with oersons "who do not
provide for themselves or their families", i.e.in jail (Acts of 1825,
Ch. CLI, #2).
4. Family placement provisions were passed in Acts of 1882, Ch.LXXXIV,##1,2.
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licenses to boarding houses'for abandoned or neglected children. Although
partial subsidies were offered by the state to boarding houses, the
majority of poor children continued to be sent to almshouses.
The law of 1882 provided that: "the Overseers in every city shall
place every pauper child in their charge over four years of age in some
respectable family in the state, to be supported there by the city".'
Towns were able to escape this fiscal responsibility through various ex-
emptions inserted in the law. A later section of the same law allows
exemptions also in cases where the family is unable to support the pauper
child "without inordinate expense" 2 Disabled children were therefore
excluded from home placement provisions. The law then states that home
placements do not include "state pauper children" (i.e. those on relief).3
The law thus stood for only those children of parents who were not already
pauperized themselves, only for those who had incurred some misfortune
which prevented them from providing adequate support for their children.
The children of poor parents were to be treated under the law in exactly
the same way as their neglectful parents, and sent to jail or to alms-
houses. In distinguishing carefully between those eligible for adoption
and those ineligible, the law effectively excludes poor children from its
provisions. The so-dalled " right" of poor children to state support
referred to in the Quincy Report should therefore be interpreted as only
1. Acts of 1882, Ch. LXXXIV, Section 1.
2. Ibid. Section 4; cf. Acts of 1887, Ch. 401. "Inordinate expense"
is not defined in the law, and we may assume fairly broad discretion on
the part of local officials in its interpretation. In addition to dis-
abled children, it could refer to "stubborn" children as well.
3. Ibid. "No child who can be cared for [through family placement] with-
out inordinate expense may be placed in the almshouse, unless [the child]
is a state pauper, or idiotic, or otherwise so defective in body or mind."
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a right for non-poor children, and a privilege for poor children.
One result of the distinctions made under the law between poor and
non-poor was the creation of a specific class of poor. Another was the
perpetuation of the stigma of relief dependency. Pauperism, together
with physical and mental disability, reflected some sort of pathology
associated with the whole class of poor families, a pathology which could
only be purged by hard work. In this way, the rights to support of poor
children were directly tied to the services which they could supply the
society or state, specifically their wage work. The system of indenture
and almshousing was seen as one way of insuring that poor children would
have the opportunity to so "purge." themselves, in spite of their exposure
to criminals presumably. The laws thereby perpetuated the myth of poverty
as a disease which could be cured only by the diligence of the poor them-
selves. To summarize, the differentiation of poor from non-poor children
under the laws governing adoption, settlement, employment, and illegitimacy,
strongly suggests that the primary purpose of these laws was not the de-
velopment of children's support rights. In addition to the discriminatory
application of enforcement against poor parents only, these laws suggest
that the primary concern was fiscal.
Parental Support Obligations
The parental obligation to support, unlike state support of poor
children, was in no way tied to parental rights to the services of a child.
That is, the parent was legally obligation to support regardless of whether
the child obeyed the parent. However, various relationships governing the
1. Kelso, op.cit., p. 175.
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child were analogous to that of a servant. The parental duty to train
a child in an employable skill, to educate the child in writing, reading,
religion, and arithmetic,2 applied equally to masters and apprentices as
well as parents and their children. However, just as children did not
develop rights to support at common law, neither was the parental support
responsibility regarded by the courts as a legal obligation.3 The courts
entered non-poor family relationships only reluctantly, so that most cases
of support enforcement occurred between the state and the poor parent.
The courts did not exercise their powers of amendment in the matter of
child support until the late 19th century, and even then showed great re-
luctance to issue new rulings. 4  In the following subsection, we will show
how this reluctance by the courts did not extend to cases involving poor
families. Indeed, the courts would apply the full force of child support
enforcement laws against parents whose children were relief recipients.
Although the 19th century did not witness any real advances in terms
of the support rights of children, nevertheless parental support obligations
under the law were extended considerably -- at. least- for poor parents.
Following the Quincy Report of the early 1800s, legislation dealing speci-
fically with the parental support duty was proposed. Previously, support
1. The Selectmen of each town were entitled to punish all "children and
servants (who] behave themselves disobediently and disorderly toward their
parents, masters, or governors, to the disturbance of families" (Colony Laws
of 1642, Ch. XXII, Sections 1 and 2, p. 74).
2. In 1642, it was decreed that "all masters of families ... catechize
their children and servants in the grounds and principles of religion, and
all parents and masters do breed and bring up their children and apprentices
in some honest lawful calling, labour, or employment" (Ibid. Section 1).
3. At common law, the support obligation was based on a "voluntary assump-
tion ... implicit in the act of begetting" (tenBroek, op.cit., Part I, p.305).
4. For a complete account, see F. Hall, "The Common Law: An Account of Its
Reception In the United States", 4 Vanderbilt Law Rev. (1951) p. 791.
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provisions had been appended to other acts governing the poor and their
families. Toward the end of the century, in addition to laws governing
the support of paupers and the maintenance of bastard [sic.] children,1
a new law was passed for the better protection of children (amended in
1885 to 'wives and children').2 That the legislature deemed it necessary
to create a separate child support law indIcates the degree to which the
problem of poverty among deserted families had become a major public con-
cern. The new legislation was not in response to higher levels of poverty
per se, but rather to the increased numbers of such families which were
dependent on relief.3 As we might have expected from discussion in the
previous subsection, the actual support rights of children were not sig-
nificantly affected by this bill.
The statute of 1882 provided that: "any parent who abandons a child
less than two years of age in the Commonwealth or who, having made a
contract or provision for the board or maintenance of such child, absconds
or fails to perform such contract or provision, [without] visiting or re-
moving the child within four weeks thereafter, [and without] notifying the
Overseers of the Poor of the city or town where such parent resides of his
1. Massachusetts Statutes of 1825, Ch. XLIX: An Act Providing For the
Maintenance of Bastard Children.
Massachusetts Statutes of 1860, Ch. LXX: An Act Providing For the
Support of Paupers by Cities and Towns; and Ch. LXXII: An Act Providing
For the Maintenance of Bastard Children.
Massachusetts Statutes of 1882,- Ch. LXXXIV: An Act Providing For the
Support of Paupers by Cities and Towns; Ch. LXXXV: An Act Providing For
the Maintenance of Bastard Children; and Ch. CCLXX: An Act Providing For
the Better Protection of Children.
Massachusetts Statutes of 1884, Ch. CCX: An Act Providing For the
Better Protection of Children.
2. Massachusetts Statutes of 1885, Ch. CLXXVI: An Act Providing For the
Better Protection of Wives and Children.
3. There were several reasons for increased family poverty: the Civil War
had produced many fatherless homes, concentrated waves of new immigrant
workers created severe unemployment, and the repeal of child labor laws
reduced family earnings.
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or her inability to support such child, shall be punished by imprisonment
not exceeding two years".' A second section applied only to parents of
illegitimate children, who were to provide the town Overseers of the
Poor with all information concerning the child's parentage and legal
residence of parents and relatives.2 A third, and broader, provision
of the 1882 Act governed the support obligations of both parents for their
minor children: "Whoever unreasonably neglects to provide for the support
of his minor child or children shall be punished by a fine ... or imprison-
ment."3 In 1885, the law was amended to include wives as well as minor
children: "Whoever unreasonably fails to provide for the support of his
wife or minor child ... ".4 In spite of the fact that support obligations
now covered both spouses, only the husband was liable for enforcement
under the law. While the husband was alive, the mother was not legally
liable for the support of her children. Consequently, public support
to her children would not pauperize her, nor prevent her from gaining
legal residency.5
1. Acts of 1882, Ch. CCLXXII, Section 1 continues: "unless such in-
ability (to support] arises from physical or mental disability [of
the parent]".
2. Ibid. Section 2.
3. Ibid. Section 4. Note that the basic provision of the law is for
"reasonable", not "adequate", support. Courts have shown wide variation
in their interpretation of what constitutes "reasonable support", while
the discretion is wide for state officials in determining support levels.
The focus is on enforcement of the obligation, rather than on the right
to support of the family. On the other hand, "unreasonable neglect" is
simpler to establish. If a family is on relief, the burden of proof is
on the father to prove he has contributed reasonably to their support.
This clause now forms the basis of current enforcement law in Massachusetts
(Section 1 of Chapter 273A of the Massachusetts General Laws: An Act
Governing Desertion, Nonsupport, and Illegitimacy).
4. Acts of 1885, Ch. CLXXVI, Section 1.
5. Gleason v. Boston (1887), 144 Mass. 25.
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In placing the full support responsibility on the father, maintaining
a distinction between the duties of the parents, the law tended to in-
stitutionalize existing family roles: the fathers as providers for the
family, the mothers as caretakers. The law of 1885 clearly states that
mothers are to be considered equally as dependent as children in the
event of marital dissolution or desertion. While the realities of
society suggest this was a reasonable assumption to make, nevertheless
by not challenging the more fundamental reasons for the dependency of
women, the law served in some ways to institutionalize that dependency.
At the same time, husbands were granted certain freedoms by the
courts in the event of marital dissolution. It was difficult for wives
to separate from their husbands without impunity. Wives were required
to have "just cause" for deserting their husbands, but not vice versa.
Various forms of abuse on the part of the husband were tolerated by the
courts (for example, persistent unfaithfulness, physical abuse, and so on).
Few wives could exercise legal leverage, or indeed had sufficient funds
to leave their husbands. Divorce laws thereby tended to worsen the eco-
nomic vulnerability of the mother.
On the other hand, if a husband abandoned his wife, and could prove
"just cause" for doing so, 2 he might be relieved of his support respon-
sibilities toward her. In some sense, her support rights depended on the
services she rendered. If the family was on relief, however, the father
rarely escaped, as we shall demonstrate in the following subsection.
1. Following the passage~of the Equal Rights Amendment in Massachusetts,
support :esnonsibility was extended to mothers as well as fathers
(Massachusetts statutes of 1977, Ch. 848, #2).
2. "Just cause" workc& against the mothcr's interest in two ways: (i) the
burden of proof rested on her to show "just cause" if she wished to leave
her husband, but (ii) if he left her for "just cause" she would have to
prove his action was unjustified in order to obtain support.
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Similarly, a mother was not deemed liable for child support while her
husband lived, she was not exempted from liability under the principle
of consanguinity. Therefore, if her child became dependent on relief
she too would be liable for support. Nor was the mother exempted from
full support responsibility if she was unmarried, widowed, or divorced.
Her liability was restricted, however, because under the law only the
father was subject to penal sanctions for nonsupport (i.e. fine or im-
prisonment).
Until the 1977 law which extended support responsibility to the
mother, little change occurred in the laws governing parental support.
The separation of the parental support responsibility increased over the
century. As women were emancipated, they gained more control over their
property, their marriages, and their children. Whereas before a father
was automatically granted child custody in the event of marital disso-
lution, now the mother was almost invariably granted custody in these
cases. One consequence of this was that courts came to see women as more
financially dependent within the family network, more dependent on a
provider's income, and so they began to rule in favor of wives seeking
alimony and child support.2
In 1906, the father's liability was extended beyond the wife's to
include abandonment of the family: "Whoever unreasonably neglects to
provide for the support of his wife or minor child, or who actually
1. The ERA cleared the path for fathers to openly contest court custody
decisions which favored the mother.
2. A list of court rulings which resulted in major changes in remedy
for nonsupport at common law is provided in Appendix A.
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abandons them in danger of becoming a burden upon the public ... "l shall
be punished. "Proof of neglect to provide for the support of a wife or
minor child [shall be] prima facie evidence that such neglect [was]
unreasonable."2 In 1884, it had been decreed that "all fines imposed
under this section be paid in part or in whole to the town, city, cor-
poration, society, or person actually supporting such minor child at the
'3time of making the complaint [against the parent]". In 1906, it was
further decreed that fines, or sums paid under a court order for support,
could also be paid "to the Treasury of the Commonwealth for the use of
the State Board of Charity, if the minor child has been committed to
said board".4 The language of these laws leaves little doubt that the
provisions were designed to protect the state from the responsibility
and burden of support of the deserted child. 5
1. Acts of 1906, Vh. 501, Section 1. The addition of this clause re-
lating to the avoidance of public burdens of support precludes the
possibility that reliance on the state for the support of the family
could be considered reasonable.
2. Acts of 1893, Ch. 262: An Act Relating To Evidence in Proceedings
for Neglect to Support a Wife or Minor Child (amending Acts of 1882,
Ch. 270, Section 4); cf. Acts of 1902, Ch. 212, Section 45.
In 1929, the following prima facie evidence was decreed admissable:
"A decree or judgement of a probate court establishing the right of
the wife to live apart, or of her freedom to convey and deal with her
property, or the right to custody of the children" (Acts of 1929, Ch. 258,
Section 1; cf. Acts of 1931, Ch. 226, Section 1).
3. Acts of 1884, Ch. 210, Section 1 (amending Acts of 1882, Ch. 270,
Section 4).
4. Acts of 1906, Ch. 501, Sections 2, 4. This provision has remained
in effect in all cases involving children who are recipients of welfare
(AFDC) grants in the Commonwealth.
5. Although the provisions allowed for "complaints to be made by the
wife or any other person to the municipal, district, or police court,
or trial justice of the district [in which the couple resided]", thereby
recognizing the fact that common law remedy was virtually non-existent,
they in no way pre-empted the position of the relief board as the primary
part of interest in the action at law (Acts of 1905, Ch. 502, Section 5;
Acts of 1907, Ch. 266 amending Revised Laws, Ch. 162, Section 19).
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Child Support Enforcement
In the uncompromising view taken by the early settlers of
Massachusetts that the family was the responsible social unit, there
was naturally little tolerance for nonsupport of children. The colonial
administrators were quick to develop sanctions against desertion, ex-
tending the Poor Law provisions to cover the threat of desertion as
well as actual desertion. For the most part these sanctions were em-
ployed only -in the event that a child became dependent on public relief.
As we have illustrated in the previous subsection of this Chapter, the
father of the family was then compelled by statute to support his de-
pendents, and failing therein was himself frequently forced to employ-
ment, his children apprenticed, and the family unit broken up. In
general, "failure to support" was synonymous with relief dependency.
In previous subsections we have outlined the use of indenture and
other penalties for unsupporting parents. In this subsection we will
show major development in the laws governing enforcement in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The present system of poor relief to
deserted families, poor families, or families with unemployed parents,
has inherited many of its features from the early colonial legislation
governing child support enforcement, for example, the pursuit of liable
relatives, settlement eligibility rules, the employment prerequisite for
the male parent of a family on AFDC, and the use of fines (arrears pay-
ments) and imprisonment against nonsupporting fathers.
1. In Massachusetts and several other states (viz. New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia, Missouri, and Arizona), the
enforcement of child support is almost exclusively restricted to
cases involving families on relief.
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Given the unwilling poverty of the early settlers of the Colony,
nonsupport was not always wilful. But the early administrators continued
to apply strict penalties for nonsupport without distinguishing between
poverty caused by idleness or disaffection and that which was unavoidable.
In 1658, towns were directed to appoint two or three men to determine
futures for unsupported children, regardless of the causes of their poverty:
"to dispose of them as they shall see meet, soe [sic.] as they may be com-
fortably provided for".1 The attachment of children to a respectable
family in some occupation that would become self-sustaining had already
been sought by compulsion of statute as early as 1642,2 and these injunc-
tions were followed by a provision which stated that, parents or masters
failing, the authorities themselves would place the children out to
better advantage. In 1672, the warning was re-issued by the Plymouth
court: failure to support would result in the indenturing of children in
the poor family.3
The threat of poverty, as well as actual poverty, was encompassed by
the laws governing the support obligations of parents. While a father had
no right to prevent the marriage of his child, fathers were quite uniformly
required to give bond to the town against the possible future dependency
of sons or daughters by marriage who came to reside with him, or else
1. During these early decades of the Colony, the English Poor Law officials
continued to dump their undesirables on their colonies. Between 1617 and
1619 it was recorded that 100 children had been shipped from London to
Virginia (W. A. Bewes, Church Briefs (1617) p. 96 quotes the Records of
St. Alphage, London Wall).
2. Colony Laws of 1642, Ch. XXII (p. 73); Records of the Colony of
Plymouth, o.cit., p. 111.
3. Ibid. vol. 5, pp. 85, 116. By 1692, local town constables and officials
were themselves penalized by a fine if they were derelict in their duty to
indenture poor children (Colony Laws of 1692, Ch. XV, p. 250).
4. Colony Laws of 1641, Ch. XXII: An Act Respecting Children and Youth,
Section 6 (p. 76).
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ensure that the offending stranger or relative leave the town.1 Similar
precautions were also recorded in a case ruling which decreed that a
father had to "pay for his child's keping [sic.], and promises to bind his
house in securitie so that [the child] shall be noe further chargeable to
the towne".2  By 1692, it was decreed that any person who entertained a
non-resident, whether related to that person or not, "shall be the town's
securitie in their behalf, and shall be obliged to relieve and support
them in case of need". 3 Once on public relief, a recipient was required
to make all possible return to the public, and invariably his children
were indentured.4 The support obligation of the poor parent was therefore
an obligation to the public as much as to the child.
Few changes occurred in these provisions until the late 1880s. The
1382 statute5 provided for the stricter enforcement of support through
the attachment of assets, garnishment of wages, and more effective pro-
cedures for pursuit of delinquent parents. Several significant changes
were made at this time to the language of the statute regarding the
parental support obligation which would guarantee greater discretion for
relief officials bringing a nonsupport complaint into court. In 1909,
the law was amended to read: "Any person, being under legal [civil or
6
criminal I duty to support his wife, or of his or her minor child or
1. Records of the Town of Dorchester (January 1670) offers some early
examples.
2. Boston Town Records, 2 Rep. Rec. Com. Boston, p. 107; Idem. 3 Rep. Rec.
Com. Boston, p. 55. A wealth of other instances may be found in the re-
cords of local towns in Massachusetts during this period.
3. Province Laws of 1692. Ch. XV, Section 9 (p. 252).
4. Records of Plymouth Colony, op.cit., December 7, 1641.
5. Massachusetts Statutes of 1882, Ch. 270.
6. Acts of 1925, Ch. 216: "No civil proceeding in any court shall be held
to be a bar to a [criminal] prosecution hereunder for desertion or nonsupport".
83
children, unreasonably neglects to provide suitable support, or abandons
or leaves any of them in danger of becoming a burden upon the public, or
any parent ... whose minor child, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunken-
ness, habits of crime, or other vice of such parent, is growing up without
salutory control or education, or without proper physical care, or in
circumstances exposing [the child] to lead an idle and dissolute life"1
[shall be punished]. A second law threatened the dissolution of the poor
family. The burden of proof was placed on the parent to "show cause why
such child ... should not be committed to the State Board of Charity". 3
The language is reminiscent of early legislation governing poor
families in Massachusetts Colony which, as we have shown, strove to create
similar distinctions between those poor for whom the law was intended and
all other persons. The class of poor has been gradually expanded to in-
clude the idle, disabled, unemployed, poor, unsettled poor, unattached5
women, unwed parents, and now the drunken, criminal, and otherwise neg-
lectful parent. The statute expands the rights of children, as well as
the duties of parents. However, in practice the law was exercised against
those on relief, or those in imminent danger of relief dependency. The
unwilling poor parent was classed together with parents who criminally
abused, or neglected, their children.
1. Acts of 1909, Ch. 180 (amending Acts of 1906. Ch. 501, Section 1):
An Act Relating To the Support of Wives and Children.
2. In 1911, the father's liability was tempered by the inclusion of a
provision for "just cause" in cases of desertion or abandonment (Acts of
1911, Ch. 456, Sections 1-7). Neglect must by wilful and without just
cause to warrant criminal liability on the part of the father (Section 7).
3. Acts of 1909 Ch. 181: An Act Relative to the Care of Neglected Children.
4. Usually new immigrants.
5. Single, divorced, or widowed women were specifically included in the
support liability.
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In 1954, the clause would be amended as follows: "Any parent, guar-
dian, or custodian of a minor child who ... fails to provide necessary
physical, educational, moral care or guidance, or who permits the child
to grow up under circumstances or conditions damaging to the child's
sound character development, or who fails to provide proper attention
for said child"1 [shall be punished]. Broad discretion was available
to officials determining."wilful neglect", but invariably a positive de-
termination involved the father of a welfare-dependent family. Although
other criteria could be used, such as "damaging circumstances" or in-
adequate "physical or moral care",2 the primary criteria for child support
enforcement was still welfare dependency. In this respect, the support
laws had showed virtually no change over three and a half centuries of
legislative history.
The exclusivity of child support as laws which governed poor families
only was evidenced in the 1950 URESA bill, including the so-called Noleo
Amendment.3 This required AFDC case workers to notify the appropriate
law enforcement officials whenever an AFDC case involving paternal de-
sertion was opened. The full force of the support laws would continue to be
4
brought against fathers of families on welfare. No similar provision was
made for fathers who had deserted non-welfare families. The support obli-
gations of poor parents were thereby institutionally determined: relief
extended to the family would be conditional upon the mother's full
1. Massachusetts Statutes of 1954, Ch. 539.
2. Poverty invariably requires some form of compromise in the care of, or
attention to, family. Proof of criminal neglect was far easier to esta-
blish as a result.
3. Massachusetts Statutes of 1950, Ch. 273A: The Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act.
4. The interest of the state in the support relationship is evidenced by
the availability of additional remedies for the collection of support pay-
ments from fathers associated with families on welfare (28 Baylor Law Rev.
(1976) p. 197, 199).
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cooperation in enforcing child support against the absent father. The
mother herself was excluded from initiating any action at law in pursuit
of child support, She was required to assign all such rights to support
to the Welfare Department. Support enforcement initiative and control
had been pre-empted by the agency providing her and her children with
support.
Summary and Conclusions
The early assumption of the role of support enforcer by the state
of Massachusetts was an inevitable part of its assumption of the role of
support provider. Support enforcement against fathers of families on
relief had as its primary purpose the avoidance of welfare dependency,
and where a family was already dependent on public assistance, the partial
or full recovery of public support costs incurred. Enforcement provisions
carefully distinguished between the dependent and independent poor in de-
termining those eligible for pursuit. Support laws were therefore in-
tricately involved with other laws governing the poor and their families:
settlement laws, indenture laws, labor laws, etc., which served to re-
inforce the support obligations of poor parents. It was not surprising
that support enforcement developed as a law governing poor parents only.
The relative absence of remedy for nonsupport at common law, and various
institutional mechanisms, ensured its development as a law of, and for,
the poor.
1. At common law, a mother was entitled to bring action against the
father on her own behalf, or that of her children. However, once on
relief, she suffered the loss of this right. In a real sense, rights to
support were abrogated by state rights to enforcement and recovery.
State rights to recovery were subrogated to the support rights of the
family [i.e. welfare surport rightsj to the extent of payments made to
the family by the Welfare Department (Massachusetts General Laws, Ch. 18,
Section 21, 1973).
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The child support enforcement role assumed by the state also guaran-
teed the early development of a whole host of rules and procedures gover-
ning the support obligation of poor parents, together with an elaborate
machinery for the enforcement of support orders in the Commonwealth.
State intervention into the family ifairs of the poor has been justified
on the grounds that the state is recovering damages in behalf of the
family on relief. All support payments collected, however, go directly
to the State Treasury for re-appropriation. The family itself cannot re-
cover support while on relief, nor even initiates the action at law against
the absent father. Indeed, the assumption of state prerogative in the
enforcement process has occurred in sharp contrast to the slow development
1
of support rights at common law. State intervention in enforcement of
support has also been justified on the grounds that strict application
of the laws governing support obligations of poor fathers will induce
non-delinquent behavior in the future. In Chapter Five, we analyze data
on the support payment responses of low-income fathers in New Bedford,
Massachusetts. The evidence suggests stongly that delinquency behavior
is independent of level of enforcement. 2
Modern laws governing child support and its enforcement in Massa-
chusetts today are a direct reflection of the earliest legislative efforts
in the Colony. First, they have reinforced the enforcement and recovery
1. The tendency for support enforcement to remain the almost exclusive
prerogative of poor relief officials, wherein litigation occurred between
the relief officials and the offending father, served to further undermine
any potential development of remedy for nonsupport at common law.
2. Although payment compliance levels do appear to vary according to the
mode of enforcement (i.e. informal agreements, probate court orders, and
district or criminal. court orders for support).
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rights of the state rather than to preserve or extend the support rights
of the family. In some sense, nonsupport did not constitute a crime:1
damage for nonsupportwas not automatically granted, nor were nonsupporting
or negligent parents automatically penalized. Although a mother has the
right to bring criminal complaint against the father of her children,
the courts have shown reluctance to establish "adequate" support orders,
maintaining the criteria of what is "reasonable" support to expect from
the father. The costs of private court action are prohibitive, and chances
of obtaining support on a regular or adequate basis remote, If a mother
is on relief, she loses her rights to bring such action into court.
In a very real sense, child support laws were enforceable only where the
family was on relief, The state's.interests in these cases insured strict
application of the support laws.
Second, in order to maintain state control over the disbursement of
2
public relief funds and processes of enforcement and recovery, support
laws have traditionally distinguished between the eligible poor and in-
eligible poor in the application of penalties for nonsupport. Originally,
the unemployed, idle, criminal, and un-married were specifically included
in enforcement provisions of the law, Later, the provisions would include
unattached mothers, single, divorced, or widowed. Today, they also cover
parents who have shown criminal neglect or abuse of their children. But
the single, universal criteria for inclusion in the list of enforcement
eligibles was poverty, or more specifically, relief dependency. Even
1. In fact, until the 1800s, deserted families had no clear rights to
support from a deserting or negligent parent.
2. Where the family is on relief, any support payments recovered are used
to reimburse the state up to the amount paid to the family (Massachusetts
General Laws, Ch. 18, Section 21, 1973).
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today, state interest in support enforcement involving non-welfare
families is negligible in the Commonwealth.1 Finally, the restriction
of support enforcement proceedings to actions at law between relief
officials and the nonsupporting parent, to the exclusion of the mother
and family, reduced the potential for private remedy while guaranteeing
the control of the state over the process of enforcement and recovery.
1. In part this is due to the strong traditions of enforcement law within
the realm of welfare, or poor, law. As we shall show in Chapter III.,
it is also due to the relative lack of equivalent financial incentives in
non-welfare enforcement. Aside from a small service fee, no support
payments collected on behalf of the non-welfare family may be retained by
the state. The Federal and state governments share collections made on
behalf of welfare families,
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CHAPTER III
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS
A. INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter, we will outline the development of child support
enforcement programs in the United States up to the most recent legis-
lation of 1975 (P.L.93-647).1  The major objective of enforcement pro-
visions has been to reduce expenditures under the Aid To Families With
Dependent Children (AFDC) program by maximizing the recovery of support
payments. Support payments recovered pursuant to these provisions were
to be used either to reimburse the states for assistance payments to
eligible families where the sum recovered was less than the amount of the
family's welfare grant, or to enable the state to terminate assistance
to families for whom support payments recovered exceeded their welfare
grant.3 In February of 1979, it was reported that an AFDC rollback of
19,000 families in 29 states had been achieved through the Child Support
Enforcement Program since its inception in 1975.4
1. 42 U.S.C. ##652-653 (Supp. V, 1975).
2. Id. ##651, 657(a)(2)-(4), (b)(1)-(3).
4. td.1657(a)(2)-(4), (b)(1)-(3).
4. The Washington Post (2/12/79).
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Given the stated goals of the program, we would expect legislative
initiatives to occur in response to pressures to reduce overall welfare
expenditures. This appears to be the case for at least the major legis-
lative efforts of 1950 and 1972 following substantial increases in the size
of the welfare population. The particular provisions of current child
support enforcement legislation which promote these policy objectives will
be noted, specifically those which provide financial incentives for state
and local participation in the program, as well as those which guarantee
the full cooperation of families and other parties in the enforcement
effort. We will also present in brief budget statistics showing the poten-
tial impact of incentive provisions in terms of financial benefits realized
by Federal, state, and local governments.
In Section B of this Chapter, we trace the historical development of
child support enforcement programs in the United States up to 1975. In
Section C, we provide a detailed outline of the provisions of P.L.93-647,
noting those provisions which guarantee cooperation in the enforcement
process, and those which have served to bias enforcement efforts toward
fathers of welfare families. Specific reference will be made to the program
developed in Massachusetts since 1967.2 The administration of Federal,
state, and local programs will be presented in capsule in Section D.
Finally, in Section E, methods of enforcement employed in the New Bedford
Child Support Enforcement Unit will be used as a case study of local pro-
cedure.
1. For example, the employer(s), bank officials, or other government or
private agency able to assist with information on the father's whereabouts
or level of earnings.
2. Massachusetts began its program of enforcement as early as 1951. With
the exception of Michigan, Washington, California, and Massachusetts, other
states did not establish child support enforcement programs until after the
1975 legislation (P.L.93-647).
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B. A HISTORY OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT IN THE U. S.
In the early 20th century, a Mother's Aid pension program was esta-
blished in Massachusetts to assist women with dependent children, primarily
widows, in the support of their fatherless families.1 The program was the
first in the nation which gave specific recognition to the problem of
support deprivation and its effects on female-headed families.2 By 1920,
under the Massachusetts program of Mother's Aid, approximately 10,000
mothers, and almost 30,000 children, had been assisted, the state spending
3
over $1.5 million each year, However, support enforcement did not become
a major public concern until the program came to include significant numbers
of deserted families. During the Depression years, many families became
destitute because the father was unable to provide for the care and main-
tenance of his family,
By 1935, the problem of poverty in female-headed families (FHFs) had
grown to proportions which demanded public attention. On August 14, 1935,
the AFDC (Aid To Families With Dependent Children) program was enacted as
Title IV of the Social Security Act. AFDC offered welfare payments to
families in which a parent was dead, disabled, absent, or, in states which
exercised the option, unemployed. The main condition for eligibility was
that there not be a "man in the home", a provision which applied up through
1966 when an unemployed father could remain in the home and be included in
1. Winifred Bell, Aid To Dependent Children.(New York, Columbia University
Press, 1965) provides a complete history of mother's aid and pension pro-
grams, together with later AFDC programs.
2, Program benefits were generally made available only to those mothers
who were from "suitable" homes, allowing considerable discretion on the
part of program officials in the matter of eligibility. Mothers of ille-
gitimate children were excluded, for example.
3. Kelso, op.cit., p. 153.
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the AFDC budget of the family.1 The "no man in the home" rule was designed
to discourage unemployed or marginally employed fathers from welfare de-
pendency by high benefit levels, but the effect in destitute families was
to force the father out of the home.2 Benefits for unemployed fathers
have traditionally been very low. Grant levels are usually tied to local
wage levels, so that grants in poorer regions of the country are invariably
inadequate. Low unemployment benefits, or denying aid to fathers, forced
destitute couples to "separate" in order that the family be eligible for
AFDC assistance. Fathers who cheated the system by remaining in the home
ran the risk of pursuit for nonsupport. Thus, the problem of nonsupport
and desertion could not in many cases be dissociated from the problem of
unemployment and poverty among intact families,
Two years prior to the passage of P.L.74-271 (AFDC), President Roosevelt
had called for a Civilian Conservation Corps, a public works program, and
a program for emergency Federal relief. The FERA, as this last was called,
established a federal assumption for all relief, and most restrictions in
the granting of relief were abandoned, so that traditional categories no
longer were applied. Under this program, relief was given not only to
widows, orphans, and other specified groups of disadvantaged persons, but
also "to all needy unemployed persons and/or their dependents. Those whose
employment or available resources [were] inadequate to provide the neces-
sities of life for themselves and/or their dependents [were also] included"3
1. Massachusetts was the first state to exercise the option of the AFDC-UP
program (Unemployed Parent).
2. Piven and Cloward, op.cit., argue that that this system "ensured a pool
of marginal workers, men who must take work at any age and price" (p. 127).
3. Josephine Chapin Brown, Public Relief. 1929-1939. (New York, Henry Holt
& Co. 1940) p. 231.
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The inception of AFDC marked a beginning of the return toward welfare
"reform" of the earlier massive relief expansion which had been under-
taken at considerable cost to the Federal government. Relief recipients
would once again become identifiable groups, each with specific require-
ments for eligibility, while control of relief programs gradually returned
to the states and to local government control. However, Federal grants-
in-aid would now be available to supplement local expenditures, a feature
which would remain intact throughout subsequent decades in the welfare
system.2
The Second World War produced many eligible families for AFDC relief,
but efforts were concentrated on providing relief to those families which
had lost a father during the war, or in which the father had become in-
capacitated. Indeed, families with a deceased or disabled parent con-
stituted 52% of all eligible families on AFDC by 1948 (see Table III-1).
During the 1940s, however, as the AFDC porgram and recipient population
expanded, Congress became increasingly aware of the dependency of female-
headed families resulting from paternal desertion or support inadequacy.
Although by definition the AFDC-dependent family was headed by a single
parent in order to be eligible for relief, the swift growth of the program
evidenced the larger problem of FHF economic dependency, particularly in
the event of marital dissolution.3
1. With the onset of World War Two, the WPA (Works Progress Administration)
was subject to sharp cuts in Federal funds, and by 1942 was eventually
eliminated.
2. Title XX of the Social Security Act, Grants To States and Localities.
The ratio of Federal to state fund-sharing gradually increased to 1:1 for
most human services. In 1975, a major increase was effected in the Federal
share to 75% of costs incurred in programs including child support enforce-
ment.
3. The problem of the economic dependency of women is discussed briefly in
Chapter I.
TABLE III-I. CHILDREN RECEIVING AFDC AS A PROPORTION OF ALL CHILDREN IN U.S. AND BY STATUS OF FATHER,
1948 TO 1974.[number of children in thousands]
[Source: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare]
12
TOTAL AFDC CHILDREN STATUS OF FATHER
3
Year Number % of All Children Dead Incapacitated Unemployed AbsentFrom Home Other
1948 1,146 2.5% 272 327 -- 522 25
1949 1,366 2.9 306 382 -- 648 30
1950 1,660 3.4 350 455 -- 818 37
1951 1,617 3.2 320 435 -- 826 36
1952 1,527 3.0 283 402 -- 808 34
1953 1,493 2.8 255 386 -- 819 33
1954 1,566 2.9 245 404 -- 884 33
1955 1,691 3.0 234 443 -- 982 32
1956 1,707 2.9 210 451 -- 1,015 31
1957 1,831 3.0 211 482 -- 1,103 35
1958 2,090 3.4 222 546 . -- 1,278 44
1959 2,239 3.5 217 571 -- 1,399 52
1960 2,322 3.5 202 569 -- 1,493 58
1961 2,600 3.9 193 590 89 1,658 71
1962 2,819 4.1 198 594 179 1,774 74
1963 2,893 4.1 198, 584 179 1,856 76
1964 3,097 4.3 203. 583 238 1,990 83
1965 3,241 4.5 208 584 232 2,130 87
1966 3,382 4.7 212 583 213 2,282 92
1967 3,744 5.2 224 608 250 2,258 105
1968 4,207 5.8 246 652 234 2,956 119
1969 4,893 6.8 274 684 242 3,563 130
1970 6,092 8.5 341 852 301 4,436 162
1971 7,015 10.5 305 874 457 5,113 266
1972 7,787 11.2 339 971 507 5,675 295
1973 7,718 11.3 307 785 317 6,040 269
1974 7,746 11.3 308 . 787 318 6,062 271
1 Data for the period 1948 through 1968 based on information obtained from State agencies in June 1948,
November 1953, February-March 1956, October-December 1958, November-December 1961 and May 1969. All
other entire are June of the year. Data based on 1942-56 studies adjusted to agree with later classification
with respect to coverage of "Absent From Home" and "Other". 1971 and 1973 are data from January.
2 Data for 1970-1974 based on findings of 1971 and 1973 AFDC Surveys.
3 Includes children with father in home as caretaker due to death, absence, or incapacity of mother.
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Durings the 1940s, various legislative proposals designed to enforce
the support responsibilities of absent parents were considered, but none
were enacted. Even from that time, the desertion issue was viewed basi-
cally in terms of the economic effects of parent loss on the family.
One of the reasons for this was the higher likelihood of relief-dependency
among families with one parent. Not surprisingly, then, we find public
concern for the family was activated only when members of the family be-
came dependent on public,funds for its support. Legislative interest in
child support enforcement appears to be directly related to the level of
public funding required for the support of families, and to the potential
for at least partial recovery of some of the costs of public support from
delinquent fathers. The relative disinterest in establishing enforcement
services for non-welfare families until recent years is supported by this
theory.2 In general, where public funds go, the public interest will
follow. We therefore would expect to find the stongest legislative ini-
tiatives in child support enforcement occurring in periods of substantial
increase in the size of the AFDC population and the level of funding re-
quired for its maintenance and expansion.
Such an expansion in the AFDC population took place in the years
immediately following World War Two, when the numbers of eligible families
rose as a result of the dramatic increase in paternal death and disability.
In 1950, the Congress took its first step toward developing a child support
1. Marital dissolution among poor couples almost invariably resulted in
relief depndency of the family, given the impotence of private court action
for support.
2. 'This theme is developed in Chapter II. For the most part, financial
incentives for support enforcement in non-welfare cases was too low to in-
duce state interest until the mandates of P.L.93-647.
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enforcement program by adding Section 402(a)(ll) to the Social Security
Act of 1935, a provision which required that State agencies notify
appropriate law enforcement officials upon the furnishing of aid (AFDC)
to families which were dependent because of parental desertion or support
negligence. This was the so-called Noleo Amendment, In the same year
Congress also passed the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA) which was designed to facilitate the interstate enforcement of
support obligations in cases where a father had left the state.
During the 1950s, however, it would become apparent that this
new notification procedure of Section 402(a)(11) was having little, if
any, impact on the problem of deserted families. Even in cases where a
father was located through this procedure, there was considerable diffi-
culty in obtaining support payments due to inadequacies in the court en-
forcement system. Judges generally awarded the family support orders
which were inadequate to meet their basic needs, court officials were
often reluctant to incur costs in behalf of non-local applicants, and the
long delays in securing court orders, and re-opening default cases, re-
sulted in prolonged and expensive action for the welfare agency. Garnish-
ment of wages or attaching property in nonsupport cases might further be
hampered by the absence of enabling statutes or by statutes disallowing
such action in the state of the father's residence. In cases of persis-
tent delinquency, a court might jail the defendant, an action which rarely
succeeded in altering support behavior, far less in assisting the family
to economic independence.2
1. The assumption that strict enforcement of support will result in non-
delinquent behavior is- held by program proponents even today. However, our
knowledge about delinquenciy behavi.)r and the reasons for nonsupport is
greatly lacking. In Section C of Chapter V, we examine the impact of al-
ternate modes and levels of enforcement on support payment levels.
2. In Section D of-Chapter V, we discuss the impact of enforcement on the
welfare dependency of FHFs in New Bedford, Massachusetts.
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Proponents of child support enforcement have traditionally used the
HEW statistics of Table III-1 to show the growth in the AFDC population.
They point out that substantial growth in that population occurred in the
early 1960s, when the number of children on AFDC rose from 2.3 million
to 3.2 million in just five years. In the late 1960s, the growth rate
was even more dramatic, with an increase of 2.6 million AFDC children
between 1966 and 1970. These increases were in contrast to the 1950s
when no significant increases in the AFDC population occurred. Over the
decade, the total number of AFDC dependent children rose by just 0.6
million. Using the growth statistics for AFDC, enforcement program pro-
ponents point out that the growth is primarily due to increased rates of
family dissolution, particularly among the poor. The proportion of all
AFDC children dependent because of parental death or disability fell sig-
nificantly after the War years, while at the same time the proportion
dependent due to paternal absence from the home increased. The enforce-
ment programs of the late 1960s and early 1970s were justified on the basis
of these statistics. It is therefore worthwhile to examine their validity.
Certainly, throughout the 1950s, AFDC population increases were very
slight. There were even decreases in the AFDC child population in 1953
and 1956 as shown in Figure III-a.1 That is to say, the AFDC population
remained a fairly constant proportion of the overall U. S. child population.
If we assume a constant level of poverty in the nation, and therefore
pool of AFDC eligibles during this period, we would expect AFDC population
increases to approximate increases in the overall U. S. population.
1. In 1948, the AFDC child population was 2.5% of the U. S. child population.
By 1950, it had risen to 3.4%. However, over the following decade the per-
centage showed little change, rising to just 3.5% by 1960.
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Not surprisingly, there were few legislative proposals for the establish-
ment of a child support enforcement program during these years.
The early 1960s witnessed a similar rise in AFDC rolls commensurate
with overall population growth in the nation. However, the five-year
increase from 3.5% to 4.5% represented an absolute increase of one million
children on AFDC, or an increase of 40% in the AFDC population. If the
percentage of children on AFDC had remained a constant proportion of the
overall U. S. child population during the period, we would still have ex-
pected a rise in the AFDC population. Similarly, annual increases in the
welfare budget would be required even if the percentage of U, S. children
on AFDC was constant, However, the 40% increase in absolute numbers of
welfare-dependent children between 1960 and 1965 necessitated a substantial
increase in the welfare budget. The child support enforcement legislation
of 1965 and 1967 were made in direct response to these welfare budget in-
creases.
Another problem with the interpretation of the HEW statistics in
Table III-1 is that no distinction is made between fathers who are absent
from the home by reason for nonsupport. Enforcement legislation proponents
concluded from these statistics that family desertion rates were rising,
particularly among poor families. Several points need to be made. First,
in the absence of comparable statistics for the overall population, we do
not know whether desertion rates among poor families are relatively higher
solely on the basis of AFDC population increases. Second, we know that
family dissolution among poor couples almost invariably leads to the wel-
fare dependency of the family.
1. Although we do know that family dissolution rates are higher among poor
couples. See P. Cutright, "Income and Family Events: Marital Instability",
J. Marriage and the Family, vol. 33 (May 1971) pp. 291-306.
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----Finally , we do not know the extent to which nonsupport among fathers
of families on AFDC was intentional and unjustifiable. It is widely
assumed that paternal "absence from the home" implies total economic aban-
donment of the family by the father. In the brief discussion following,
we will suggest that there are various reason for paternal absence from
the home, each of which may imply a different level of ability to support
and thereforeunwilful neglect,
In the years following World War Two, the numbers of AFDC children
dependent because of the death or disability of a parent gradually de-
creased, from 52% in 1948 to 39% in 1958, and by 1968, the percentage had
dropped to 26% (refer to Table III-1). During the same period, the pro-
portion of children on AFDC due to parental absence rose considerably.
In 1948, parental absence accounted for 46% of all AFDC children, rising
to 61% in 1958 and 70% by 1968. Proponents of child support enforcement
programs concluded from these statistics that desertion rates were rising.
However, as death and disability decreased, we would expect other cate-
gories to rise in compensation. Since by definition AFDC eligibility re-
quired that a man not be living in the home, we would expect this category
to dominate, It is unlikely that paternal desertions were the primary
reason for the increase. Far more likely is the fact that eligibility re-
quirements were relaxed for families in which a parent was absent from the
home in order to offset AFDC caseload reductions in death and disability
categories.
Promoting-a program of child support enforcement on the basis of these
statistics also requires that we know the reason for paternal absence from
the home. We do not know, for example, whether absence is due to marital
dissolution, to prolonged employment search by the father, to armed service,
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incarceration, or to actual desertion by the father, In many cases,
destitute couples are forced to "separate" in order that the family become
eligible for AFDC assistance,1 Each category suggests a different reason
for nonsupport and possible justification for inadequate provision of
support by the father.2 We are also led to assume that fathers of families
on AFDC pay no support at all, that they have economically abandoned their
families. In some cases, fathers have continued to contribute support to
their families although they are receiving public assistance, support pay-
ments commensurate with their ability-to-pay. Thus, we cannot conclude
from HEW statistics that parental absence necessarily constitutes parental
desertion, nor can we assume that nonsupport by absent fathers is both
wilful and absolute. To promote a child support enforcement program solely
on the basis of these statistics does not seem justifiable, In sum, the
statistics do not tell us whether the family is on welfare because the
father has withdrawn financial support or because both he and his family
are destitute.3
Nevertheless, given the impotence of the notification procedure esta-
blished in 1950 and the steady increase in the welfare budget, Congress
passed new child support enforcement legislation in 1965, and again in
1967. It was argued that enforcement would reduce welfare costs by pro-
viding support payment collections to the states in cases where those
payments did not exceed the AFDC budget of the family, and by forcing the
AFDC ineligibility of families where the father's payments did exceed the
1. Thereby satisfying the "no man in the home" condition for eligibility.
2. The problem is magnified when we consider that changes in family
structure as well as changes in the levels of earnings of both parents
may each affect the welfare status of the family.
3. We need to know also whether there is any relationship between ability-
to-pay and willingness-to-pay for each category (refer to Sections 3 and C
of Chapter V).
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family's AFDC budget.
The 1965 amendments (P.L,89-97) provided that states or local agencies
could obtain the address and place of employment of an absent parent from
the Secretary of HEW in certain situations. The 1967 amendments (P.L.90-
248) added Section 410 to the Social Security Act, providing for the ob-
taining of address information from the Internal Revenue Service. Infor-
mation was to be made available only in those AFDC cases for which a court
order for support, or petition for such an order, had been established.
The 1967 amendments also added Section 402(a)(17), (18), (21), and
(22) to the Act. These provided that, as part of its AFDC program, each
state would be required to establish a single organizational unit to
attempt to determine paternity in the case of illegitimate children re-
ceiving aid' and to collect support for children receiving public assis-
tance who had been deserted by one or both parents. The states were re-
quired to utilize reciprocal arrangements adopted with other states (the
so-called URESA agreements), and to enter into cooperative agreements
with appropriate courts and law enforcement agencies and officials for
assistance in implementing the program of child support enforcement. The
1967 amendments also provided for Federal reimbursement of administrative
costs incurred by states and localities at a rate of 50% in cases in-
volving paternity determinations and support enforcement activities.
1. The percentage of AFDC families involving so-called illegitimate
children rose from 21.3% in 1961 to 34.7% in 1973, as shown in Table III-2.
2. That is, those under cooperative agreement with their state. Coopera-
tive agreements provided for the channeling of incentive payments to
intrastate parties to the enforcement process. Such an agreement was re-
quired before these parties could recover administrative costs from the
Federal government. These costs were taken from the Federal share of
support collections made in each state. States were permitted, but not
required, to enter into cooperative agreements, Certain states, including
Massachusetts, have shown reluctance, Dreferring instead to maintain centra-
lized control over enforcement activities.
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During the latter half of the 1960s and early 1970s, the AFDC popu-
lation underwent a dramatic increase, rising from 4.7% of the U. S. child
population in 1966 to a peak of 11.2% by 1972. Although proponents of
child support enforcement programs suggested the increase was due to
higher rates of family desertion, it seems far more likely that the ex-
plosion of the late 1960s was due to a conscious policy change. Piven and
Cloward argue-convincingly that the welfare increase was in direct res-
ponse to the civil disorder experienced in most major cities,2 One proof
of this is that the explosion did not occur in the poorer, more depressed
regions of the south., where levels of income and unemployment were the
highest in the nation.3 That is, AFDC populations did not rise dramatically
in those areas where public assistance was most vitally needed. Instead,
we find the welfare explosion concentrated in the larger, northeastern
cities where black migration and unemployment resulted in political unrest.
The major institution available to respond to the growing disorder was the
relief system which was allowed to expand in order to defuse unrest among
1. Piven and Cloward, op.cit,, p. 38: "When disruptions in the economy
lead to occupational dislocation causing widespread discontent (and po-
tential labor unrest), the government generally responds by expanding the
relief rolls," The relief explosion of 1930s was similarly founded in
econo-political causes. "Relief restrictions collapsed only when the situ-
ation constituted a direct threat to the political stability and order"
(p. 72-79).
2. Ibid. p. 116. Piven and Cloward show how the modernization of southern
agriculture forced concentrated waves of black migration to northern cities
where high levels of un employment contributed to the growth in black poli-
ticial power.
3. In Table 111-3, we provide a comparison of AFDC grant levels in various
regions of the nation. Local relief levels reflect local variations in
wage levels as a rule, so that in areas of the south where wage levels
are lowest, AFDC grant levels are commensurately low in order to avoid
potential competition between public relief and local industry. Maintaining
grant levels well below wage levels is designed to ensure that workers are
discouraged from relief dependency. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation
(Beacon Press, Boston, 1957) called this the "deterrent doctrine of relief"
(p. 82) for all but the most destitute.
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the unemployed and poor in the nation, at least those with a potential
for causing civil disorder. It seems far more likely that conscious policy
change,. rather than an:abrupt behavioral change (i.e. higher desertion rate),
was responsible for AFDC increases. The fact that increases occurred in
cities where AFDC benefit levels were increased, and rules for eligibility
relaxed, makes this argument even more compelling.2
Regardless of the real reasons for the AFDC population explosion,
public concern was directed toward the fact that the number of children on
AFDC had more than doubled between 1967 and 1972, rising from 3.7 million
to over 7.8 million by 1972,3 The annual increases in the welfare budget
necessitated by this rise in the AFDC population were considerable.
Statistics released by HEW showed that of the 7,7 million children re-
ceiving AFDC grants in all states in 1973, 6.2 million (or 83%)4 had an
absent parent, the vast majority of whom were fathers.5 From Table 111-2,
we see that the percentages of families dependent on AFDC as a result of
the death, disability, unemployment, or informal separation of the parents,
fell between 1961 and 1973. At the same time, the percentages of families
dependent due to divorce, legal separation, and illegitimacy, rose.
Together, these last factors accounted for 73% of the growth in AFDC
1. For example, it is difficult to believe that changes in paternal de-
sertion rates, or in nonsupport rates, were alone responsible for the
sharp increase in AFDC population between 1967 and 1972, as well as for
the halt in that increase occurring in 1972 (refer to Figure III-a.)
2. Regional variations in AFDC grant increases between 1960 and 1969 are
shown in Table 111-3.
3. While the overall U. S. child population fell by 3.4% during this
period, the AFDC child population increased by 108%.
4. The percentage of AFDC families with an absent parent had risen from
67% in 1961 to 83% in 1973 (see Table 111-2).
5. Only 1.2% of all AFDC families had a mother absent from the home in 1973
(see Table 111-4).
TABLE III-2. AFDC FAMILIES, BY STATUS OF FATHER WITH RESPECT TO THE FAMILY, 1961 and 1973
Incapacitated Unemploved Total
Absent From the Home
Legally
Separated
Dr Divorced
Non-Legally
Separated
Or Deserted
Not
Married
To Mother
Armed Forces,
Imprisoned,
Other Reason
1961 884,441 68,418 160,226 45,881 590,236 120,947 237,383 188,645 43,261 19,680
100% 7.7% 18.1% 5.2% 66.7% 13.7% 26.8% 21.3% 4.8% 2.2%
1973 2,989,891 120,095 237,946 119,795 2,481,949 660,693 705,403 lp38,211 77,642 30,106
100% 4.0% 8.0% 4.0% 83.0% 22.1% 23.6% 34.7% 2.6% 1.0%
1961 estimates do not include Guam, Oregon, or Massachusetts.
the territories.
1973 estimates do not include Region I or
In 1973, this figure applied to families deprived of the mother's but not the father's support.
Sources: 1961 AFDC Study, Table 12.
NCSS, Department of Health Education, and Welfare, AFDC Study 1973, Table 37.
Child Support Data and Materials, Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate (Washington D.C., November 1975).
Total
AFDC 1
FamiliesYear Deceased
Other 2
Status
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TABLE III- 3. AVERAGE MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR AFDC RECIPIENT'
Region June 1951 June 1960 February 1969
South $14 $21 $26
West 27 35 39
North Central 25 33 45
Northeast 27 35 53
National Average 22 30 39
1 Excluding AFDC-UP (unemployed parents) cases.
Source: Piven and Cloward, OD.Cit., p.1 3 2 - They further note that,
"at the extremes, a person in Mississippi got $5 per month, while a
person in California got $36 per month. Between 1951 and 1969, pay-
ment levels almost doubled everywhere; still, Mississippi paid S10
per person per month, while Massachusetts paid $68. [Moreover], these
differences in grant levels varied directly with differences in wage
levelslwithin each region]. In 1969, the rank order correlations
between relief payments and agricultural wages was .77." Massachusetts
has traditionally had relatively higher benefit levels; for example,
In 1939, while Arkansas gave only $8.10 per month to families with
dependent children, Massachusetts offered such families $61.07.
Nationally, levels of aid averaged about half what employables were
earning on federal work relief projects (p.116).
TABLE IiI-4. AFDC RECIPIENT CHILDREN, BY REASON DEPRIVED OF PARENTAL SUPPORT, 19731
Deprived Because Father2  Deprived of
Mother's
Absent From Home Support
Total Separated
Recipient In Armed Court No Court Not Married Other
Children Unemployed Deceased Incapacitated Forces Divorced Decree Decree To Mother Reason
7,717,665
100%
317,223
4.1%
306,941
4.0%
784,765
10.2%
14,484
0.2%
1 369,237|305,78911,915,850
17.7% 4.0%
_________________ .1 ____________ 1 -.- J.--.--.-----.----.-----l J 4
24.8%
2,434,872
31.5%
173,588194,906
2.2% 1.2%
1 Proportions may be underestimates because the upper limit of nine children per family was used for each
category
2 The father is the child's natural, adoptive, or legally responsible stepfather.
Source 1973 AFDC Study, Pt. 1, Table 17 (NCSS, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare).
Child Support Data and Materials, Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate (Washington D.C., November 1975).
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families with an absent parent between 1961 and 1973.
As relief costs rose, the welfare system became a target for public
criticism and concern. As a source of political controversy, it became
an obvious target also of proposals for "reorganization" and "reform".'
Congress began to regain control of the AFDC program, their efforts ranging
from the removal of recipients from the rolls through provision of various
social and rehabilitative services to what critics have regarded as re-
gressive work requirements for recipients.2 Renewed efforts to establish
a comprehensive child support enforcement program in the early 1970s were
part of this overall plan to reduce welfare expenditures.3
For the first time, HEW published statistics on the level of non-
support among fathers associated with AFDC families, Of the 83% of
families with an absent parent in 1973, only 32% were reported to have a
court order for support and/or voluntary agreement to provide child support.
Furthermore, only 22% of all families with an absent parent were receiving
the full amount of that order, indicating a post-order delinquency rate
of around 30%. More than half of all AFDC families with an absent parent
were receiving no support at all; that is, the state was receiving no support
1. Piven and Cloward, op.cit., p. 183-184.
2. Abe Lavine, "Administration of Public Welfare in the Case of Aid To
Families With Dependent Children", (Unpublished Manuscript, October 1976),
p. 47.
3. Congressional sponsors of the bill included Senators Russell Long,
Chairman of the Finance Committee, Herman Talmadge (D,-Ga.) and Henry
Bellmon (R.-Okla.), all conservatives. In 1967, Senator Long had stated:
"The cost of this [AFDC] program is going up very, very drastically, and
in regard to most of these children, there is a father somewhere earning
wages ... " Few liberals objected to a program designed to "guarantee the
rights of poor children to paternal support".
4. Since SRS summary statistics for AFDC families assumed that parents
under voluntary agreements were paying in full, their statistics probably
underestimate actual levels of support delinquency.
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on behalf of the family from the absent parent,
It was also apparent by 1972 that, with a few notable exceptions,1
the 1965 and 1967 amendments for child support enforcement were not being
vigorously implemented bu the states. HEW had been concentrating on the
implementation of alternate methods of achieving a welfare rollback, and
had not placed a high priority on enforcement of the child support pro-
visions of the Act. In particular, it was felt that states would require
additional incentives, specifically a higher rate of Federal cost-sharing,
in order ot be induced to expand their enforcement programs. Those states
with lower welfare (AFDC) populations, who could not hope to recover sub-
stantial amounts in child support payments from absent fathers, would be
the primary target of any increase in the Federal cost-sharing rate and
incentive payments,2
1. Viz. Massachusetts, Michigan, California, and New York.
2. States could claim 50% of all collections made by fathers associated
with families on AFDC. However, payments recovered from absent fathers
associated with non-welfare families could not be claimed by states, but
were instead to be directed to the family itself. States could claim
50% cost reimbursement from the Federal government for enforcement in
both welfare and non-welfare cases.
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C. THE NEW CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS (P.L.93-647)
In order to strengthen the earlier provisions for child support en-
forcement, the Senate Committee on Finance included in H.R.1, reported
on September 26, 1972,1 a version containing a new Part D of Title IV of
the Social Security Act. This proposal, with some major exceptions,2
formed the framework for the new Title IV-D which would be enacted in
Part B of Public Law 93-647 in January, 1975. The child support provisions
included:
(1) The transferral of program responsibility from the Secretary of HEW
to the Attorney General of the United States, who would determine
which state programs qualified for Federal funding according to the
standards stated in the proposal.
(2) A new Parent Locator Service would be made available on request to
all welfare and non-welfare applicants seeking to establish or en-
force the support obligations of absent parents. All Federal and
other agencies would, if necessary, furnish available records and
files of information on addresses of delinquent parents. Only this
part of the program was to be made available to non-welfare indivi-
duals under this early versions.
(3) As a condition of eligibility for support from AFDC, individuals would
be required to assign all rights to support over to the state, and to
cooperate with officials or the IV-D agency in establishing paternity
or in obtaining support payments for themselves or a child, although
children themselves could not lose their AFDC grant if such conditions
were not fulfilled.
(4) States would be encouraged to use voluntary agreements to establish
paternity and secure support. However, states would be required to
establish the necessary administrative mechanisms to enforce these
agreements.
(5) States would be entitled to receive as incentive payments those child
support collections which they made.
1. Senate Report No. 92-1230, legislated on September 25, 1972.
2. Several examples were: (i) the level of IRS assistance was limited to
cases involving enforcement of court orders for support (i.e. those
involving arrears); (ii) AFDC recipients would later be protected against
*grant reductions in states which had low relative grant levels (support
payments could not be used to offset grant payments); (iii) a major
revision in the later version of the child support enforcement bill was
the inclusion of non-welfare individuals as eligible for enforcement, as
well as parent locator, services from the state; (iv) provisions for
regional blood laboratories were later abolished.
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(6) In collecting support payments, the collection mechanism of the IRS
could be utilized by the Attorney General.
(7) Individuals who failed to meet their obligation to support their
children would be subject to a penalty of 50% of the child support
amount which was due, or $1,000, or a year's imprisonment, or a
combination of these penalties.
(8) Regional blood typing laboratories would be set up to assist in
paternity determinations.
(9) The wages and salaries of employees of the Federal government could
be garnished in order to collect child support or alimony payments
from delinquent parents,
(10) Child support payments collected by the state IV-D agencies under this
program would have to be distributed as provided by the statute.
The child support provisions of H.R.1 were passed by the Senate, but were
not considered, due to insufficient time, at the House-Senate Conference.
The House Ways and Means Committee, however, undertook to report out a
social security bill in early 1973 for consideration by the Senate,
H.R.3153, which passed the House in March of 1973, and was referred to the
Senate Committee on Finance.
Despite the exclusion of Title IV-D from the H.R.1 amendments that be-
came law, interest in legislation which would establish a child support
enforcement program continued to be strong in the Senate, Two bills,
S.1842 and S.2081, were introduced in the first half of 1973. S.1842,1
introduced by Senator Bellmon on May 17, proposed a new Title XX of the
Social Security Act which would have established a Parent Locator Service
(PLS) similar to that proposed in H.R.1 provisions, but it would be operated
by the Secretary of HEW. Nonsupport by a parent of a child on AFDC would
thereby create a debt owed by that parent to the United States which could
then be enforced by the Attorney General.2 This bill also proposed that
1. 93rd Congress, 1st Session.
2. Based on the fact that support payments made to the child were made
directly by the Secretary of HEW.
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non-cooperation by AFDC recipients in the program would result in fines or
imprisonment. Senators Nunn and Talmadge introduced S.20811 on June 25,
proposing, with some minor changes, the same new Title IV-D as in H.R.
3153 (those deleted from H.R.1). On September 25, 1973, public hearings
were held on these two proposals, S.1842 and S.2081, by the Senate Finance
Committee.
On November 21, 1973, after consideration of the proposal passed by
the House (H.R.3153) and the other two bills before it, the Finance Committee
reported H.R.31532 the Social Security Amendments of 1973. The Committee
had decided to leave the child support enforcement program under state
administration and under the direction of HEW, but at the same time mandated
more aggressive administration at the Federal, state, and local levels with
the inclusion of various incentive provisions for compliance and with
penalties for non-compliance. While the basic services under this program
were the same as the earlier Title IV-D proposals, there were some signi-
ficant changes:
(1) The Secretary of HEW, rather than the Attorney General of the United
States, would have the primary responsibility for the program,
with powers to create a new and separate organizational unit to
operate the program, together with specific functions assigned to
the Assistant Secretary:
(a) to establish the Parent Locator Service (PLS) providing the services
described in H.R.1;
(b) to establish standards for state program organization, staffing,
and operation, to assure an effective program, to review state plans
for their enforcement program, and to evaluate state program opera-
tion in order to determine if a penalty should be imposed (a loss
of 5% of Federal financial participation in the state's AFDC program);
(c) to certify cases as being appropriate for using the Federal courts
to enforce support obligations, and others for collection by the
IRS; and
(d) to establish regional blood typing laboratories.
1. 93rd Congress, 1st Session.
2. Id.
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(2) Primary responsibility for operating the child support enforcement
program would be placed with the states, pursuant to a state plan,
which plan must meet minimal standards set, before Federal monies
would be made available. A state would receive reimbursement of 75%
of the administrative costs it incurred in the provision of services
pursuant to the state plan (Section 455).l Major requirements of that
plan were:
(a) the state must designate a single and separate organizational unit
to administer the program under which -it would establish paternity
and secure support for those for whom an assignment was effective;
(b) the state must also provide child support enforcement services for
non-welfare applicants, not merely offer PLS services;
(c) the state would enter into cooperative agreements with appropriate
courts and law enforcement officials, and cooperate with other states
under the URESA provisions in locating absent parents, establishing
paternity, and securing support;
(d) the state would establish a Parent Locator Service (PLS) which would
utilize both Federal PLS services as well as state and local re-
sources;
(e) the state would maintain a full record of collections and disburse-
ments made under the plan; and
(f) child support payments collected would be made directly to the state
for subsequent distribution (not to the family), and be distributed
in the manner outlined in (3) below.2
(3) A new procedure for the distribution of child support collections made
(subsequently adopted in P.L.93-647) would replace the distribution
procedure included in H.R.l:
(a) all child support payments would be made directly to the state IV-D
agency, and would only go directly to the family when that family
was no longer eligible for assistance;
1. A substantial increase over the 50% reimbursement available under the
repealed Title IV-A provisions, The reimbursement applied to costs in-
curred by the state, as well as local law enforcement officials and agencies
under cooperative agreement with their state. It applied to administrative
costs incurred in both AFDC and non-welfare enforcement of support.
Section 458 of the Act provided that political subdivisions collecting and
enforcing child support on behalf of the state would receive an incentive
payment in cases involving an AFDC recipient. The provision also applied
to states enforcing support on behalf of other states through URESA.
2. This did not apply to child support payments for non-welfare applicants.
States would no longer have the option of allowing child support payments
by an absent parent to be made directly to the family as an offset against
their AFDC assistance grant, as had been the case under the repealed Title
IV-A provisions. If the support payment collected was insufficient to make
the family ineligible for public assistance, the family continued to re-
ceive its full AFDC grant, and the support payment was distributed as re-
quired by Section 457 of the Act.
114
(b) 40% of the first $50 collected (during the first 15 months of the
program only) would go to the family as an incentive payment over
and above the AFDC assistance grant amount;1
(c) otherwise, all support collected would go directly to the state
IV-D agency. If the monthly collection was greater than payments
made by AFDC to the family, the additional amount would be credited
to the family up to the amount of the court order established per
month, Collections exceeding this would go to the state IV-D
agency to offset past AFDC child support payments to the family
(so-called arrears). At this point, the family is generally in-
eligible for con tinued AFDC support. Amounts retained by the
state IV-D agency would be distributed between Federal and state
governments according to the proportional shares contributed by
each for funding of family support programs (AFDC),2 as well as to
local courts and other law enforcement officials and agencies under
cooperative agreement with the state to be taken out of the Federal
share of support collections at the rate of 15% of total collections
per case.
(4) Incentive payments would be assessed, for local authorities under
cooperative agreements with states, at 25% of amounts collected during
the first year of collections, reduced to 10% of collections in sub-
sequent years.
(5) U. S. district courts could be used to enforce interstate child support
cases if such cases were certified by the Secretary of HEW under the
URESA provisions.
(6) Eligibility requirements for applicants to AFDC for child support
would be added to the program, namely the assigning of all support
rights to the state, cooperating with the state IV-D agency in its
efforts to establish paternity and secure child support, and furnishing
the agency with the social security numbers, and other information re-
garding the employment and whereabouts of absent parents, where possible.
1. This provision was subsequently dropped from the program.
2. These shares were to be computed according to the FMAP (Federal Medicaid
Assistance Program) formula based on per capita industrial wage earnings
in each state. The FFP (Federal Financial Participation) level in Massa-
chusetts for most Title XX human services, including AFDC, is currently
51.62%. It is expected to be revised upwards to 51.75% in Federal FY 1979.
3. This incentive provision resulted in a bias toward enforcement of new
AFDC cases by local court officials and agencies. Subsequently, the in-
centive payment was amended in Section 458(a) to a flat 15% of collections
made. The incentive was computed as a percentage of the first year's obli-
gation, so that if a fathers' child support obligation was assessed at S100
per month ($1,200 per year), the incentive payment would be 15% (no longer
25% then 10% in later years) of that first year's obligation, or S130.
This incentive payment applied to enforcement in AFDC cases only, which
has led to AFDC case preference by many courts and agencies. In non-welfare
cases, the enforcement agency may, in addition to a fee for application, de-
duct from child support collected on behalf of the family some amount that
is not "prohibitive" (i.e. would not discourage non-welfare applicants from
seeking enforcement services). Considerable discretion is allowed in these
cases.
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(7) The emphasis in the prior child support enforcement proposals on
the use of voluntary agreements as a basis for establishing the
support obligation of absent parents was to be omitted from this bill.
H.R.3153 was subsequently passed in the Senate on November 30, 1973
(66 votes to 3) and went to a House-Senate conference in December of that
year, at which time certain provisions that required immediate implemen-
tation were taken from H.R.3153, incorporated into another bill, and then
enacted into law. No further House-Senate conferences were held on H.R.
3153. However, in December of 1974, after the House had passed H.R.170451
establishing a new Title XX of the Social Security Act, the bill was passed
onto the Senate Finance Committee, which struck certain provisions of the
House bill and substituted the social service provisions, child support
enforcement provisions, and work bonus provisions from H.R.3153. The
original provisions for child support from H.R.1, amended in H.R.3153,
were now added to H.R.17045, which passed the Senate on December 17, 1974
(76 votes to 17), and from there went to a House-Senate conference.
During this conference, the work bonus provisions were deleted, the
social service provisions were compromised, and the child support enforce-
ment provisions were approved, except for the following modifications:
(i) the "Assistant Secretary" in the bill could be "person designated
by the Secretary";
(ii) the blood typing laboratories provisions were deleted; and
(iii) the IRS collection mechanism 2 was modified to apply only in court-
ordered cases of child support delinquency (arrears cases), with
60-day notice to the absent parent the first time of collection.
1. 93rd Congress, 2nd Session.
2. At present, the IRS may supply the state IV-D agency with information
regarding the delinquent parent's income. The IRS collection mechanisms
may also be utilized by IV-D agencies (viz. attachment of property, or
wage garnishment procedures), At present, these procedures are operative-
in arrears cases only. The IRS charges a total of $122.50 per case for
such assistance. The low cost of services provides a strong incentive for
pursuit of AFDC cases by state IV-D agencies.
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R.R.17045, as amended, was approved by both Houses and signed by
President Ford on January 4, 1975, as Public Law 93-647. The effective
date of the statute was to be July 1, 1975, delayed to August 1 by
P.L.94-46 which recognized the inability of states to implement the law
due to lack of statutory authority or because of statutory barriers. It
was also found that because of maximums in a few states on the amount of
aid payable to families under AFDC programs,1 certain recipients having
child support income would lose some disposable income when P.L.93-647
was implemented,
To alleviate these and other problems, Congress passed P.L.94-88 on
August 1, 1975, and offered as amendment to a tariff bill (H.R.7710)2 a
bill which had already been approved, This amendment provided for:
(a) temporary waivers for certain states for the requirement for im-
plementation of plans under P.L.93-647;
(b) protection of recipients of AFDC from a decrease in their grants
because of payments in child support made directly to the state;
(c) waiver of the requirement for support assignments by AFDC recipients
during transitional period;
(d) modification of the safeguarding of information provision of
P.L.93-647;
(e) excusing applicants on AFDC from the cooperation requirements in
establishing paternity or securing support 3when doing so would not
protect the "best interests" of the child;
1. i.e. states with relatively low AFDC benefit levels.
2. By Senator Long, Chariman of the Finance Committee that day.
3. The burden of proof law with the AFDC recipient unwilling to cooperate
with the state IV-D agency to establish the effects of cooperation as
they applied to the "best interests" of the child on the basis of such
criteria as: (1) the birth resulted from rape or incest; (2) probable
cause to believe that physical harm would occur to mother or child as a
result of her cooperation; (3) the mother claims to have cooperated to
the fullest, and the IV-D agency is unable to prove otherwise. These
early guidelines provided by the AFDC Handbook (4/1/76) were challenged by
various groups acting on behalf of non-cooperating mothers (e.g. Center On
Social Welfare Policy and Law, New York City). In February of 1978, grounds
for non-cooperation were extended to include the child's "best pyschological
interests". However, burden of proof still lay with the non-cooperating
mother.
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(.f) removal of the vendor payment limitation with regard to child
support; and
(g) authority for quarterly advances to states for child support enforce-
ment programs, and payments to states for certain expenses incurred
during July of 1975,
This amendment was approved by both the House and Senate and signed into
Law by the President on August 9, 1975, as PL.94-88.
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D. THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
Since the passage of P.L.93-647, child support enforcement plans
have been developed in all states, together with programs for enforcement.
On March 8, 1977, under the new Carter Administration's departmental re-
organization plan, the SRS (Social and Rehabilitation Service), whose
Administrator was Director of OCSE (Office of Child Support Enforcement),
was abolished. The Commissioner of Social Security was designated as
Director of OCSE 'under authority delegated by the Secretary for Human
Services (formerly HEW). The status of OCSE as a separate organizational
unit within the Department remained unchanged.1 OCSE is responsible for
all program and policy aspects of child support enforcement (Title IV-D
of the Social Security Act), and has three divisions: the Parent Locator
Service, Policy and Planning, and Administration.
The primary functions of the Parent Locator Service are to operate
the PLS and to coordinate and enhance state IV-D activities. The primary
functions of Policy and Planning Division are to provide policy development
and interpretation, to perform planning and evaluation activities, and to
assist states in improving IV-D program operations and management practices.
The Administration Division is responsible for providing administrative
services such as personnel liaison, and for developing and coordinating the
annual audit function. In order to assure effective technical assistance
to the states, a Program Operations and Monitoring Branch was established
in the Policy and Planning Division during the fiscal year 1977-78. A re-
structured Division of Audit was also developed. The new re-organization
1. Figure III-b shows the revised organization for cash assistance pay-
ments under the Department of Human Services. (This chart appears at the
end of this Section.)
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became effective during fiscal 1978. A full summary of OCSE functions
by division is provided in Appendix B,
In addition to various administrative assistance, OCSE provides state
IV-D agencies with technical assistance in their development of local PLS
units, and a variety of procedural guidelines including schedules for
child support payment based on the father's income level,1 interpretation
of legal items concerning non-cooperation exemption, cooperative agree-
ments, and procedures for attachment of property and garnishment of wages,
etc.2
In Massachusetts, the state IV-D plan provides for a highly centralized
administrative structure3 in the enforcement of child support. For
collection purposes, the state has been divided into seven regions,4 each
with a regional coordinator administering sub-regional offices of child
support enforcement. The local IV-D offices, although not strictly con-
tiguous, conform closely to state welfare office subdivisions.5 In most
cases, one IV-D office operates out of a regional welfare office, so that
1. Refer to Table III-5.
2. These are contained in various Action Transmittals and Information
Memoranda listed in the Annual Reports of the Office of Child Support
Enforcement.
3. Refer to Figures III-c, d, and e at the end of this Section.
4. Viz. Boston, Brockton, Springfield, Worcester, Lawrence, Greater Boston,
and New Bedford.
5. At present there are 87 IV-D local offices in Massachusetts, located in
either a CSA (Community Service Area) office or WSO (Welfare Service) office,
of which there are 40 and 61 offices respectively in the Commonwealth. Six
regional offices cover CSA and WSO activities and coordinate state welfare
service provision.
TABLE 111-5. HEW SCHEDULE GUIDELINING SUPPORT PAYMENTS LEVELS OF FATHERS,
BY INCOME LEVEL AND NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
(Support as a % of income, and support payment range)
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INCOME NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS
RANGE($) 1 2 3 4 5 6+
(10%) (11%) (12%) (13%) (14%) (15 %)
$76 - $80 $7.60-$8.0( 8.35-8.80 9.10-9.60 9.90-10.4C10.60-11.2(11.40-12.00
(13%) (14%) (15%I (16%7)- (17%) (18 %
81 - 85 10.50-11-0(11.30-11.9012.15-12.7512.95-13.6C13.80-14.4514.60-15.30
(16%) (17%) (18%) (19%) (20%) (21%)
86-- 90 13.75-14-4(14.60-15.3015.50-16. 2C16. 30-17.1C17.20-18.0C18.05-13.90
(19%) (20%) (21%) (22%) (23%) (24%)
91 - 95 17.30-18.0(18.20-19.0018.90-19.9520.00-20.9C20.'90-21.8 21.80-22.30
(22%) (23%) (24%) (25%) (26%) (27%)
96 - 100 21.10-22.0(22.10-23.0023.05-24.0C24.00-25.0C24.95-26.oC25.90-27.'0
(25%) (26%) (27%) (28%) (29%) (30%)
101 - 105 25.25-26.2!2 6 .25-27.3027.30-28.35128.30-29.4C29.30-30.4530.30-31.50
(25%) (28%) (29%) (30%) (31%) (32 %)
106 - 110 26.50-27.5( 29.70-30.8030.70-31.9031.80-33.0 C32.85-34.10 33.90-35.20
(26%) (30%) (32%) (33%) (34%) (35%)
- 115 28.85-29.9 33.30-34.5035.50-36.8 C36.60-37.9 37.75-39.1038.85-40.25
(26%) (30%) (33%) (34%) (35%) (36%)
116 -120 30.15-31.2 C34.80-36.0038.30-39.6 C39.40-40.8 040.60-42.0041. 75-43.20
(27%) (31%) (35%) (37 %) (38%) (39 %)
121 - 125 32.70-33.7237.50-38.7542,35-43.7544.80-46.2546.00-47.5047.20-L8.75
(27%) (31%) (35 %) (38 %) (40%) (42 %)
126 - 130 34.00-35.1 39.05-40.30 44.10-45.50 47.90-49.4050. 40-52.00152.90-54.60
(28%) (32 %) (36%) (40%) (42%) (43-4)
131 - 135 36.70-37.8C 41.90-43.20 47.16-48.6 052.40-54.0055. 00-56.7056.30-58.00
(28%) (32%) (36%) (40%) (43%) (45%)
136 - 140 38.10-39.2C43.50-44.8048.95-50.4054.40-56.004 8.50-60.2061.20-63.00
(29%) (33%) (37%) (41%) (45%) (47%)
141 - 145 40.90-42.0 C46.50-47.85 52.20-53.65 57.80-59.4553.45-65.2566.30-63.15
(29%) (33%) (37%) (41%) (45%) (49%
146 - 150 42.35-43.5 048.20-49.50 54.00-55.5059.85-61.5065.70-67.5071.55-73.50
(30%) (34%) (38%) (42%) (46%) (50%)
151 - 155 45.30-46.50 1.35-52.7057.40-58.90163.4-65.1o59.45-71.3075.50-77.50
(30%) (34/0) (38%) (42%) (46%) (50%)
156 - 160 46.80-48.0053.00-54.4059.30-60.8065.50-67.2071.75-73.60j78.00-80.00
(30%) (35%) (39%) (43%) (47%) (50%)
161 - 165 48.30-49.5056.35-5 7 . 7 5 6 2 . 8 0-64.3569.20-70.9575.65-77-, 580.50-8,2.50
(30%) (35%) (39%) (43 %) (47 %) (50%)
166 - 170 49.80-51.00 58.10-59.5064.75-66.30 71.40-73.1078.00-799083. 00-85.00
(30%) (35%) ((40%) 4 %) (48%) (50%)
171 - 175 51.30-52.5059.85-61.2568.40-70.0075.25-77.00*2.10-84.0085.50-87.50
(30 %) 0(35%) (40%) (44%) (48 %) | (50 %)
176 - 180 52.80-54.00 1.60-63.0070.40-72.0077.45-79.2004.50-86.40188.00-90.001
(30%) (35 %) (40%) (45%) (50%)
181 - 185 54.30-55.5063.35-64.75172.40-74.0d 81.45-83.2 .70-90.6590.50-92.50
(30%) (35%) (40%) (45%) 49 / (50%)
186 - 190 55.80-57.0045.10-66.5074.40-76.0083.70-85.5 115-93.1093.00-95.00
(30%) 05 %) (40 %) (5%) (50 (
191 - 195 57,30-58.5066.85-68.2576.40-78.0 85.95-87 .50-97.5095.50-97.50
(30%) (35%) (40 %) (45 %) (500 i (50%)
196 - 20058,80-60.00168.60-70.0078.40-80.088.20-90.0098.00-100.098.00-100.0
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several towns may be within the jurisdiction of one local IV-D office.
Enforcement is conducted at the local level through the various district
and probate courts1 of the Commonwealth dealing with criminal and civil
nonsupport cases respectively. Local support enforcement workers pre-
sently number a hundred, each office having from one to three IV-D case
workers, depending on local AFDC caseloads. Clerical and non-court work
associated with each IV-D office is handled by a social service admini-
strative technician, a minimum of one per IV-D office. Until recently,
several IV-D offices operated without a technician.2
A majority of IV-D case workers in Massachusetts were previously
employed as AFDC case workers or social workers for the state Department
of Public Welfare (DPW). Choosing IV-D workers from among AFDC case
workers was a conscious policy decision. Most workers had an intimate
knowledge of the functions, system, and procedures of the state AFDC pro-
gram at state and local levels, a knowledge considered essential for the
smooth transition of TV-D into local welfare offices. More importantly,
given the discriminatory application of child support enforcement laws in
the Commonwealth against fathers of families on welfare, AFDC workers
would also offer to their IV-D jobs first-hand experience with child support
delinquency and the problems of support enforcement from their association
1. In Massachusetts, there are 69 district (criminal) and 14 probate
(civil and family) courts, the latter corresponding to the 14 counties in
the state. Under the 1977 Cox Reforms, return of the courts from county
to state control was proposed. The state IV-D agency currently has co-
operative agreements with. just three of the probate, and one of the district,
courts. However, cooperative agreements with 60 district courts and all re-
maining probate courts are expected to be operative by early 1979.
2. There are currently in Massachusetts 55 social service administrative
technicians for the 87 local IV-D offices. In the past year, 30 clerks
were also employed by IV-D to assist in local offices with largest AFDC
caseloads. For example, two clerks provide assistance in the New Bedford
IV-D office.
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with the families on AFDC, The various functions and activities of local
support enforcement workers are discussed in the following Section of this
Chapter dealing with local enforcement procedures in New Bedford.
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E. LOCAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE 127
Enforcement and Non-Welfare Families
The major objective of the child support enforcement provisions of
P.L.93-647 was to reduce expenditures under the AFDC program by maximizing
the recovery of support payments.1 Support payments recovered pursuant
to these provisions were to be used either to reimburse the states for
assistance payments to eligible families where the sum recovered was less
than the amount of their welfare grants, or to enable the state to ter-
minate assistance to families for whom support payments exceed their welfare
grants.2 As we showed in the previous Section of this Chapter, various
provisions in the law (P.L,93-647) serve to encourage discriminatory, or
at least, concentrated enforcement of support obligations in cases invol-
ving AFDC families, Although non-welfare applicants are also entitled to
enforcement services under the law,3 the financial incentives for state
and localpursuit of fathers associated with non-welfare families are con-
4
siderably lower than for AFDC cases. Several states, including Massa-
5
chusetts, have provided support enforcement exclusively against fathers
associated with families on AFDC.
1. 42 U.S.C. ##651, 657(a)(2)-(4), (b)(l)-(3), Supp. V, 1975. This theme
was introduced in Chapter II where we showed how enforcement of support
developed as a law governing poor families only due to the state interest
in recovery.
2. Id. #657(a)(2)-(4), (b)(l)-(3). To date, 19,000 AFDC families from
29 states have had their public assistance payments terminated as a direct
result of child support enforcement (The Washington Post 2/12/79).
3. Id. #654.
4. As shown in Section D of this Chapter, provisions relating to incentive
payments for states, localities, and other enforcement officials in AFDC
cases, as well as the provision allowing states to retain substantial
amounts of collections made for AFDC families, has created a bias in the
enforcement process.
5. Other states include Virginia, West Virginia, Rhode Island, New Hampshire,
Missouri, and Arizona.
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Consistent with this enforcement policy, child support workers in
the Commonwealth have generally assumed that although PLS services would
be made available to non-welfare applicants, requests from non-welfare
applicants for full enforcement services would be denied. In some cases,
these applicants have been referred by support unit workers to enforce-
ment assistance outside the IV-D program. For the most part, though,
non-welfare applicants must themselves approach their local police pro-
secutor, court probation officer, or hire an attorney, services which are
available to the public but which are most often cost prohibitive. The
chances of successful collection of child support are very low, particularly
on a regular and adequate basis.2 Delays caused by inefficiencies in the
marital courts, and by low priority assigned to support enforcement cases
in the district (criminal) courts, favor the nonsupporting parent.
1. In 1973, the average costs of hiring an attorney for support enforcement
services in Connecticut was $750. In-state collection chances were only
about 60% for obtaining even one payment from the delinquent parent, while
out-of-state collection chances were only 30% for obtaining one payment
and took on average -two and a half years to process. The Massachusetts
Advisory Council on Home and Family (op.cit., pp. 15-19) noted in their
1972 study of child support enforcement that cases seldom come to criminal
court when the family income is substantial. There are several reasons
for this. First, even prior to 1967, AFDC applicants in the Commonwealth
were required, as a condition for eligibility, to file nonsupport complaints
in the criminal courts. At the same time, many courts in high-income
neighborhoods either flatly refused to entertain criminal nonsupport com-
plaints, particularly where a probate court order was already in effect,
or encouraged the wife to come to some out-of-court agreement with the
delinquent father. Where a family was not on welfare, but did not have
substantial resources for private court action, the support problem often
"filtered into the criminal court because of the cost of filing contempt
petitions in the probate court" (p. 19).
2. In the same study of Connecticut court workloads, it was found that the
attitude of judges establishing orders for support was important in deter-
mining order amounts. In Section B of Chapter V, we show how judges in
New Bedford have displayed a regressive application of HEW support guide-
lines, requiring far less than recommended support levels from higher
earning fathers.
3. Betty Cox Spaulding, (Unpublished address to National District Attorneys
Association, Connecticut, 1975), p. 5.
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Enforcement and The.Family on Welfare
On the other hand, full state interest and control over the enforce-
ment process in the case of AFDC families has been assured by requiring that:
(a) the mother assigns all rights to support to the IV-D agency of the
state, relinquishing all claims to support payments as long as the family
is on AFDC; (b) the IV-D support worker in charge of the case undertakes
all enforcement measures from that time (locating the father, establishing
paternity, collecting payments, and pursuing the father in court); (c) the
action at court no longer involves the family but is between the IV-D
worker acting on behalf of the Welfare Department and the father.2
Given the fact that the Massachusetts IV-D agency has applied enforce-
ment laws exclusively against fathers associated with AFDC families, the
procedures for enforcement described below pertain only to AFDC cases.
The 87 child support enforcement offices in Massachusetts differ somewhat
in their application of enforcement procedures according to variations in
local welfare office filing systems, payments and collections methods, and
local court participation in enforcement. Nevertheless, the basic functions
of all child support enforcement offices are the same:" (i) to determine
paternity and establish support agreements or orders for all existing AFDC
cases in which there is an absent parent; (ii) to ensure that all new
1. Although the father has the right to cross-examine in a criminal defense,
so that the mother's presence may be required.
2. Judges have occasionally shown reluctance to enforce support against
fathers whose families are on AFDC, because they rightly perceive that all
payments go to the state, not to the family, so that.refusal to enforce
does not jeopardize the family's AFDC grant nor does strict enforcement
result in financial gains for the family.
3. For a complete description of the administration of child support en-
forcement in Massachusetts, see How They Do It. Child Support Payments
Control in Massachusetts and Washington, Social and Rehabilitation Service,
U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1976) pp. 9-48.
130
AFDC cases in which there is an absent parent are immediately brought
into the IV-D program; (iii) to monitor all cases on IV-D in order to
ensure regular support payments to the Department of Welfare; and (iv)
to use criminal court procedures against delinquent fathers in order to
guarantee continued support and to maximize support payments made to the
Department. 1
Local offices are required to accept referrals of AFDC cases in-
volving IV-D action against the father from other IV-D offices in the
state, and conversely, to refer support files for outgoing cases to des-
tination IV-D offices, This transfer of files involves all materials
relating to the family's AFDC history in addition to all child support
records available on the father. A majority of all such moves made by
families in New Bedford are to intrastate destinations. The inter-office
system of tranferring case records within Massachusetts allows uninter-
rupted monitoring of all child support enforcement cases within the state.
Given the substantial numbers of AFDC cases in Massachusetts which
are eligible for enforcement action,2 and the limited budget of the IV-D
program, a major problem has been understaffing in the state. Conse-
quently, local workers need to devise some system for prioritizing IV-D
caseloads.3 The priorities of the IV-D program are clear enough: to
maximize IV-D revenues from child support payments of absent fathers.
1. The overwhelming philosophy in most states is to recover support funds
on behalf of taxpayers. The primary concern of IV-D program management is
therefore "good business" using the criterion of cost-effectiveness.
(See "Absent Parent Child Support Cost-Benefit Analysis", Report prepared
by Arthur Young & Co., SRS-74-56, December 1975.)
2. Of a total 101,000 cases involving an absent parent on the Massachusetts
AFDC rolls, approximately 48,000 had had some IV-D action initiated by 1978.
3. Alternative schemes for case prioritizing are suggested in Chapter VI.
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Most support workers elect to ignore those cases in which the father is
in jail, is alcoholic, has continually defaulted on payments in spite of
court action or threat of jail sentence, or who cannot be located through
the PLS. Cases involving interstate enforcement under URESA may also
be discontinued where the out-of-state courts have shown reluctance to
assist in the enforcement process,
Interestingly enough, there is no reluctance to pursue cases invol-
ving fathers who are unable to provide adequate or even low support.
More than 30% of fathers participating the the New Bedford IV-D program
2have been marginally employed2 or had unemployment experience. Support
orders established for these fathers reflect their relatively low ability-
3to-pay. For example, orders of $10 per week or less are fairly common
in New Bedford, comprising 14% of all initial orders established. 45% of
all initial support orders established in New Bedford are $20 per week or
less. The average support order level for New Bedford fathers is approxi-
mately $28 per week. As shown in Section D of Chapter V, very few fathers
are able to pay support amounts which exceed the welfare grant of their
families, thereby making them inelgibile for further assistance. In spite
of this fact, however, even smallest dollar amounts are strictly enforced
in the New Bedford IV-D office.
1. One reason for the discontinuation of URESA cases has been the in-
ability of local courts to realize the financial incentives contained
in the legislation (P.L.93-647) due to an absence of statutory authority
within the state or actual statutory barriers to interstate enforcement.
Incentive payments may also be denied to any locality not under coopera-
tive agreement with their state IV-D agency.
2. The marginal employed include those who undertake part-time or seasonal
employment (such as fishing or home construction and repairs), or who de-
pend in part or in total on public assistance for their income (for example,
unemployment compensation, disability pension, old age pension, etc.)
3. The median range of earnings For employed fathers was $126-150, while
marginally employed fathers earned between $101 and $125 net per week.
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In New Bedford, the Child Support Enforcement Unit is maintained by
three court workers, one social service administrative technician, and
two senior clerks who manage collections and maintain all IV-D file re-
cords. The three support workers in New Bedford each have exclusive
responsibility for one of three types of court enforcement: those invol-
ving probate court orders for support (legal separations and divorces),
those involving district court actions (criminal nonsupport), and those
involving out-of-state (URESA) court orders. URESA orders may involve
either (or both) criminal and civil actions for support.
The general procedure by which fathers are drawn into the Massa-
chusetts IV-D program is outlined in Figure III-J. The IV-D unit relies
on the referral of any potential child support enforcement case from
AFDC intake workers, who assess the eligibility of each applicant for an
AFDC grant as well as for IV-D eligibility. The AFDC intake worker con-
siders an AFDC case eligible for IV-D action if: (a) the father is not
in the home; (b) the father is not dead or incapacitated; and (c) the
mother has assigned all rights to child support to the state (i.e. has
signed an affidavit and intends to cooperate fully with all enforcement
efforts).2 The assumption in most cases of maternal non-cooperation
1. In Section B of Chapter IV we provide a complete listing of all file
systems and information contained therein.
2. If a mother does not cooperate in assigning support rights to the
state, and if she cannot establish "just cause" for her refusal (grounds
far non-cooperation are listed in Section C above), the state may withdraw
her AFDC grant. This penalty specifically applies to AFDC mothers only,
and not to their children. IV-D workers generally assume that a mother
who will cooperate if she is destitute and has no other choice. Given
that her AFDC eligiblity has already been determined, withdrawal of her
grant in the event of non-cooperation suggests unnecessary coercion.
Moreover, the mother's grant constitutes a sizeable proportion of the
overall family's grant, so that although her children's individual grants
are not affected by her refusal to cooperate, we cannot assume the family's
economic welfare in unaffected by withdrawal of her grant.
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is that the mother is choosing in some way to protect the father from
IV-D enforcement, Consequently, the IV-D agency adopts the position that
it represents the interests of the child, often against both father and
mother, in nonsupport cases,1 Such an assumption, however, is not
necessarily justified,2
Following a mother's successful application for AFDC, and assignment
of her support rights to the state, the AFDC intake worker notifies the
local IV-D technician of the case, transmitting two forms (A-30 and
A-32) to the IV-D office located in the same building. The technician
then proceeds to open a file on the case. If the mother has been unable
to assist the intake worker in providing information on the father's
residence and place of employment, social security number, and other
information,4 the administrative technician applies to the state IV-D
office in Boston for PLS (Parent Locator Service) assistance. The IRS,
SSA, or other agency of the government may be employed in these efforts
to locate the father and determine his income level,
1. Although the child, in fact, never receives payments obtained on its
behalf by the state,
2. If we assume the mother and her family is destitute, then we must also
assume that this provision requiring her cooperation with IV-D efforts
effectively removes all choice from her. There may be several reasons for
her refusal: she may be threatened with physical harm by the father of her
children, or he may threaten to stop visiting the child if she cooperates.
Since the burden of proof is on the mother to justify her non-cooperation,
the law seems to require that such threats alone would not be sufficient
cause, implying that only real evidence of assault or actual psychological
harm to the child constitutes "just cause" not merely the threat of same.
3. See Figures III-g and h. If the mother is uncooperative, Form A-33
is sent to the IV-D office by the AFDC intake worker (see Figure III-i.)
4. Figure III-j showing the A-23 Form lists the information required on
both parents,
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When the father has been located, he is sent a form letter from the
1
Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, requesting child support
payments from the father in accordance with any established probate or
district court order,2 If no order has been established, the father is
requested to make arrangements with the Department for a voluntary agree-
ment to support. If the case is new (i.e. not a re-application for AFDC),
and the father has been located, the administrative technician cross-
checks welfare files to determine whether the father is currently the
recipient of public assistance himself, under old age, disability, un-
employment compensation, etc., in which case support enforcement action is
discontinued.3
The "voluntary" agreement is a signed affidavit of paternity con-
taining the support amount agreed upon with the father.4 If the father is
unwilling to sign an affidavit of support, the technician may try instead
to obtain a "verbal" (unsigned) agreement to support from the father.
The technician then files all pertinent information in a IV-D file used
specifically for new cases, containing all cases which were established
over the past three months. After three months of non-delincuent payments,
a case is transfered into active files by type of agreement or court order,
and is no longer monitored by the technician.
1. Figure III-k shows the Form A-29 letter to the father from the Depart-
ment, which may also be sent if he has become delinquent in support.
2. Re-applications for AFDC often already have an A-24 Form on the father
for support (see Figure III-Z).
3. In approximately 5,000 AFDC cases in Massachusetts (out of 101,000),
the father himself is eligible for inclusion in the family's AFDC budget
under the AFDC-UP program for unemployed parents.
4. This Form A-25 is presented in Figure III-m.
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If non-judicial procedures for enforcement prove unsuccessful, the
case will be passed on by the technician to the appropriate court worker
for civil (probate) or criminal (district) nonsupport action. The IV-D
court worker sends a wage report to the father's primary -employer in
order to estimate the father's net weekly earnings,1 Insurance,
medical, and most credit union deductions from the father's pay are allowed
in the computing of netweekly earnings, although payments made for a car,
mortgage payments, or support for a second family of the father are
usually disallowed as unnecessary for the father's maintenance. The
level of support is then estimated as a proportion of the father's net
weekly earnings, given the total number of his dependents, The court
worker may also, with the mother's assistance, document the father's past
nonsupport in order to provide the court with evidence of wilful neglect.
Civil and Criminal Contempt
In cases of civil contempt, the court worker first locates records of
hearings. In many cases, no support order was established by the court.3
1. Figure III-n contains the wage report form on which is detailed the
weekly wage earnings (usually from W-2 tax forms) of the father.
2. Refer to Table 111-5.
3. Such cases are termed "Care and Custody Only", referring to the fact
that the mother was granted custody of the children by the court, but was
not provided with any order for paternal support of herself and her
children. A judgement of divorce which includes a support order often
represents the culmination of only the first phase of litigation, however,
and frequently is followed by further litigation regarding enforcement of
the order. D. S. Blank and J. Rone, "Enforcement of Interspousal Suppport
Obligations: A Proposal", 2 Women's Rights Law Reporter 13 (June 1975) p. 13,
suggest that the assumption of payment by the obligor should be replaced
by presumption of nonpayment.
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Where a probate court order has been established, non-payment by the
father may account for the family's application for AFDC,1 Similarly,
where a father's ability-to-pay support has changed, the family may no
longer be able to maintain their welfare independence. In both cases,
the court worker will return the case to the probate court of the original
2 3
action for contempt or modification of the original order. If a probate
action had not been completed (i.e.! divorce or legal separation finalized),
the court worker may attempt to obtain a temporary, or separate, support
order for the family pendente lite (pending litigation). Once an order
has been established, the father begins making support payments directly
to the IV-D office or, more usually, to the probate court which then for-
wards payments to the IV-D office, As long as the family remains on AFDC,
no payments may be made directly to the family. In probate cases, the
mother's presence in court is not required, since the father has no rights
to cross-examine. However, he does have the right to appeal the court's
decision to the state Superior Court, which generally rules on matters of
1. In Section C of Chapter V, we examine the payment responses of fathers
to different types of support orders and agreements.
2. Contempts imay be civil or criminal, direct or indirect. Probation
officers may initiate civil contempt proceedings against fathers if they
determine that court-ordered support payments are not being made
(General Laws of Massachusetts Annotated, Ch. 276, ##83, 85A, 85B, 1972).
In Salveson v. Salveson, 351 N.E,2d 499, 501 (1976) in Massachusetts, in-
ability to pay $13,854.64 in support arrears at the time of the hearing
precluded sentencing for civil contempt. In another Massachusetts case,
Sodones v. Sodones, 314 N.E.2d 906, 913 (1974), it was ruled that a two-
year interval between the hearing and appellate decision required re-
evaluation of the defendant's ability-to-pay.
3. Although the original controversy cannnt be relitigated in a contempt
proceeding, nevertheless the original order may be modified upon a showing
of substantial change in the father's circumstances and ability-to-pay
support. See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 353 Mass. 351, 352/231 N.E.2d 570,
571 (1967). For a complete discussion of contempt in civil nonsupport
cases, see Philip P. Houle and Eugene Z. Dubose, "The Nonsupport Contempt
Hearing: Constitutional and Statutory Requirements", 14 New Hampshire Bar
Journal (1973) p. 165.
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due process.1
Similar procedures are used in criminal nonsupport cases.2 However,
the father is also generally placed on probation by the court for a period
not exceeding six months, although probation extensions covering several
years are not unusual. If a father defaults on payments, or does not
appear before the probation officer, within the prescribed period, he
may be cited for contempt and ordered to appear before the judge or magi-
strate for sentencing. A finding of guilty often results in the establish-
ment of an order for arrears to be paid in bulk or in addition to weekly
support sums.
Where arrearages have been reduced to a money judgement, parties
seeking to recover support may employ remedies typically available to
creditors, such as post-judgement executions, liens, wage garnishments,4
5
and attachment of the debtor's property. Until recently, when the IRS
1. D-..B. Dobbs, "Contempt of Court: A Snrvey", 56 Cornell Law Review
(1971) pp. 241-245, contrasts standards and procedures operative in civil
and criminal contempt cases. The line between civil and criminal contempt
is not always clear.. For example, the-objective of-contempt proceedings
to coerce contemnors to testify may compel the classification of con-
tempt as civil despite a district court finding of criminal contempt, as in
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1966).
2. R. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power (Anchor Ed. 1971), contrasts safe-
guards available to civil and criminal contemnors. See also Comment,
"Contempt of Court: Some Considerations For Reform", Wisconsin Law Review
(1975) pp. 1117, 1120-21.
3. Arrearage sums can be considerable and may be paid beyond the termina-
tion of the family's AFDC grant. They may accrue from the time of the
court order and continue through the entire period the family is on AFDC.
4. Wage garnishment has been relatively impotent as an enforcement tool
in Massachusetts due to lack of statutory authority in the state. See
Roger A. Olson, "Involuntary Wage Assignments: A New Approach For Effective
Enforcement of Support Obligatons", 11 Buffalo U. Law Review (1961) p. 396.
Through garnishment, an employer may be required to deduct support from the
father's paycheck and send support payments direct to the IV-D agency.
5. For a complete discussion of alternate measures used in the enforcement
of support, see Blank and Rone, og.cit.. pp. 15-25. Only recently, the
IRS became active in enforcing support in behalf of the IV-D agency by
attaching property in arrears cases.
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became involved in the prcoess of collection for IV-D agencies, these
procedures were seldom used. One reason is that judges tend to rely on
enforcement measures which have proved effective in the past or are in
common use.
Judges occasionally decide to incarcerate a father who has shown
persistent delinquency in support of his family. 2 However, before a
court can impose coercive imprisonment for violation of a court order, it
must find not only that the defendant had the ability to comply when the
payment was due, but also that he is able to pay the accrued arrearage at
the time of the contempt hearing.3 The sentencing is generally carried
out on weekends4 so that the earnings capacity of the father will not be
impaired.5 This procedure has been challenged on various grounds, but
1. The absence of a comprehensive system of enforcement, such as that
provided for arrearage collection by the IRS, has served to discourage
judgements which the court may be unable to execute successfully.
2. It has been argued that coercive imprisonment of civil contemnors
should be limited because such contemnors are afforded only basic due
process rights (see Comment, "The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt",
33 U. Chicago Law Review (1965) pp. 120, 121-122
3. The U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 64
(1948) that the court may not impose a condition for release from imprison-
ment with which a defendant is unable at the time to comply, The potential
ability to comply was ruled insufficient cause for imprisonment. Some
courts, however, have ruled that a father's labor is sufficient evidence
of ability to comply, upholding jail sentences in these cases, although the
use of jail sentencing as an inducement to friends to pay for a debt has
been criticized (see Houle and Dubose, op.cit, pp. 165, 178-179).
Just as a father may not declare bankruptcy in order to avoid child support
obligations (see Commonwealth v. Burlington, 136 Mass. 435, where father
threatened to close business and leave the country rather than provide
support), a defendant may not render himself unable to comply with a support
order by deliberately terminating his employment just prior to a contempt
hearing. In Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C.App. 390, 392-393/204 S.E.2d, 554,
555-556 (1974), it was ruled that a court may impose a definite prison term
as punishment for past misconduct in such cases.
4. General Laws of Massachusetts Annotated, Ch. 215, #34 (Supp. 1976).
5. Incarceration of a family provider defeats the state interest in en-
forcing the support obligation (see Yoder v. County, 278 A.2d, 379, 387-
388, Me. 1971).
139
primarily as an abridgement of the father's constitutional rights.1 It
is also argued that jail sentencing, as either a punishment or induce-
ment to comply, rarely effects any change in the support behavior of the
persistent delinquent, nor acts as a deterrent to hard-core contemnors.2
In some cases, although a probate court order has been established,
a criminal complaint will also be sought against the father for persistent
nonsupport, In this event, the support orders operate simultaneously,
not consecutively. When either terminates, the other (generally the pro-
bate order) remains in effect. Thus, arrears do not accrue on the order
which is temporarily superseded. For the most part, criminal actions re-
sult in support orders for arrears, upon payment of which a father may no
longer be on probation or may be required to pay directly to the IV-D
agency, unless probation extensions are effected. In the case of a probate
court order, the order remaiin in effect until such time as the child
reaches majority, the father dies, or the mother's husband formally adopts
the child.
1. Constitutional rights of support contemnors are discussed by F. Dibble,
Jr., "Contempt of Court: Go Directly To Jail, Do Not Pass Go. Do Not Collect
Your Constitutional Rights", 7 Suffolk U. Law Review (1973) p. 517; H. B.
Palmer, "The Rising Divorce Rate: Familiarity Breeds Contempt", 11 Suffolk
U. Law Review (Spring 1977) pp. 1073-4; T. Willging and J. Ellsmore,
"The 'Dual System' in Action: Jail For Nonsupport", U. Toledo Law Review
(Spring 1969) p. 348.
2. See in general, David L. Chambers, "Men Who Know They are Watched: Some
Benefits and Costs of Jailing For Nonpayment of Support", OCSE-IM-78-3
(1/31/78), Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Human Services
(Washington D.C,); and Pamela Burgy, "Enforcement of Support: Unequal and
Ineffective", (Unpublished Dissertation, 3rd Year Requirement, Harvard Law
School, 1968). Although we did not analyze the impact of jail sentencing,
in Chapter V we examine the impact of court action on support behavior.
3. A defendant may be found guilty of either or both civil and criminal
contempt, these two actions not being mutually exclusive. Initiative by
the state in nonsupport cases generally involves criminal action, while
action initiated by the mother is civil, depending on whether the action
is designed to address a public or private wrong.
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Case Closure
Of the approximately 4,000 AFDC cases in New Bedford with IV-D
potential, about 2,800 have had some form of enforcement action initiated.
Significant numbers of these have had multiple case openings and closures.'
The pattern of high turnover in AFDC cases has been well documented,2 and
since IV-D case closure (or re-opening) occurs simultaneously with AFDC
case closure (or re-opening), we would expect high turnover among IV-D
cases., When an AFDC case is closed, the case worker generally notifies
the IV-D office, and the appropriate court worker notifies the father that
he will be making payments directly to the family (or court) in the future.
The father's support enforcement files are then placed in a "limbo" file
for cases which have closed wihtin the past three months. Fathers often
become delinquent in support payments following their family's exit from
AFDC when they find they are not being actively pursued for support by the
Welfare Department. This, and the fact that AFDC cases may re-open because
the mother financial circumstances have changed (e.g. she has subsequently
lost her job), means that there is a high probability that a "limbo" case
will re-open. Maintaining the separate file facilitates later case re-
opening. If no change occurs in the family's AFDC status during the three
months, the case is then transferred to a file for IV-D case closures.
1. 35.6% of all New Bedford IV-D cases showed multiple entries and exits
from AFDC (and IV-D).
2. M. J. Boskin and F. C. Nold, "A Markov Model of Turnover in AFDC",
J. Human Resources, vol.X , no. 4 (1975) pp. 467-481.
3. Except in cases where court orders establishing arrearages have been
obtained. In these cases, although the AFDC case on the family is closed,
the IV-D file on the father remains open and is marked for easy identifi-
catinn and monitoring of payments.
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Child Support Collections
After the IV-D unit has established an agreement or court order for
support with the father, he is required to make payments, usually on a
weekly or monthly basis, by mail or in person to the IV-D office in
New Bedford or to the appropriate court. Fathers who are required to
appear before the probation officer of the court at regular intervals
generally pay the court at that time. Court payments are then forwarded
to the IV-D office in New Bedford or to the office from which the court
action was initiated. Checks or cash received in the local office are
first recorded in the support payments file of the father by date and
amount received. Support payments are then forwarded, usually on a daily
basis, to a firm in Boston2 which computerizes all payments made by case
number, location of payments, amount, date, etc. All IV-D revenues are
then deposited by the firm in a receipt account for the state IV-D agency.
Moneys received do not in any way offset either the grants received by the
family on AFDC, or expenses incurred in the support of AFDC families by the
Department of Public Welfare in Massachusetts. The only adjustment made is
to the AFDC budget, adjusted each year by the amount calculated as the
Federal share of IV-D support collections for that fiscal year.3 Moneys
received under the IV-D child support enforcement program are sent to the
State Treasury where they are re-appropriated by the State Legislature each
fiscal year.
1. Although fathers may elect to pay child support in lump sums.
2. In Massachusetts, this is handled by Bradford Services, Inc.
3. viz. a Line 9 Adjustment, based on the Federal:State cost-sharing
formula for most welfare services..
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Not all collections received by the state under the IV-D program
are retained by the state: the Federal government receives approximately
51% of all collections, equivalent to the Federal share of expenses in
the support of AFDC families in Massachusetts. Local law enforcement
agencies and officials under cooperative agreement with the state IV-D
agency receive 15% of collections, which is taken out of the Federal share.
It is generally agreed that the incentives for participation in the IV-D
program are substantial at the local level, although only 15% of collec-
tions is retained in AFDC case enforcement.2 States have also received
substantial net benefits from the IV-D program, though generally less
than local agencies except in states which have restricted enforcement to
welfare cases only.3 The Federal government, last in line to receive a
share of the child support program proceeds, has consistently shown net
losses in all program years.
In fiscal 1976, figures supplied by OCSE for the first year of the
program showed actual reported collections of about $230 million.4 Of the
$230 million collected, the recipients received $40 million,5 local
1. Federal and state shares are calculated using the FMAP (Federal Medi-
caid Assistance Plan) formula for cost-sharing in each state. This is
based on the per capita industrial wage index in each state. In Massa-
chusetts, the ratio of Federal to state cost-sharing for most human
service programs is.approximately 51:49. The 51.62% which is the Federal
share is not taken from collections, but is used in a Line 9 Adjustment of
the Federal share of costs for welfare programs.
2. In their benefit-cost analysis, Arthur Young & Co., og.cit., concluded
that enforcement in non-AFDC cases was more cost-effective than AFDC case
enforcement. Non-AFDC case enforcement occurs primarily at the local level.
3. As, for example, in Massachusetts.
4. This figure does not represent a net increase in collections over pre-
vious years, since several states had child support enforcement programs
prior to the 1975 legislation (viz. Massachusetts, Michigan, California,
and Washington),
5. Some states deducted father's payments from the family's AFDC grant.
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enforcement agencies received $30 million, the states received about $90
million,' and the Federal government about $70 million. Total state
administrative costs came to $32 million and Federal costs were about
$96 million, based on a 75:25 cost-sharing ratio between Federal and
state governments for the Child Support Enforcement Program. Net savings
to the states in fiscal 1976 thus came to about $60 million, while the
IV-D program actually cost the Federal government about $26 million.2
Although a large increase in the nation's IV-D caseload, and there-
fore in IV-D revenues, was expected during fiscal 1977, nevertheless it
did not seem likely that total IV-D revenues would produce substantial
reductions in the overall Federal costs of supporting families on AFDC.3
1. Originally, the incentive payment to localities was 25% of the first
year's obligation in any case, to be reduced to 10% in subsequent years.
However, this produced a bias in enforcement toward new cases only, so
that a flat 15% incentive payment level was adopted.
2. Observed by Abe Lavine, op.cit., p. 49.
3. In fiscal 1976, the AFDC program cost the Federal government in excess
of $5.5 billion. If local agencies currently not under cooperative agree-
ments with their state IV-D agency were to become eligible for reimburse-
ment, total revenues to the Federal government from the IV-D program would
decrease further. (75% of their administrative costs would be incurred by
the Federal government, while 15% of collections made by localities would
be taken from the Federal share of collections.) On the other hand, the
existing loss to local taxpayers in the absence of cooperative agreements
is considerable. County courts in Massachusetts, for example, are funded
solely by local property taxpayers. While cooperative agreements are not
in effect, localities lose all reimbursements (75% of costs) and revenues
(15% of collections in AFDC cases and fees for servicing non-AFDC cases)
they would otherwise be entitled to. The loss is even greater in counties
which have substantial child support enforcement caseloads already being
processed in their courts. Data on revenue and reimbursement loss in
Massachusetts courts is provided by P. Berkowitz and A. Greenstein,
"Child Support Enforcement: The Need For Cooperative Agreements in
Massachusetts", (Unpublished Paper prepared at the Graduate School of
Design, Harvard University, June 1977).
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Indeed, during fiscal 1977, the Federal government incurred a net loss
of approximately $50 million, almost double that of fiscal 1976. At the
same time, states and localities received net revenues for the program of
about $215 million. For the Federal government, at least, we cannot
assume that the major intent of P.L.93-647 was to recover costs incurred
in the support of poor families, specifically AFDC. Instead, we have
suggested that the Child Support Enforcement Program was part of a larger
"welfare reform" package following the welfare expansion years of the
late 60s and early 70s. We would therefore argue that the primary intent
of the program was to effect a welfare rollback. In Chapter V. we will
examine the impact of child support enforcement on the welfare dependency
of female-headed families in New Bedford, Massachusetts.
FIGURE III-6, ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT UNIT WORK FLOW
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agency CSE worker
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Source: How They Do It. Child Support Payments Control in Massachusetts
and Washington, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Social and Rehabilitative Service (Washington D.C. 1976),
p.1 6 .
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FIGURE ITI-g
Form A-30
(Rev. 5/76)
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT UNIT
INTAKE SUPPLEMENT ON CHILD SUPPORT - AFDC
(Use a Separate Form for Each Father)
In accordance with Public Law 93-647, effective August 1, 1975, a recipient of AFDC, as a
condition of initial and ongoing eligibility, must cooperate with the Child Support Enforce-
ment Unit in locating and obtaining support from the absent parent of a child(ren) who is/are
receiving assistance, by providing information or attesting to lack of information, under
penalty of perjury.
CLIENT's FULL NAME MAIDEN NAME
ADDRESS TELEPHONE NO.
DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH SOC. SEC. NO.
DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE APPLIC. DATE
MARITAL STATUS: DIVORCED LEGALLY SEP. MUTUALLY SEP. SINGLE_ .
DATE COURT AMOUNT $ WK.() MO.()
HAS PATERNITY BEEN LEGALLY ADJUDICATED? YES O NO 7 IN PROCESS O
DATE COURT AMOUNT $ WK. ( ) MO. ( )
LAST SUPPORT RECEIVED DIRECTLY BY CLIENT (IF COURT, GIVE NAME):
FROM ABSENT PARENT ___ OR -COURT: DATE AMOUNT $
MAN'S FULL NAME_
'ATE .& PLACE OF BIRTH
HIS FATHER'S NAME_
LAST KNOWN ADDRESS_
LAST KNOWN EMPLOYER_
HEALTH INSURANCE Yes 7 No F
CURRENTLY IN MILITARY SERVICE
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION BENEFITS
MILITARY SERVICE RETIREMENT
SOC. SEC. NO.
HT. WTV'. HAIR EYES
HIS MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME
DATE TEL. NO.
DATE TEL. NO.
INSURANCE CO. POLICY NO.
Yes E No O BRANCH
Yes No
Yes No O BRANCH
NAMES AND DATES OF BIRTH OF MAN'S CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS (Only Those Receiving AFDC or for
Whom AiLC is Requested) (Use a Separate Form for Each Father)
I do hereby attest to the truth of the above statements under penalty of perjury.
SIGNATURE OF CLIENT_ DATE
(Use Reverse Side to Record Additional Information)
FIGURE iII-h
COMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE
Form A-32 VOTICE TO CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT UNIT (CSEU)
DATE:
TO: CSEU,
(Location)
FROM: CSA/WSO,
This notice refers for child support services:
Name
Address
Date of application for AFDC:
Recipient of AFDC Since:
SS #
The assignment of Support rights signed by the above-named applicant/recipient is
attached.
Check one:
Form A-30 is attached.
O Form A-30 has been completed by Social Service Administrative
Technician.
Signed:
(Assistance Payments Worker
Notice must be transmitted to CSEU within two working days after assign'ent is
sitned.
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Form A-33
TO:
FROM:
FIGURE III-4
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE
NOTICE OF FAILURE TO COOPERATE IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
DATE:
CSA/WSO Director
Child Support Enforcement Worker
RE: Name Social Security #
Address
This is to inform you that the above-named person has failcd to cooperate with the
Child Support Enforcement Unit (CSEU) with reference to the following situation:
CSEU Worker has had conference with Assistance Payments (AP) Worker:
Yes Q No O
Conference is requested with AP Worker Yes No -
Action should be taken to enforce th-e eligibility requirement of cooperation:
Yes M No E
Distribution:
Original - WSO/AP Unit
Copy - - - CSEU
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FIGURE III-]
REFERRAL TO COURT SOCIAL WORKER
FOR SUPPORT ACTION - AFDC CASE
RECIPIENT'S FULL NAME
ADDRESS
(USE A SEPARATE FORM FOR EACH FATHER)
MAIDEN NAME
TELEPHONE #
AFDC REG. # DATE OF APPLICATION
DATE OF BIRTH __
DATE OF MARRIAGE
MARITAL STATUS 1. DIV. 2. LEGALLY SEP. 3. MUTUALLY SEP. 4. SINGLE
1.
2.
3.
4.
DATE COURT AMOUNT $ WK. ()
DATE COURT AMOUNT S WK.
DATE COURT AMOUNT $ WK. ( )
HAS PATERNITY SEEN LEGALLf ADJUDICATED?
DATE COURT AMOUNT $ W ( K.
DATE LAST SUPPORT PAYMENT RECEIVED AMOUNT $
RECEIVED BY CLIENT
MONTHLY GRANT $
WELFARE DEPARTMENT
QUARTERLY (FLAT) GRANT $ OTHER INCOME $.
FuLL NAME OF PARENT NOT SUPPORTING FAMILY
LAST KNOWN ADDRESS TELEPHONE #
S.S.# DATE OF BIRTH
LAST KNOWN PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT
DESCRIPTION: HEIGHT WEIGHT
HIS rATHER'S FULL NAME
HIS MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME
HIS MOTHER'S
CHILDREN'S FULL NAMES AND DATES OF BIRTH (ONLY THOSE IN AFDC SUDGET)
______________ 
1~ _______ ____
DATE SOCIAL WORKER WSO
(SEE REVERSE SIDE)
Fom A-23
P1554
Rev. 10/72
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PLACE
PLACE
MO. ( )
MO. ( )
MO. ( )
-1y~
m . ( )
PLACE
HAIR EYES RACE
S.S.#
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FIGURE iii-k
Form A-29
P 1545
Rev.- 11/71
RETURN TO:
STEVEN A. MINTER
COMUISSIONEN
DATE:
Dear Sir:
Your family is beirg provided financial assistance by the Depart-.
ment of Public Welfare under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program.
Cur records indicate that you are under a District Court ( ),
Probate Court order ( ) or have signed a voluntary agreement ( ) to
pay S per week for the support of your dependents.
Your last support payment was 3 received on
Since we may be unaware of present cIrcuostances which may have affected
your ability to comply with either a court order cr voluntary agreement
we urge you to contact this office irm.ediately.
If you are not making support payments by one of the methods out-
lined above we expect you to contact this office within ten days in
order to make arrangements for support payments to your family.
It is also possible that you, are making direct payments to your
family and that this department is not aware of this arrangement. In
this case you should also contact this office.
In the event that you do not make an effort to contact this office
regarding support payments we have no other recourse except to start
legal action. Seotion T-.nty-One of Chapter 18 of the General Laws,
as amended by Ch-ptor 885 of the Acts of 1969, provides that a parent
who deserts or who unreisonably refuses to support his wife and/ or
minor children is subject to legsl action irtiated by the Department
of Public Welfare in the courts of the Ccrmonwealth.
Yours very truly,
SUPPORT UTNIT
Tel:
Arg.
"X
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FIGURE III-Z
Form A-24
P 1550
Date
Social Worker
GRANTEE RELATIVE
LAST NAME FIRST NAME
LOCATION AND SUPPORT CARD
NUMBER OF
CHILDREN IN GRANT
Community
Region
DATE OF IMONTHLY MAINT.
GRANT GRANT
NAME OF SEPARATED OR ADJUDICATED CURRENT :OR LAST KNOWN ADDRESS
PARENT (LAST NAME - FIRST NAME) ALIASES (Specify "C" or "LK")
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH FATHER'S NAME MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME
SOCIAL SEC: # ARMED FORCES SERIAL # THER IDENTIFYING DATA:
EMPLOYMENT RECORD
Date ( Employer Address 'ccupation Weekly Earnings red.Plan
(Current)
(Previous)
EXISTING COURT ORDER: $ NAME OF PROBATE/DISTRICT COURT: DATE OF ACTION:
VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT (Effective date): WEEKLY AMOUNT: $
REFERRAL FOR COURT ACTION DATE: NAME OF PROBATE/DISTRICT COURT: 1STATUS:
COMPLAINT OR PETITION DATE: DISPOSITION; COURT ORDER: $ EFF. DATE:
INTERSTATE RECIPROCAL ACTION: NAME OF COURT: WEEKLY AMT: $ EFF. DATE:
Yes No
ACTION ON MISSING PARENT
IF LOCATED, DATE: CURRENT ADDRESS: ACTION TAKEN:
REFERRAL TO SUPPORT UNIT FOR LOCATION, DATE:
LIST SOURCES TO LOCATE MISSING PARENT:
SUPPORT PAYMENTS
Date Amount Date, Amount Date Amount Date Amount Date Amount
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FIGURE III-m
Form A-25
Rev. 10/73
PARENTS SUPPORT AGREEMENT
DATE:
Parents Social Security #:
(Father)
(Mother)
I, of
(Street) (City or Town)
am the father of
the children of
I agree to pay the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare the sum of
$ each and every week toward the cost of support and maintenance of
my dependents who are now being provided for by said Department. The first
payment to be made on . I further agree that these payments will
continue to be made by me during the time that my dependents are being
partially or totally support by the said Department. I am presently employed
by (company)of (address)
and my gross pay is $ weekly. Should circumstances change which
affect the conditions of this agreement, I shall notify the Department of
Public Welfare immediately. This includes an increase or decrease in salary
as well as loss of employment.
Signed under Penalty of Perjury
(Parent's Signature)
(Witness's Signature)
Postal money orders or bank checks are to be made payable to the Massachusetts
Department of Public Welfare and sent to Welfare
Service Office located at (address), Massachusetts.
Section twenty-one of Chapter 18 of the General Laws, as amended by Chapter
885 of the Acts of 1969, provides that a parent who deserts, or who unreason-
ably refuses to support his wife and/or minor children, is subject to legal
action initiated by the Department of Public Welfare in the courts of
Massachusetts.
Form A-28
P 1544
WAGE REPORT
FIGURE III-n
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE
DATE:
CASE #
RETURN TO:
THIS DEPARTMENT IS INTERESTED IN
(Occupation) (Department)
WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COOPERATION IN PROVIDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
VERY TRULY YOURS,
(Support Unit)
(Current address)
NO. OF TAX EXEMPTIONS: SOCIAL SECURITY #:
IS THE ABOVE-NAMED PERSON AND/OR HIS FAMILY ENTITLED TO HOSPITAL OR SICK
BENEFITS? Yes No Type
ABOVE-NAMED PERSON IS NOT IN OUR EMPLOY:
DATE OF AND REASON FOR TERMINATION OF SERVICE:
HAS EMPLOYMENT RECENTLY BEEN OFFERED?
EARNINGS FOR PAST TEN WEEKS
Week Ending Gross Net $ Week Ending Gross Net $
TEL #:
SIGNATURE:
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CHAPTER IV
THE DATA
A. A CASE STUDY OF NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
In November of 1977, the author gained access to the complete files
of the Child Support Enforcement Office in New Bedford, Massachusetts.1
All cases of child support enforcement in the Commonwealth involved the
fathers of families on AFDC. We need data on the family from AFDC files
-and on support enforcement against the father from IV-D files. During
the next three months, information was recorded from both sets of files
(AFDC and IV-D) covering the complete history of AFDC dependency of the
family, the marital history of the parents, and a record of the father's
history of child support since the family's first successful application
for AFDC. Of an approximate total of 5,000 AFDC cases in the New Bedford
region, about 4% were AFDC-UP cases,2 6% involved a deceased father, and
another 10% a father who was incapacitated (unable to work toward the sup-
port of his family). Of the remaining 3,950 cases with IV-D (child support
1. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Representative Mel King,
Commissioner Alexander Sharp, General Counsel A. Van C. Lanckton, both of
the Department of Public Welfare in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and
to Gertrude L. Linehan, Director of the Massachusetts Child Support Enforce-
ment Office, for their assistance.
2. Where the father is unemployed, he may live in the home and be included
in the family's AFDC-Unemployed Parent budget, in which event child support
enforcement action is terminated.
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enforcement) potential, approximately 70% (about 2,800) of absent fathers
had been located for support purposes, and an agreement of order estab-
lished.1
2
New Bedford City is located in Bristol County on the south-eastern
coastal area of Massachusetts, about 80 miles south of Boston. Figure IV-a
shows a map of east Massachusetts, and Figure IV-b provides an enlarge-
ment of the inset area featuring the cities and towns which form the
study area, the New Bedford Region: New Bedford, Achushnet, Dartmouth,
and Gosnold Island. The AFDC records of families residing in these towns
are located in the New Bedford Welfare Service Office (WSO), although this
office also coordinates welfare service provision throughout a larger
region which includes the towns of Mattapoisett, Rochester, Marion, Wareham,
3
and Fairhaven. For the purposes of this child support enforcement re-
search, we will be concerned only with those towns shown in the inset of
Figure III-b. All child support payments made by fathers on behalf of
AFDC families in this region are collected by the IV-D unit office located
also in the New Bedford Welfare Office building. Frequently, enforcement
of court orders requires that local IV-D unit workers travel to courts in
4
which a particular order originated. Many such cases are transfered for
1. A complete dscription of the data on child support enforcement in New
Bedford is provided in Section C of this Chapter.
2. The population of New Bedford City in 1970 was approximately 650,000.
3. Both Fairhaven and Wareham have WSOs, and therefore their own child
support enforcement units. Figure IV-c shows a map of the larger region,
indicating the location of CSAs (Community Services Area offices), WSOs
(Welfare Service offices), and courts.
4. In addition to the local district and probate courts, New Bedford is
also the site for a Superior Court, one of seven in Massachusetts, which
occasionally handles appeals in child support enforcement cases.
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FIGURE IV-a. EAST-COASTAL MASSACHUSETTS WITH NEW BEDFORD REGION INSET
Boto
Vineyard
Nantucketq
0
do 4w 
A0
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FIGURE IV-b. THE NEW BEDFORD REGION OF MASSACHUSETTS
dG
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FIGURE IV-C. COMMUNITY SERVICE AREA OF NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
(REGION 34, TITLE XX)
CSA Community Services Area office
WSO Welfare Service office
Lreham + Superior Court
WSO)* x Probate Court
.oo District Court
* Child support payments
collected
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convenience to local New Bedford courts, probate or district.
Economically, the New Bedford region is relatively depressed. It has
the highest unemployment rate of any region in the Commonwealth, 5.1% in
1970 and 12.0% in 1977. The high unemployment is also reflected in the
numbers of individuals whose income was below poverty level in 1970 and
who were receiving public assistance: 14% in New Bedford, compared with
9% in the state overall. Local manufacturing provides employment for 41%
of the local labor force, specifically textiles and machine equipment (20%)
and non-durable goods (9%).2 Most factory work is highly unionized in the
region. A significant proportion of local jobs are seasonal: local fishing
and construction industries account for 8% of the local New Bedford labor
force. In the absence of local job opportunities particularly during the
winter months, many workers seek out-of-state employment in nearby Rhode
Island or further down the east coast.
Labor force participation rates for both men and women between 18 and
21 years of age are 8.2% higher in New Bedford than in the state overall,
as shown in Table IV-1. This trend toward earlier labor force participation
is also apparent from the low relative school enrollment rates for the
same age group, which is 12% lower than in the state overall. In 1970,
25% of all 16 to 21 year old New Bedford males were not high school graduates,
compared with just 12% in the state that year. The median school years
1. The unemployment rate for the state in 1970 was just 2.2%.
2. This is 10% higher than state levels of employment in manufacturing.
Fully 29% of local New Bedford workers are machine operators (non-transport
industry), compared with 15% in the state overall.
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TABLE IV-1. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES, 1970
New Bedford %
Age SMSA Massachusetts Difference
Males 18-19 66.7 58.5 8.2
20-21 74.5 68.6 5.9
Females 18-19 61.6 52.3 9.3
20-21 65.7 59.9 5.8
25-34 51.0 43.3 7.7
35-44 58.6 50.9 7.7
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970.
General Social and Economic Characteristics. Final Report.
Massachusetts. PC(1)-C23. Tables 64 and 85 (pp. 258, 318).
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completed by New Bedford males was 9.3, by New Bedford females 9.6, com-
pared with state averages of 12.2 years for both males and females.
Finally, the percent of 18 to 24 years olds in New Bedford with four or
more years of college was 4.1%, compared with 8.8% for the state as a
whole.
Note also from Table IV-1 that the labor force participation rate
for women of major child-bearing age (24 to 44 years) in New Bedford is
substantially higher than for the state. On the other hand, overall rates
for mothers in female-headed families with children under six years of age
is lower (31%) than for the state (38%). This may reflect the higher com-
petition for jobs among women in New Bedford, but more importantly, the
rate indicates that there are probably higher levels of family poverty
if FHFs are unsupported by wage earnings of the mother. We would also
expect higher proportions of FHFs to require public assistance under the
AFDC program.
In 1970, the median family income in Massachusetts was $10,835; in
New Bedford it was $8,792. Much of the difference can be explained by the
higher percentage of blue-collar worker in the New Bedford labor force.
We also find, however, that average wage levels for all professional workers,
and for women in the New Bedford work force, were substantially lower than
state levels. In 1970, 10% of all New Bedford families had incomes lower
than poverty level, compared with 6% in the state. Although the mean size
of New Bedford families was 3.4, compared with 2.4 for the state, the mean
2
size of poor families was approximately the same for both (about 3.6).
1. Although the difference is somewhat inflated by the high percentage of
Massachusetts residents attending college.
2. i.e. those with annual incomes lower than the poverty level.
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In New Bedford, 38% of all families were headed by women, a lower per-
centage than for the state as a whole (43%). This suggests that higher
levels of family poverty in New Bedford are to be explained by higher
numbers of intact families belo poverty level in the region. In 1970,
27% of all New Bedford families received their income from social security
(6% higher than for the state), while 9% of New Bedford families were
receiving public assistance or public welfare income (compared with 6% in
the state overall). By 1977, fully 12% of all New Bedford families were
receiving assistance under the AFDC program.2
1. An alternate explanation would be that New Bedford had a relatively
high percentage of families headed by fathers only. However, only 0.1%
of all poor families on welfare in 1973 were headed by males, 1.1% lower
than-for the 1U. S. as a whole.
2. These statistics do not include families receiving other forms of
public assistance and are therefore an underestimate of actual levels of
family poverty in New Bedford in 1977.
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B. CREATION OF THE STUDY FILE
Data Files in New Bedford
The New Bedford Child Support Enforcement Unit maintains several files
pertaining to both the family on AFDC and the father from whom support is
being enforced. Each filing systemwas organized alphabetically under
either the mother's, or the father's, name. A main filing system listed
all IV-D cases, by name of the father, in which some action for support en-
forcement had been taken against the father by December of 1977. A second
file cross-referenced parents by name changes, single, married, re-married,
and maiden. These basic files contained the names of approximately 2,800
parents, and comprised 67.5% of all New Bedford AFDC cases.
A third filing system listed all IV-D (child support enforcement) cases
according to whether they had been established by verbal or voluntary agree-
ment, or by probate or district court order. URESA cases were filed under
probate or district court orders, depending on the type of action involved.
A fourth filing system contained a folder of information on each father par-
ticipating in the IV-D program, including a full history of support enforce-
ment against the father, the various wage reports associated with each court
action, together with other documentation of the father's ability-to-pay
support.2 This folder also contained all information available on
1. Voluntary agreements are signed affidavits of paternity establishing the
amount of the weekly support obligation. Verbal agreements are generally
obtained by telephone from fathers unwilling to formalize their support
arrangement with the Department of Public Welfare, either through fear of
disclosure of their relationship with the child's mother and/or court action.
2. Such as information regarding a father's second family, evidence of par-
ticular hardship (hospitalization, unemployment), etc.
I 1AA
the father's own need, specifically his receipt of income subsidies. For
example, if a father had been receiving OASDI,1 unemployment compensation,
General Relief, or any other form of public assistance, enforcement pro-
ceedings against him are temporarily suspended. 2
A fifth filing system consisted of cards recording the total AFDC
grant amounts of the family, together with changes in the grant level by
date and amount, but not by reason for the change.3 These cards also re-
corded each support payment made by a father by date and amount paid. For
the most part, this filing system was not used as a means of monitoring the
support payments of fathers, but rather as a handy reference system for
payments received in the event of a discrepancy between payments alleged
by the father or received by the Boston office from New Bedford. These
so-called "green cards" were divided into open or closed cases, referring to
the AFDC status of the father and therefore the IV-D status of the father.
The only exception was cases involving arrearage payments by the father,
which may remain open for IV-D collection purposes even though the family
is no longer on AFDC. Arrears cases were kept in the file for open cases,
and were tagged to facilitate closer monitoring. All cards in this file were
listed under the mother's name (i.e. AFDC applicant on behalf of the family).
1. Old age or disability insurance.
2. A father may also qualify for inclusion in the family's AFDC budget, in
which case he may remain in the home. Relatively few fathers in the New
Bedford IV-D program participate in this AFDC-UP program; most unemployed
fathers are absent from the home and receive instead U.C. (unemployment
compensation).
3. Reasons for AFDC status or grant level changes were recorded in the
AFDC folders of the family, located in another office of the building. For
the most part, these were voluminous and were only refered to when data re-
quired clarification.
4. In the change to a fully computerized system of payment records, the New
Bedford IV-D office has maintained this separate file as a back-up system.
A sixth filing system listed all IV-A (AFDC) status changes of the
family, noting dates of applications, reasons for status changes, and
reason for denial of a grant. Unless otherwise stated, all AFDC case
openings involved a father who was absent from the home. The file system
listed cases under the name of the mother or other applicant for AFDC on
behalf of the family. It also contained the A-302 form detailing the marital
history of the parents together with personal data on parents and children
of the family.3
The process of recording data for the study file involved accessing
each of these six filing system separately. Since each file was established
for a different purpose (e.g. case monitoring or payment record), they
were variously listed under the name of the mother or father, for AFDC or
IV-D purposes respectively. We therefore created a separate system for
tracking all cases using the cross-reference file of names and a cross-
check of social security numbers of both parents. Although all cases were
identifiable by assigned numbers in chronological order, those numbers could
now be directly related to actual case records through the alphabetic file.4
1. Case workers usually recorded just the main reason for case opening or
closure, although several reasons may apply (for example, paternal nonsupport
and the loss of employment by the mother).
2. See Figure III-g.
3. Such as the birthplace of the father, and birthdates of all family mem-
bers.
4. This would allow changes which occurred subsequent to December of 1977
to be added to the study file at any later date.
Completeness of the Data
The initial research file compiled from the six filing systems in-
cluded approximately 2,800 child support enforcement cases. As each file
was reviewed, it was found, however, that not all cases had complete infor-
mation on marital, AFDC, employment, or support histories of families and
fathers. We decided to exclude from our study file all cases for which
wage reports were not available, introducing some degree of sampling error.
Cases without wage reports usually involve fathers who are either: (a)
paying support under an older agreement with the Department, established
informally (verbal or voluntary agreement), for which no wage report was
required; or (b) "skip" cases, where a father has managed to evade all
measures for enforcement of support or has left the New Bedford region and
cannot be located.2 In the first case, the father under a verbal or volun-
tary agreement to support has usually been non-delinquent, so that subse-
quent court action (and wage reports) have not been sought against him.
In the second case, since the father cannot be located, wage reports were
not obtained. If both types occurred with equal frequency in our New Bedford
sample, we would expect their effects on overall measures of support delin-
quency to be offsetting.
1. Informal agreements to support (verbals or voluntaries) are now accom-
panied by wage reports. In the early stages of the Massachusetts Child
Support Enforcement Program, fathers who responded to initial enforcement
proceedings were rarely subjected to wage scrutiny.
2. The problem of enforcing support obligations against fathers who have
"skipped town" is discussed by Henry H. Foster et al., "Child Support:
The Quick and The Dead", 26 Syracuse Law Review (1975) p. 1157,
3. Estimates of support delinquency in New Bedford would be inflated by
the exclusion of non-delinquent, informal cases for which no wage report
was obtained. On the other hand, estimates would be deflated by the ex-
clusion of "skip" cases.
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We also excluded all cases involving an absent mother from the home
against whom enforcement proceedings had been initiated on behalf of the
father and family, We also excluded all cases involving a grantee relative
or other applicant for AFDC on behalf of the family.2 Aside from these
three types of cases, non-systematic rule was applied in the exclusion
of other cases from the study file. We decided to exclude any case for
which all marital, employment, support, or AFDC information was not avail-
able or was incomplete. From our original file of approximately 2,800
IV-D cases, we compiled a study file of 682 cases for which complete infor-
mation was available.4
All data files contain some error. In the following paragraphs of
this subsection we will identify known or potential sources of error in
the New Bedford study file. For the most part, we have not provided any
estimates of the magnitude of this error, but we do indicate the effects,
if any, it may have on our later analyses. Error in the data file is
1. Comprising 0.1% of all New Bedford IV-D cases only, compared with a
national average of 1.2% of support enforcement cases.
2. Less than 3% of all cases involved a grantee relative or other appli-
cant. We did not, however, exclude cases from our file involving a child
who was temporarily out of the home and mother's care (i.e. in an institu-
tion or with a relative).
3. This could mean the absence of details such as the birthdate of a child,
the dollar amount of a support order, or the date of an AFDC status change.
If missing, we would attempt to locate this information from the AFDC file
of the family located in the TV-A offices. However, data which could only
be obtained from these AFDC files, such as the mother's age, birthplace,
and employment history, was not included. The AFDC files of families were
often voluminous, and therefore were used only for purposes of data verifi-
cation where the IV-D files were incomplete.
4. 24% of all New Bedford IV-D cases. No data was available in the IV-D
files on the education levels of parents or children in participating
families,
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derived from three major sources: (i) the deliberate provision of misinfor-
mation to the IV-D agency by either parent; (ii) maintenance of incomplete
records by IV-D or AFDC workers; and (iii) the unintentional mis-recording
of information by IV-D or IV-A workers or by the author of this study.
Occasionally a mother will provide false information to the AFDC or
IV-D workers. She may be reluctant to reveal an illegitimate birth, or
that she is married but not to the father of the child on AFDC. She may
even wish to preserve a relationship with the father of the child and there-
fore be reluctant to reveal his whereabouts. The mother may also fear re-
percussions from the father if she cooperates in the enforcement effort.
On the other hand, many mothers were willing, even enthusiastic, to assist
IV-D workers in the enforcement effort, particularly during the first year
of the program when incentive payments were given to those mothers who could
convince the fathers to pay support promptly. Trained welfare workers are
generally quick to detect inconsistencies in information supplied to them
by applicants.
Fathers may also supply the IV-D agency with false or inaccurate infor-
mation. For fear of disclosure, they may neglect to mention the existence
of a second family they are supporting. Many couples need welfare assistance,
but can obtain a grant only if the father is unemployed, or they are separa-
3ted. In order to become eligible, many destitute couples "separate".
1. Incentive payments were $20 for prompt support by the father. No doubt
the threat of forfeiting their own AFDC grant provided the strongest incen-
tive for mothers to cooperate.
2. Fathers may fear their present family will learn of a former, or unwed,
alliance. They may also fearmultiple enforcement proceedings against them
where both families are on AFDC.
3. The father may remain in the home. More often, however, he leaves his
family if only to live close by with relatives or friends. The fact
that many women do become pregnant subsequent to the parents' "separation"
lends some support to this theory.
These destitute couples are among the least likely to object to IV-D efforts
because they cannot afford close scrutiny of their AFDC case.
Fathers may also falsify their employment and earnings. It is in the
interest of the nonsupporting father to underestimate his real net worth
or earnings level so as to minimize his support costs. A low weekly wage
means a commensurately low level of support. It is generally assumed that
there is moonlighting among fathers, particularly among seasonal workers.
Until IRS procedures for monitoring tax returns of fathers in the IV-D pro-
gram are put into effect, we cannot estimate the potential impact of these
jobs on the earnings levels of fathers, far less on AFDC recipient families.
Revised support orders based on full disclosure of the annual income of
fathers under IV-D could result in substantially higher support orders in
the future.
For the most part, however, errors in the data file were not inten-
tional. 2 In the general area of terminology, we used simplest terms to
describe complex marital, AFDC, employment, and support situations pertaining
to the fathers and their families. At the outset we caution the reader
against making sweeping assumptions about the behavior of delinquent parents
or their families on welfare based on these data, To emphasize this point,
we have provided below some examples of incompleteness in the study file.
1. For the. most part, enforcement efforts are most successful therefore
against those least able to object or to avoid enforcement measures. Un-
fortunately, these fathers are often those least able to pay support.
2. Such errors were located in approximately 4% of-cases in the study file.
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We tried to locate errors in two ways. First, after the data had been
ordered chronologically, various tests for gross inconsistencies were de-
-1
vised. A second way was by conducting interviews with more than a dozen
support and enforcement workers in New Bedford and other offices. Errors
could occur because workers chose a more convenient or simple procedure.
AFDC grant level adjustments and eligibility re-determinations depend on
the maintenance of accurate records. Although recent laws have condemned
past welfare practices and now favor the privacy of welfare recipients,
the inception of the IV-D program marked the beginning of an increase in the
level of case monitoring, Close monitoring of the family's financial
status has been justified by the need to determine appropriate levels of
support, or levels of support at which the family may become ineligible for
continued assistance. Consequently, there has developed close cooperation
between AFDC and IV-D workers: the AFDC worker refers cases to IV-D, noti-
fying IV-D when a case has terminated and enforcement is no longer required.
1. For example, we cross-checked ages of fathers with marriage dates of
the parents and the birthdates of their children. This also provided a
check for changes in the marital status of the mother. In another test,
we checked for AFDC entries occurring prior to the birth of the first child.
If the AFDC case was later opened because of a legal separation or divorce
of the parents, we could infer a marriage where one had not been listed.
However, unless the date of that marriage could be obtained, the case was
not included in the study file. In some cases, an AFDC file was open for a
mother prior to the conception of her first child. We discovered that this
usually meant the mother herself was a minor and recipient of AFDC as a
child, Another test was devised to test whether fathers were continuing to
pay support to the Welfare Department after the termination of the family's
AFDC grant (i.e. they should then pay directly to the family under the
Massachusetts enforcement system). Invariably, those cases where a father
continued to pay involved the payment of arrearages which had been estab-
lished under a prior court order, but had not been correctly tagged to so
indicate this status. In some cases, information not actually found in the
IV-D files was infered. For example, where a case had been closed "per re-
quest of the mother", but subsequently re-opened because she had lost her
job, or had separated from the father again, the earlier AFDC exit reason
was adjusted to reflect the major reason for the AFDC status change.
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However, given the high rate of turnover in AFDC, and therefore IV-D,
cases, workers have devised various systems for reducing the amount of
time spent on case records, So, for example, when an AFDC case is opened,
although there may be several reasons for the family's welfare application
(such as loss of the mother's job, marital separation, unemployment and
job search by the father, etc.'), 'the support worker will list only the
. 1
major reason.
Each case in the study file contains data on a particular father and
mother and their child or children. Although we obtained complete marital
histories of the mother in each case,2 there was no comparable record of
marital status change for the father of the family other than those which
involved the mother of the particular AFDC family. For example, we had no
information on second families associated with each father unless those
families happened to live in New Bedford and were recipients of AFDC. 3
If data on the second AFDC family was judged complete for the purposes of
our research, that case would be included in the study file, Thus, one
father might be represented in more than one case on the file. Similarly,
a woman who had children by more than one father in the New Bedford region
1. Reasons for AFDC case openings and closures used in this research are
provided in Appendix C,
2. At least during the period she and her family were on AFDC. Obtaining
full marital information on the mother is relatively easy since changes in
marital status directly affect the AFDC status of herself and her family
(i.e. re-marriage generally results in the termination of an AFDC grant).
3. Although in several cases, the father indicated that he had a second
family, no information on those families was recorded unless they were AFDC
recipients living in New Bedford.
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might also appear in more than one case on the study file,1
Our estimates of the number of second families associated with fathers
in the New Bedford IV-D program are inadequate for several reasons. First,
we only have knowledge of second families which are on AFDC in the New
Bedford region, not in other regions, Second, the study file will include
these c&ses only if complete information was available on the second family
(i.e. marital, support, employment, and AFDC histories). No doubt many
fathers have second families, or first families, living in other regions2
of Massachusetts and in other parts of the United States. Given the in-
adequacy of our statistics on other families associated with the New Bedford
fathers, we cannot accurately assess the impact of child support enforcement
on these second families.3 Given the Supreme Court ruling stating that a
father has a prior support responsibility for his first family, regardless
of the circumstances of his second family, and the fact that support order
levels are established without regard to another family of the father, we
would expect the impact of support enforcement on the second family's
financial welfare to be considerable.
1. Cases which involve a mother or father who is represented in another
case of the study file number 14 or 2%.
2. The Massachusetts IV-D Agency is currently compiling a list of all
fathers in the state who have two or more families on AFDC residing within
Massachusetts, Our estimates of AFDC dependency associated with the New
Bedford fathers in the IV-D program will still be underestimated, however,
since we might expect some numbers of out-of-state families on AFDC.
3. Our information on second families of fathers not on AFDC is sketchy at
best, and was provided only where the father volunteered the information.
The study file contains no information on these families. However, we have
data on cases where the mother on AFDC is caring for her own children as
well as the father's children by a prior marriage or alliance.
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Although marital histories in the study file include all marital
status changes of parents who have been married, no information was avail-
able on informal alliances of parents. Although unmarried couples undoubt-
edly live together, and subsequently separate, the only reason listed for
AFDC openings-in these cases is that the "mother is single". In 31.1% of
the New Bedford cases, the parents were married post-conception but prior
to the birth of the child, In another 11,9% of cases, the parents married
after the birth of their first child. It seems likely that at least in some
of these cases the parents lived together while unmarried. Informal
marriage was probably also the case in at least some of the 5,3% of all
single mothers who remained single throughout the study period, although
we suspect that a significant number ~of fathers of illegitimate children
were themselves married.3 The effect of these inaccuracies in the data file
is that they indicate a higher level of "casual" pregnancy than was probably
the case. They also suggest a higher rate of total economic abandonment by
fathers of illegitimate children which may not have been the case. That is,
fathers may have separated from mothers who are single and only then become
support delinquent.
1. A large volume of data was available from the New Bedford study files.
However, we restricted the scope of our research to an examination of the
impact of support enforcement on welfare dependency. We therefore did not
carry out many of the analyses on marital data originally proposed. For
example, we did not estimate the average duration of marital status types
prior to changes, such as the duration of marriages prior to legal separation
or divorce, nor did we examine the impact of enforcement on marital status.
However, in Section E of Chapter V we present data which strongly suggests
a relationship exists between enforcement and marital "reconciliation". We
also briefly present statistics on separations prior to and after the birth
of children in a family.
2. We will define the study period in Section C of this Chapter.
3. In the California study, it was found that about half of all fathers of
illegitimate children were married (Young & Co., op.cit., p.32).
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This brings us to another source of potential error in our statistics.
Throughout this research we have assumed that support enforcement proceed-
ings were established by IV-D against nonsupporting fathers. However, we
know that many fathers were at least offering partial support to their
families subsequent to their departure from the family home, and even while
the family was receiving public assistance. We also discovered that some
fathers settled their support obligations in lump sum out of court, or at
pre-trial hearings. Our data does not include hearings or other out-of-
court settlements made by fathers to the Welfare Department, Only those
enforcement actions involving civil or criminal action, or a verbal (un-
signed) or voluntary (signed) agreement to support, are listed in the
study file. We therefore cannot estimate the deterrent effects of such
informal or intermediate actions for enforcement on the support behavior
of fathers.1
Finally, the employment data on fathers participating in the IV-D
program is incomplete in the sense that we have not recorded all changes
in employment status, nor all job changes, which occurred during the study
period.2 We also do not have any record of the duration of employment or
unemployment in each instance, so that the net weekly earnings may be in-
flated or deflated. We have already mentioned the absence of any infor-
mation on second jobs held by fathers in the IV-D program. Only with the
1. The methodology for assessing support delinquency among fathers is
discussed in detail in Section C of Chapter. V. In lieu of obtaining data
on every payment, by, date, amount, and type of order established, we in-
stead developed a scale of "compliance" with support orders. Levels of com-
pliance are listed in Appendix C.
2. We allowed only three entries per case for changes in employment status.
Changes included job changes, unemployment experiences, and incidences of
reliance on public assistance income.
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use of IRS data on fathers annual incomes will we be able to make accurate
assessments of appropriate support levels based on fathers' ability-to-pay.
Ideally we would have constructed case histories which related weekly
payments by the father, and changes independent of support in the family's
AFDC grant level, to determine the impact of enforcement on welfare depen-
dency, We could also have examined the impact of IV-D by comparing AFDC
closures, by reason for closure, both prior to, and after, the Child
Support Enforcement Program. The first approach was cost-prohibitive.
Changes in AFDC grant levels of families, and in fathers payment levels,
occur regularly in many cases, The second approach would have been possible
if we had obtained data on the family's prior to the establishment of the
first order for support, However, all cases on the study file (and in the
IV-D office) list only those AFDC entries which occurred just prior to
support enforcement action against the father. The enforcement program in
Massachusetts has been in operation since the 1950s, and the likelihood of
obtaining a sample of families which entered AFDC well before enforcement
action occurred is remote. In Chapter V, we will show that detailed his-
tories of AFDC and support level changes may not be necessary for infering
a positive relationship between the enforcement of child support and welfare
dependency. Few fathers in the New Bedford study file were able to pay
support amounts which exceeded their family's AFDC grant, thereby effecting
the termination of the family's grant.
1. For example, changes in the AFDC grant level can occur if the mother
finds a job, receives a wage increase or decrease, or becomes unemployed.
Adjustments may also occur according to the number of eligible children
for inclusion in the grant. The mother may have another child, or one of
her children may reach majority (21 years of age for the purposes of AFDC
support). A child may also be under 21 years of age and employed. Or a
child may be out of school and unemployed, but refuses to register in the
WIN (Work Incentive) program, thereby forfeiting his or her grant.
176
The data gathering process took approximately nine weeks, with data
verification and cleaning requiring an additional four weeks. All cases
in the study file were recorded in alphabetical order to facilitate later
additions to the file or corrections to the data. All dated entries were
also ordered chronologically to aid computing in longitudinal analyses.
Various checks were then made for inconsistencies in the data file. Coding
was developed to describe all marital, employment, AFDC, and child support
status changes. By March of 1978, the study file of 682 cases was ready
for transfer onto IBM computer cards.2 A duplicate deck and tape were
made of the datafile. All computing for this research was performed on
the IBM 370 facility at M.I.T. Initially, we used SPSS 3to obtain frequency
distributions and cross-tabulations, outlined in the following Section of
this Chapter. All subsequent analyses of the data4 were performed using
Fortran,
1. The complete list of codes appears in Appendix C.
2. A total of four cards per case was required to store data on each
father and family. A brief summary of the format for data stored on IBM
punched cards is provided in Appendix D.
3. Statistical programming package for social sciences.
4. All anaylses performed are discussed in Chapter V.
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C. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Summary
For each of the 682 cases on the New Bedford study file, we obtained
the birthplace and age of the father, the total number of AFDC families
and AFDC children in the New Bedford region associated with this father,
and the number of children in this particular AFDC family, that is, those
children of this mother and this father. This last number may also include
children by a former alliance of the father who are being cared for by this
mother. We also listed the ages and sex of each child in the family.
We then constructed a marital history of the father and mother in each
case on the study file. First, we made a chronological listing of all
marital status changes involving the parents (or the mother), including ma-
ternal single status, marriages, separations, reconciliations, and re-
marriages (by the mother to the father or another man). A total of six
marital status changes could be recorded in each case on the study file.
We also constructed similar histories of the family's dependency on
AFDC. All AFDC status changes were ordered chronologically, each entry
containing the date and reason for the case opening or case closure. Where
multiple reasons were provided for the status change, they were included as
a separate entries with the same date. In each case, there could be twelve
possible AFDC entries.
We then recorded the employment data on the father. For each case, a
total of three changes in the father's employment status (or occupation and
earnings) could be recorded. Each action for the enforcement of the father's
support obligations to his AFDC family generally requires a new wage report
providing evidence of his ability-to-pay. Most employment entries are there-
for dated just prior to an action for support enforcement. Each employment
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entry included the date when the information was obtained, the father's
occupation entered in code, and his net weekly earnings at that time. The
net weekly earnings are estimated as the average net wage earned during the
previous ten week period. The employment code may refer to the occupation
of the father, or may indicate that he was unemployed at the time, or that
1-he was receiving a particular type of public assistance. It could also
show whether the father was receiving income from insurance or pension
policies. If the father was not receiving regular wage earnings, his average
earnings were estimated in the same way as if employed, except if he was
unemployed and receiving no compensation or other assistance. In that case,
his net weekly earnings would be listed as $0.
Finally, for each case we recorded all actions for support enforcement
in chronological order, up to a total of five possible actions. Each support
enforcement entry included the date, type of order, and weekly dollar amount
of support required under the order. After each order we also added a coded
assessment2 of the father's payment compliance with that particular order.
This compliance (or delinquency) code included up to three payment level
changes, as well as the date (month and year) of the final payments made by
fathers who stopped paying support altogether. Each case in the study file
was also assigned a single code, indicating whether the case was open or
closed as of December 1977, and showing the father's then current status in
terms of payment compliance with.the most recent order established for
support.
1. Such as General Relief, OASDI (Old Age Security and Disability Insurance),
or U.C. (Unemployment Compensation).
2. A full descriDt-ion of-our method of ranking payment compliance levels
is provided in the final subsection of this Chapter.
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The Study Period
The study file contains the complete AFDC, marital, and child support
histories of 682 families, In many cases, the AFDC history of the family
started in the early 1960s, the oldest record on the file beginning in 1959.
Similarly, the support enforcement program in Massachusetts began in some
cases as early as 1960. The oldest- child for which we have a support en-
forcement and AFDC history was born in 1952. Employment data on fathers
began with the institution of support orders, the earliest entry on the study
file dated 1960. Marital histories can begin much earlier of course. The
earliest marital status entry recorded on the file was in 1939. Our first
concern in creating this study file was to obtain all the information avail-
able on the family from the IV-D office files regardless of the date of the
first AFDC entry and subsequent support enforcement action. Consequently,
the beginning of our study period will vary with each particular case.
However, we also decided on a cutoff point for our data gathering of December
1977. Any AFDC, marital, or support status change occurring after this date
was not included in the study file.
All earnings and support statistics have been reported in current
dollars in this research even though there was high inflation during the
study period. However, no adjustments to current dollars was needed because
no direct comparisons were made between dollar amounts. Instead we used
ratio of. support to earnings in all our analyses.1
1. There were two exceptions: (i) in the following subsection of Chapter IV,
we compare the average net weekly earnings of fathers in the New Bedford
IV-D program; and (ii) we compare average weekly support orders and payments
of participating fathers in Tables V-2a, V-4a, and V-5a, with HEW recommended
levels (Table V-la). In the first case, we averaged all earnings data avail-
able for each father to obtain a rough approximation of average earnings. In
the second case, we used support and earnings data from only those cases
which had post-1974 data. In constructing these tables, we chose the first
wage report entry and support order entry which occurred since January of
1975. Cases which did not contain both entries were excluded.
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The Fathers and Their Families
For each case on the study file we obtained the age and birthplace of
the father. The distribution of ages among the New Bedford fathers in the
IV-D program is provided below in Figure IV-d.
FIGURE iv-d. IISTOGRAM OF AGE DISTRIBUTION OF IV-D FATHERS IN NEW BEDFORD
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Given the high proportion of Spanish-speaking persons in the New Bedford,
we also decided to see whether there was a higher incidence of welfare de-
pendency due to parental absence among new immigrants. We divided birth-
places into the following categories: (i) New Bedford; (ii) local (adjoining
county) but not New Bedford; (iii) nonlocal, but in Massachusetts; (iv) other
1. The average age of the New Bedford IV-D fathers was higher than that of
fathers in the California IV-D program in 1975. The Young &.Co. study (op.
cit.) notes the average age of fathers was 30 years (p. 31).
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New England states and New York; (v) all other states in the U.S.; (vi)
Portugal, Azores, Cape Verdes Islands, other Portuguese Dominions; (vii)
Puerto Rico; (viii) Canada; (ix) other non-U.S. countries.1 51% of fathers
participating in the New Bedford IV-D program were born in New Bedford,
another 22% were born in local counties adjacent to New Bedford, and 3%
were born .in other regions of the state. 4% of fathers were born in other
New England states or in New York, 7% in other states of the U. S. In
total, 87% of fathers in the New Bedford IV-D program were born in the
United States. These figures are directly proportional to the numbers of
native and foreign-born fathers in the New Bedford region as a whole, and
show no over-representation of Portuguese among IV-D fathers. 7% of fathers
in the study file were born in Portugal or in Portuguese dominions, another
4% in Puerto Rico. Other non-U.S. birthplaces accounted for just 1% of
cases on the New Bedford study file. To summarize, there were 3% fewer
foreign-born fathers in the New Bedford IV-D study file than in the
overall New Bedford population.
We also calculated the number of AFDC families associated with any parti-
cular father in the New Bedford program, together with the total number
of children on AFDC of which he was the father. In 94% of all cases, the
father had just one family dependent on AFDC in the New Bedford region.
1. Very few cases were expected in the last two categories, but they were
included for sake of completeness.
2. The Young & Co. study (og.cit.) reported a clear pattern of minority
over-representation among IV-D fathers in California (p.31), but the New
Bedford data suggests quite the reverse. 15% of the New Bedford population
was foreign-born in 1970, while only 11% of IV-D fathers were foreign born.
Less than 2% of the local New Bedford population in 1970 was black American.
We have no statistics on black representation in the IV-D program.
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In 5% of cases, the father had two families on AFDC in New Bedford. In a
little over 1% of cases, the father had more than two families dependent on
AFDC.1 The average number of AFDC children of fathers in the IV-D program
was 2.3. This includes children of second (and more) families of fathers.
When we look at each single family on the study file,2 this average drops to
2.2, somewhat lower than for Massachusetts state in 1970 (2.4) and sub-
stantially lower than the 1970 average for New Bedford (3.4 children per
family). In 6% of IV-D families, the mother was caring for children of the
father by a previous marriage or alliance in addition to their own children.
If any children of the mother's by a former alliance or marriage existed,
and were included in her AFDC family grant, a separate IV-D (enforcement)
case would be established for the second father. Thus, the mother may be re-
presented in more than one case on the study file, if that second father was
in the New Bedford IV-D program and information for the case was complete.
Similarly, fathers with second families receiving AFDC assistance in the
New Bedford region would also appear twice on the study file if data on the
second family was complete. Fathers were represented in more than one study
file case in approximately 5% of all cases.3 The ages of children ranged
4from less than one to 18 years of age, although a mother could receive a
grant if pregnant to cover costs of delivery.
1. Recall that these statistics do not include AFDC-dependent families of
fathers in the New Bedford IV-D program who are living in other regions of
the state, or out-of-state. Only 2% of cases involved URESA (out-of-state)
enforcement.
2. i.e. where the parents are the same for all children in the family.
The maximum number of children in a family on the study file was eight.
3. Since IV-D study file cases were listed by fathers paying support, we
did not calculate similar percentages of multiple representation by mothers.
4. The average age of children on the study file was 10 years.
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Marital History
We also constructed complete marital histories of parents in the study
file. Although comparable data was not available for the fathers, we could
obtain data on all prior and later alliances, marriages, and re-marriages
of the mother to men other than the father of the children in a particular
case. Each marital status change is recorded by date and type of change.
2
All dates, with one exception, are listed by month and year. Marital status
types are as follows: (i) the mother is single; (ii) the mother was married,
but not to the father at the time of the child's birth; (iii) the parents
are married; (iv) the parents are separated; (v) legally separated; (vi)
divorced; (vii) the parents have reconciled; (viii) the mother married a
man other than the father of the child subsequent to the birth of the child;
(ix) the mother married the father of the child after she gave birth to the
child; and (x) the parents underwent multiple separations and reconciliations.
All entries for a particular case were then ordered chronologically to pro-
vide a history of marital changes experienced by the couple. In the case of
single mothers, we assigned the date of the birth of their first child to
the coded entry. Where a mother applied for AFDC during her pregnancy, and
subsequently married prior to delivery, we. assigned the date of her concep-
tion (month and year) to her first marital status (i.e. single). Note that
1. The reason for this is that changes in the mother's marital status
often directly affect her AFDC status. If, for example, she re-marries,
her AFDC grant almost invariably terminates. Since the IV-D file on a
father closes simultaneously with the closure of the AFDC cases (except in
arrears cases), the IV-D unit closely monitors changes in the mother's AFDC
status. The unit also monitors all changes in her grant level, because her
grant will also be terminated if the father's support payments should exceed
her AFDC grant level.
2. In the case of parents who had multiple separations and reconciliations
(22% of all parents), we avoided the problems of exceptionally long records
by assigning a separate code to these couples followed by two years marking
the period during which these marital changes occurred. The multiple
separation/reconciliation code was always followed by a final code indicat-
ing the most recent status of the couple (e.g. separated or reconciled).
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mothers who were married to a man other than the father at the time of the
child's birth would be separated from that husband at that date in order to
be eligible for AFDC assistance for herself and the child.
49% of mothers on the New Bedford study file were single at the
time of their conception.1 5,3% would remain single throughout the study
period, but fully 42.3% married the father of the child either during the
pregnancy months, or some time thereafter.2 Figure IV-e provides a histo-
gram of marriages which occurred post-conception. Although, as we saw from
FIGURE IV-e. POST-CONCEPTION MARRIAGES IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
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1. In 1977, 17% of all New Bedford births were to mothers under 20 years
of age, while 13% of New Bedford births involved unmarried parents (either
unmarried, or married to another person).
2. Only four single mothers (1.2%) later married a man who was not the
father of the child. At the birth of the child, 17.1% of all mothers were
single, but this would drop to 5.3% as many mothers later married the father
of their child.
the statistics presented in Table 111-2 of Chapter III, the number of
mothers with illegitimate children on AFDC has risen substantially,'
at least in New Bedford we have found that a high proportion of such births
are followed by the marriage of the parents. A majority of these marriages
tend to occur prior to the birth of the child, so that the AFDC case is
not listed as an illegitimacy unless the mother applied for benefits prior
to the marriage. Few marriages occurred close to the time of the birth.
Most occurred between four and seven months prior to delivery, although
24% of single mothers married at some time after the birth of the child.
To summarize, there seems a clear trend toward formal marriage alliances
among the parents in the New Bedford sample. The percentage of mothers
remaining single throughout the study period (5.3%) is substantially lower
than expected, given national, state, and even regional statistics for un-
wed mothers. The number of cases for which the IV-D worker needs an affi-
davit of paternity2 is relatively low.
The higher preference of the New Bedford couples for formal status
changes (marriage, divorce, and legal separation) is further evidenced by
the proportion of cases involving formal marital dissolutions (43.8). From
Table I11-2 of Chapter III, we found that between 1961 and 1973 the percen-
tage of AFDC-dependent families involving formal court dissolutions in the
1. Between 1961 and 1973, the percentage of AFDC dependent families in-
volving illegitimate children rose from 21.M to 34.7%. This may not rep-
resent an absolute rise in birth rates to unwed parents. Another reason
for the increase may have been a change in AFDC policies regarding the
eligibility of unwed mothers for benefits.
2. In order to ensure the child's rights to support and inheritance.
A low percentage of mothers not married to the father of their child were
single but later married another man (1.2%). Of mothers who were married
at the time of the child's birth (80.9%) about 2.2% were married to a man
other than the child's father, close to half of whom divorced their hus-
bands and later married the father of the child.
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United States rose, from 13.7% to 22.1%.
On the other hand, informal separations anda desertions2 among AFDC
couples in the U. S. fell between 1961 and 1973, from 26.8% to 23.6%.
In the New Bedford file, 50.9% of all cases involved informal marital sepa-
rations. A large percentage of separated couples would later reconcile
(45.9%). 22.5% of couples underwent multiple separations and reconciliations.
These separations and reconciliations cannot be.interpreted in the strict
marital sense. A "separation" does not necessarily mean a total breakdown
in the parental relationship, just as a "reconciliation" may not refer to
the patching up of marital difficulties. The problem is more complicated.
These terms are used to describe in the simplest terms a variety of marital
states and some choices which are not marital-based at all. These categories
were developed under the AFDC program as one means of determining the family's
eligibility for assistance, and whether the father was, or was not, in the
home and therefore a potential case for support enforcement.
However, if the family is destitute, the couple may need to "separate"
in order to qualify for assistance. No doubt financial insecurity and poverty
affect marital relationships, but the high turnover of AFDC cases appears
closely related to IV-D enforcement suggesting that there may be other
reasons than marital breakdown for "separation" by poor couples. Separations
1. The New Bedford statistics approximate those in the California study,
where one half of the marriages resulted in divorce. Taken as a percen-
tage of all marriages, divorces among couples in the New Bedford file was
46.6%.
2. The issue of family instability as it relates to child support enforce-
ment is discussed at greater length in Section E of Chapter V. It is im-
portant to note that the statistics provided by HEW and the New Bedford files
do not- allow us to distinguish between mutual separation and desertion. Far
more important than identifying fathers by their marital status is to dis-
tinguish by level of nonsupport, a task which we attempt on a small scale in
Section C of Chapter V.
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are regarded by IV-D staff as primarily a matter of economics. Couples
tend to separate as the father undertakes a job search, or in order that
the family become eligible for public assistance. In Section E of Chapter
V, we show that -29% of all New Bedford couples effected a reconciliation
during the study period. We then produce evidence suggesting that en-
forement may Be related to marital status changes.
Marital change ap'pear- to- be related also to events which are not prima-
rily economic. In Figure IV-6, we show that separations tend to peak
within the three to eight month period prior to, and after, the birth of
children, with a majority (about two-thirds) occurring after the birth.
FIGURE IV-6. MARITAL SEPARATIONS AND THE BIRTH OF CHILDREN
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1. The trend may not be significant given the relatively low number of
cases in each category (n = 230). Cases which fell into the nine to
twelve month period prior to and after the birth of a child were not in-
cluded in this graph.
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We cannot make inferences from this data about the causes of marital sepa-
ration, although it appears that separations may be related to family growth.
Various others factors are involved in the decision to separate, For
example, we might also have attempted to relate unemployment, or welfare
dependency, of the father to marital separations. However, employment dates
from the study file were too imprecise for this analysis.
AFDC History of the Family
We also constructed complete AFDC histories for each of the 682 families
on the New Bedford study file. We had recorded each AFDC case opening (or
entry) and case closure (or exit) for each family, together with the date
(month and year)2 and reason for the AFDC status change. Where several
reasons for a single status change ~were recorded, each was entered with the
same date. All AFDC status changes, up to a possible total of twelve such
changes per case were then ordered chronologically. In less than 1% of
cases, the family entered and exited from AFDC within the same month of
the same year. Some adjustment was needed to preserve the chronological
integrity of these records. A detailed description of the adjustment method
used is provided in Appendix D.
In the New Bedford sample of families on AFDC, we observed a pattern
1. We were unable to obtain information on the duration of employment
or unemployment for New Bedford fathers in the IV-D program. Full wage
reports were compiled only at those times when a court order for support
was being established. In the absence of accurate dates, we assigned the
date of the enforcement action to each employment entry in a father's re-
cord.
2. As in the case of marital histories, there was one exception to this
rule. A special code was assigned to cases in which a couple had repeatedly
separated and reconciled, where the family underwent multiple AFDC entries
and exits. In these cases, comprising 22,4% of all cases on the file, we
recorded instead the two years marking the period of multiple AFDC moves.
This avoided computing problems associated with records of substantially
greater length than all others on the study file.
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a high turnover. Cases with highest levels of activity (i.e. entries and
exits) show their highest activity in more recent years, particularly since
1975.1 However, plotting the numbers of families which entered and exited
AFDC reveals that the ratio of case openings. to case closures is roughly the
same for the years between 1959 and 1977. This is presented in Figure IV-g
below.2 The
FIGURE IV-g.
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1. The late 1970s marked a period of substantial increase in the Child
Support Enforcement Porgram in Massachusetts. The impact of enforcement
on the welfare dependency of female-headed families is examined in Section
D of Chapter V.
2. Only the first AFDC case openings for families are included in this
Figure. Similarly, only the first case closure occurring in each family
case on the study file is included among case closures for each year.
No subsequent case openings or closures for a family are included in the
graph. At the close of the study period (December 31st, 1977), 77% of all
AFDC/IV-D cases opened during the study period were open, while 22% were
closed at that date. These percentages would vary considerably over time
given the high rates of turnover among 36% of the New Bedford cases.
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the study file. 50.1% of all cases in the file have remained on AFDC since
the family's firs-t application for.aid. 12.6Z initially .w-ereopen, but sub-
sequently closed and were not re-opened. Fully 35.6% of.cases were marginal
welfare families ekperienting mulptiple- case openings and. closures.
Although we have assumed that AFDC and IV-D case openings and closures
occur simultaneously, there are two exceptions to this rule. An AFDC case
may be open, but IV-D enforcement action postponed or terminated, in those
cases where a father qualifies for inclusion in the family's AFDC budget.1
He lives in the home and is not required to pay child support. The second
case involves the termination of an AFDC grant although IV-D enforcement re-
mains in effect, as in the case of arrears owed the Department of Public
Welfare. 2
A full list of coded reasons for AFDC/IV-D case openings and closures
is pr~ovided in Appendix C. In the following paragraphs of this subsection,
we will explain briefly these reasons noting their relative frequency in
the New Bedford sample. Case openings are usually provided with one of
the following four reasons: (i) the couple has separated (77% of our sample);
(ii) the couple has divorced, or the mother is married to a man other than
the father of the child (9% of all initial case openings, and 9% of all sub-
sequent AFDC grant applications); (iii) the mother is single (9%); or (iv)
other reason. Examples of 'the fourth category may concern changes in the
3
mother's status (she has lost her job or has become disabled, or she her-
self entered AFDC as a dependent child). Other reasons for case openings
1. Occurring in 2.6% of all cases on the New Bedford study file.
2. 4.3% of cases on the study file invdlved payments of arrears subsequent
to the AFDC case closure.
3. But is not receiving Unemployment Compensation or OASDI.
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may involve the child (who has returned to school, or to the home after
an absence). An AFDC/IV-D case may be opened because of changes in the
father's status also (he has lost his job and undertaken a job search,
he has left prison or another institution, or he is no longer the recipient
of a welfare grant himself, such as U.C., OASDI, G.R., etc.9 Finally, a
case may be opened in the New Bedford office after transfer from another
state welfare office. Almost 4% of all cases on the study file transfered
into the New Bedford region from another area of the state.
AFDC/IV-D case closures can occur for any of the following reasons. The
mother's employment, marital, or financial status has changed so that she
and her children are no longer eligible for AFDC assistance. The child or
children have reached majority, and the father is no longer liable for
support, or have left school before reaching 18 years of age and refused
to register in the WIN program. A child may also have been taken out of
the home and placed with a relative, or in an institution, or been adopted
by the mother's husband. The father may also affect the family's AFDC
and his own IV-D status by reconciling with the mother, by becoming eligible
for'inclusion in his family's AFDC grant so that support enforcement by the
state is'discontinued, or by paying support in excess of the family's AFDC
grant forcing their ineligibility for continued assistance from the state.
1. Unemployment Compensation, Old Age Security and Disability Insurance,
and General Relief, respectively. Although the family may continue to re-
ceive their AFDC grant, the case is closed for the purposes of child
support enforcement (IV-D), 30% of New Bedford fathers fell in this category.
2. Work Incentive Program, a pre-requisite for many male children who are
recipients of AFDC grants and who have left school prior to graduation.
3. 2.6% of cases on the New Bedford study file were closed for support pur-
poses because the father was included in the family's AFDC budget.
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The family may also become ineligible for AFDC, or the father for the IV-D
program, if either mother, father, or child die. The case will also be
closed for purposes of New Bedford AFDC grant aid or IV-D enforcement if
the family transfers out to another region of the state or to an out-of-
state destination. (6% of .all -cakes). Finally,, a mother may be denied an
AFDC grant if she refuses to cooperate with IV-D enforcement efforts.'
A majority of AFDC/IV-D case closures in New Bedford involved the re-
conciliation of the parents (45.9%). Many such closures involved the same
family. 28.7% of all families listed reconciliation as a reason for case
closure during the study period. Three-quarters of all "reconciliation"
cases subsequently re-opened for AFDC aid. Although the records generally
provide only the primary reason for case closure, it is likely that most
closures occurred as the result of a combination of factors. For example,
many mothers in the New Bedford AFDC program are employed, and their AFDC
grant is adjusted accordingly. To the extent that the grant level is re-
duced by the mother's wage earnings, we would expect the father's support
payments to exceed the AFDC grant amount more easily in cases where the
mother is employed.2 In this way, secondary reasons for case closure may
be equally as important in determining the family's AFDC status as primary
reasons stated.
1. Reasonable grounds for refusal to cooperate are discussed more fully in
Section E of Chapter III.
2. Our data on the employment of mothers in the AFDC/IV-D programs is in-
complete. Welfare workers interviewed estimated that more than half of
all New Bedford AFDC cases involved working mothers. The mother may her-
self become eligible for Unemployment Compensation, for disability or Medical
Assistance.(U.C., OASDI, M.A.). Where the amount of this grant exceeds the
amount she and/or-her family receives under AFDC, the family or mother will
be transfered to the higher grant.
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Employment and Earnings of Fathers
Data on the employment and earnings of fathers in the New Bedford IV-D
program was obtained from wage reports. These reports are generally required
for the establishment of court orders for support, although it has become
common practice in the New Bedford office to include wage reports in all
support files. For each case on the study file we obtained at least one
report of earnings and occupation. 27% of cases had more than one wage
report entry, and in 7% of all study file cases we recorded three employment
status changes. Each entry contained the date at which the report was ob-
tained, the occupation1 of the father, and his net weekly earnings over the
previous ten weeks.2 Where more than one occupation and earnings status
was available, entries were placed in chronological order on the study file.
As noted earlier, the entries record the employment status of a father only
3
at the time of the establishment of the support order. Changes in employ-
ment status were recorded only if a subsequent support order was required,
or if the father had requested that his support order be modified due to a
change in his financial circumstances and ability-to-pay support.
We decided to list all occupations exactly as recorded in the wage re-
ports rather than attempting to re-code categories according to the Standard
Industrial Classification scheme.- We needed a coding system which would
1. A full list of coded occupational categories appears in Appendix C.
2. The method of calculating the father's net weekly earnings is as follows:
gross earnings per week less credit union payments deemed necessary for the
father's own maintenance, health and other insurance, pension, and tax pay-
ments.
3. We were unable to obtain complete information on the duration of employ-
ment (or unemployment) experience. Average weekly earnings of fathers who
experienced more than one status change during the study period were averaged
to obtain an overall average. In these cases we made the assumption that
each employment status was of approximately equal duration.
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include all information available, but would not exclude cases where
the industry or the specific occupation of the father was not provided.'
We did not distinguish categories by "white" or "blue collar" occupational
types, nor did we attempt to aggregate categories into standard types. We
did, however, create new categories where traditional ones were not available
to describe the source of income, such as public assistance categories
(e.g. OASDI, U.C., G.R. and so on). For the purposes of this research, we
are primarily concerned with the source of income of IV-D. father, in parti-
cular whether a father was employed regularly, was seasonally employed, or
was dependent for at least part of his income on public assistance.
One-third of all fathers participating in the New Bedford IV-D program
were classified as marginally employed during at least some part of the
study period. This category included all fathers who had been unemployed,
as well as those who had suffered some-interruption in employment and-earn-
ings. In Table IV-2, we disaggregated.fathers into two categories: those
4
employed and those marginally employed. The subk-ategories of marginal
employment are listed in full in Table II-35. Note that the overall level of
net weekly ~earnings-of employed fathers in the New Bedford IV-D program were
very low; -70% of employed fathers received less than $150 per week, and
23:% received -less than $100 per week. As we would expect, the corresponding
1. In some instances, a code may apply to just one or a few cases only. In
other instances, no standard code was available (as, for example, in the
case of fathers dependent on public assistance for income).
2. Old Age and Disability Insurance, Unemployment Compensation, and General
Relief respectively.
3. The earliest employment record in the study file corresponds to the first
support order established for a father in the TV-D program (1960).
4. Note that the unemployment rate of fathers participating in the IV-D pro-
gram (30%) exceeded-that of New Bedford. region (7%) by 23% during the study
period.
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TABLE IV-2. EMPLOYED AND MARGINALLY EMPLOYED FATHERS IN NEW BEDFORD
Employed Marginally Employed
Level of Earnings
(net weekly) Number % Number %
$ 0 - 75 38 8 41 20
76 - 100 72 15 53 26
101 - 125 125 26 56 28
126 - 150 105 22 30 15
151 - 175 53 11. 5 2
176 - 200 38 8 8 4
200+ 41 9 9 4
TOTAL = 472 9 9 %a 202 99%a
(69%) (31%)
a Errors due to rounding off.
TABLE iv-3. INCIDENCE OF MARGINAL EMPLOYMENT BY LEVEL OF EARNINGS.
Level CETA/WIN Retired
of Other Public Other Pension Seasonal
Earnings U.C.a Employment Welfare Insurance Employment Unemployed TOTAL %
$ 0 - 75 7 2 0 15 8 20 52 21
76 - 100 32 7 4 5 12 6 66 26
101 - 125 34 8 3 5 19 1 70 28
126 - 150 4 13 0 2 14 1 34 13
151 - 175 1 0 1 0 8 0 10 4
176 - 200 2 0 0 0 8 0 10 4
200+ 1 0 0 1 8 0 10 4
TOTAL = 81 30 8 28 77 28 252b
(n=252) (32%) (12%) (3%) (11%) (31%) (11%) (100%)
(n=682) (12%) (4%) (1%) (4%) (11%) (4%) 682 (100%)
Uinemployed, receiving compensation from DES
6.7% of fathers on the study file were represented in more than one of the dbove
categories. Adjusting for double-counting, the total number of fathers who-were
marginally employed or unemployed was 206 (or 30.2% of all fathers).
a
b
I-a
0%
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percentages for marginally employed fathers were even higher: 85% of mar-
ginally employed fathers received wages of less than $150 per week, and
44% received less than $100 per week. Employed fathers earning in excess
of $150 net per week comprised 30% of all employed fathers, while only 14%
of marginally employed fathers earned more than $150 per week.
In Table IV-3, using the same earnings categories, we further disaggre-
gated marginally employed workers into categories by source of income.1
We distinguished between unemployed fathers receiving compensation and those
receiving no support. We also divided fathers receiving some form of public
assistance into those in CETA, WIN, and other public employment jobs from
those fathers receiving General Relief, OASDI, and other welfare assistance.
Finally, we included fathers who were retired or receiving pension or other
insurance income (e.g. hospital) and those who were seasonally employed.
With the exception of seasonal workers, almost all marginally employed fathers
listed weekly earnings under $125 net per week. Unemployed fathers received
on average less than $75 per week, while those receiving unemployment compen-
sation generally received between $76 and $125 per week. Fathers participating
in the CETA and WIN public employment programs tended to receive slightly
higher earnings, although maximum weekly earnings for these fathers and for
those on a fixed income (pension or insurance) was $150.3 Seasonal workers
1. In constructing this Table, we measured the incidence of marginal employ-
ment rather than the number of workers in each category. In 7% of cases,
fathers were represented in more than one category. Since categories are
not mutually exclusive, percentage estimates of the numbers of fathers in
each column are only approximate.
2. i.e. those employed in the fishing industry or in home construction and
repairs.
3. Fathers on fixed incomes generally received amounts less than $75 net
per week.
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received on average substantially higher earnings per week than all other
workers in marginal employment subcategories. Fully 34% of seasonal workers
received more than $150 net per week.
In Figure IV-h, the average weekly earnings of both employed and mar-
ginally employed workers is presented in histogram form, As we might ex-
pect, the average level of earnings of unemployed fathers not receiving
compensation was lowest ($25 per week), while those on a fixed pension or
other retirement income received only $75 per week on average. Fathers
receiving unemployment compensation, or participating in public employment
or assistance programs received roughly equivalent weekly pay (between
$102 and $113). It is interesting to note that on average seasonal workers
in the IV-D program had weekly earnings equivalent to those of workers who
were employed and who had no unemployment experience during the study
period. Fully employed workers and seasonal workers both received on average
$133 net per week. 2 The average weekly earnings of all fathers partici-
pating in the New Bedford IV-D program was approximately $121. The mini-
mum earnings recorded in the New Bedford sample of IV-D fathers was $26 net
per week, the maximum $973 per week. Only 9% of fathers received an amount
in excess of $200 net per week, most of whom received less than $275.
1. We obtained averages by weighting the mid-point (dollars) of each earn-
ings category by the number of cases in that category for each group of
employed or marginally employed workers, provided in Tables IV-2 and 3.
2. Wage reports show only the primary source of a father's income. No
doubt many fathers in the New Bedford program did not reveal secondary
income sources fearing an upward revision of their support orders. Our
estimates of average earnings presented above are therefore probably lower
than actual levels. Following the recent legislation which provides for
full IRS disclosure of annual income received by IV-D program fathers, we
might expect substantial revisions to support orders in the future.
3. This is substantially lower than the average earnings of fathers parti-
cipating in the California IV-D program in 1975, where earnings ranged be-
tween $136 and $179 per week (see Young & Co. study, op.cit., p. 33).
FIGURE IV-h. AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND SOURCE OF INCOME
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Support Enforcement History
Finally, we constructed complete histories for each case on the
study file of all support enforcement actions taken against the father.
Actions were divided into both informal (verbal and voluntary agreements)
and formal (probate and district court) actions. Each action taken
against a father was listed by the date (month and year) and type of
action.1 We also recorded for each support enforcement action the amount
of child support established under the particular order. Following each
support enforcement action was provided a coded assessment of the father's
payment compliance, or delinquency, subsequent to the establishment of
the particular order for support. In each case, a total of five actions
for support enforcement2 could be recorded. Not all enforcement actions
involved the establishment of a support order. Actions may also refer
to the modification, or dismissal, of a prior order for support.
In 52% of all cases on the study file, a single order for support
had been established. In another 32% of cases, two orders for support
had been obtained. 13% of cases involved three orders for support, while
the remaining 3% of cases involved four or more actions for support en-
forcement. Where more than one enforcement action was recorded for a
particular case, entries were placed in chronological order on the study
file. The earliest recorded support order or agreement on the New Bedford
1. A list of support enforcement actions is provided in Appendix C of
this thesis. Support orders or agreements were aggregated into groups
of formal and informal enforcement actions, described in the text below.
2. The major types of actions were as follows: (i) verbal or unsigned
agreements; (ii) voluntary or signed affidavits of support and paternity:
(iii) probate court actions involving both legal separations and divorce;
(iv) district court actions involving criminal nonsupport cases; and
(v) URESA (out-of-state reciprocal) court actions which could be either
civil or criminal in nature.
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study file was in 1960. Almost two-thirds of all enforcement actions
undertaken in the New Bedford IV-D office were initiated after 1972, and
about one-half occurred between 1976 and 1977, the years immediately
following the most recent child support enforcement legislation (P.L.93-
647).
We differentiated between the various types of support enforcement
action. First, we noted all verbal (unsigned) agreements to support
made in New Bedford under the IV-D program. Together with all modifi-
cations and dismissal actions involving verbal agreements, verbals con-
stituted 7% of all enforcement actions in the study file. In a second
category we placed all voluntary support agreements. These were signed
affidavits of paternity and agreements to support. Almost half of all
support actions in New Bedford (48%) involved either the establishment,
modification, or dismissal of voluntary agreements to support. A third
category consisted of all probate (civil) court actions for support en-
forcement. 23% of support orders obtained in probate courts involved
divorce actions, the remaining 5% involved legal separations. Probate
court orders, modifications, and order dismissals accounted for 28% of
all support actions recorded on the New Bedford study file. We also
created a fourth category for enforcement actions involving criminal non-
support, These district court actions, including modifications and dis-
missals, constituted 14% of all support.actions on our study file. Finally,
we made note of all out-of-state (URESA) court actions involving the estab-
lishment of reciprocal support orders. URESA actions occasionally involved
modification or dismissal of a prior order for support, but primarily re-
f erred to the establishment of a probate or district court order. This fifth
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category accounted for just 3% of all support enforcement actions in
New Bedford. Enforcement actions subsequent to an initial order for
support usually involved either a modification of the amount of that order,
or involved court action where initially the father had been under an infor-
mal agreement to support with the Welfare Department.
The average weekly dollar amount of support orders in New Bedford was
low, approximately $28 per week. Averages support levels did not vary sig-
nificantly between the various types of enforcement actions described above,
ranging from $27 to $28 per week only, Excluding all support order actions
resulting in a zero or unknown support amount,2 we constructed a histogram
of support order levels established under the New Bedford IV-D program.
These are presented in Figure IV-i below.
FIGURE IV-i. SUPPORT ORDER LEVELS ESTABLISHED IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
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1. The lowest order established during the study period under the New Bed-
ford IV-D program was $4 per week, the highest $96.
2. Order amounts which were unknown were coded accordingly ("999"). Enforce-
ment actions involving the dismissal of a prior support order, or in which the
court did not establish any support order (for example, divorce actions for
"care and custody only"), were assigned a support order level of $0 per week.
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Following each support 'enforcement order was a code indicating the
level of compliance by the father with that particular order for support.
Recording every payment made by a father in compliance with an order, to-
gether with the date of each payment, would have been cost-prohibitive.
Instead, we viewed the father's entire payments record following each order
and recorded his compliance or delinquency in a single code. If there oc-
curred any changes in the father's level of compliance, such changes would
also be identified and entered in the record of payments following the
particular order. Support compliance was ranked in the following way:
(1) fathers who paid regularly the total amount of their support order;
(2) fathers who paid regular support amounts which were less than levels
established in the support order;" (3) fathers who paid support irregularly,
3
or who paid amounts considerably less than required under the support
order; and (4) fathers who never paid any support after an order had been
established. We found that in the first and last categories there were
fathers who exhibited a sudden reversal in their payment response to an
order. We therefore created two further categories: (5) fathers who paid
regularly the full amount of their support order for some period, then be-
came delinquent; and conversely, (6) fathers who did not pay any support
immediately following the establishment of a support order, but who later
began to pay support. In all cases where a father stopped paying supoort,
1. Up to a total possible three changes in payments per support order.
2. We assigned to this category those fathers who paid on average an amount
that was between 50% and 85% of the original order amount.
3. This category applied to those fathers who paid less than 50% oFf their
support order amount.
4. In Chapter V, we devised a scheme for weighting these various payment
responses of fathers in order to approximate payment levels as a percentage
of order levels. This scheme is described fully in Section C of Chapter V.
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we also entered the date (month and year) of the father's last payment
under the particular order.1
We obtained breakdowns of the compliance response of fathers to their
first, and all subsequent, orders for support. The results are summarized
below. Approximately 50% of fathers responded by paying regularly the
full amount of the order. Another 20% of fathers paid regularly an amount
less than the amount established in the support order, at least initially.
About 18% of fathers never paid support under orders established by the
IV-D unit. Few fathers showed an improvement in payment compliance levels
over time. Most payment level changes recorded after a particular support
2
order showed increased delinquency. About 25% of fathers stopped paying
support altogether. In Section C of Chapter V, we examine more closely the
payment responses of'fathers of different earnings levels to alternate
modes of enforcement, viz. to various types of orders, both court and non-
court, and to various levels of enforcement and monitoring.
Where a father had defaulted on support payments established under a
court order for support, he may be held in contempt and be required to
pay arrearages to the Welfare Department. These may be paid in bulk or
in increments which are added to the father's weekly support amount. Many
fathers on the study file were paying arrears to the Department, but not
all were identified. However, where the amount established as arrearage
1. These cases were carefully checked to determine whether payment ter-
mination was valid (i.e. whether the father had stopped payments to the
Welfare Department because his family's AFDC case had been closed, or be-
cause his order had been temporarily suspended due to a change in his finan-
cial circumstances). Where no valid reason was found, the father was
assumed to be delinquent in child support.
2. This may be due in part to inadequate monitoring of cases (viz. only
three support workers are responsible for monitoring about 2,300 child
support cases under the New Bedford IV-D program).
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had not been paid prior to the family's exit from AFDC, the IV-D file on
the father remained open for arrears only.1 In all cases involving the
payment of arrears subsequent to the termination of the family's AFDC grant,
we recorded the total arrears due, the date (month and year) of the esta-
blishment of arrearage by the court, and whether the father paid in bulk or
in increments. We also recorded the dismissal of arrears orders where
applicable, including the information listed above and the date of final
payment by the father,
Finally, we entered on each record in the study file the child support
payments status of the father as of December, 1977.2 If a case was open at
that date, we noted whether the father was non-delinquent, had never paid
support under his current order, or had stopped payments, Where a father
had been compliant under a prior order for support, but had become delinquent
under his current order, we entered a separate code. We also noted where
the reverse was true (i.e. the father had not paid until the current order
was established). We also noted whether an arrears order was in effect as of
December, 1977, or whether an arrears order had been dismissed. We adopted
similar procedures in assigning codes to cases which were closed. Where the
father stopped payments prior to the closure of the AFDC case, we assumed
support delinquency prior to case closure.
1. In all such cases, it was necessary for the Welfare Department to esta-
blish in court the amount of arrears due prior to the termination of the
family's AFDC grant,
2. A full list of all coded payments status entries appears in Appendix C.
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CHAPTER V
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND WELFARE DEPENDENCY
A. INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter we examine the impact of child support enforcement on
the welfare dependency of female-headed families in the New Bedford region
of Massachusetts. There are two major ways in which welfare (AFDC) de-
pendency may be affected by thelenforcement of child support: (i) directly,
that is, the amount of child support collected exceeds the family's AFDC
grant amount, thereby forcing their ineligibility for continued assistance;
and (ii) indirectly, by discouraging marginal welfare families from apply-
ing for AFDC grants. We will examine the reasons why few families achieve
welfare independence directly, through paternal support payments in excess
of the AFDC grant. We will also examine what appears to be a strong dis-
couragement effect associated with support enforcement, particularly among
couples who may have separated in order to become eligible for welfare bene-
fits. One-third of all cases on the study file were closed due to the
reconciliation of the couple. We will argue that the enforcement of support
results in lower net welfare benefits to those families who have separated
in order to become eligible for AFDC family grants. That these couples are
unable to maintain themselves once "reconciled" is evidenced by the fact
that fully 78% of reconciled couples later separate. Although some couples
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may be encouraged to "reconcile" and forego welfare assistance following
paternal support enforcement measures, a majority of these otherwise in-
tact1 families appear to need at least temporary assistance at some point
in the future. There was also some.indication that couples who had fre-
quently separated and reconciled prior to enforcement action against the
father remained separated subsequent to the first such action taken by the
IV-D unit, These results suggest a second, quite different, impact
of the IV-D program: an encouragement toward final separation among mar-
ginal welfare families.
The Goal of Welfare Independence
A basic premise of this research is that there is nothing automatically
redeeming about the goal of welfare independence. From the point of view
of the family, the attainment of welfare independence does not bring long-
term economic security. The pattern of dependency on a paternal provider
(viz. the state, husband, father) does not change with welfare status. We
use 'welfare independence' in this research, not as a measure of legislative
success, but to illustrate the limited view of child support enforcement,
parental support obligations, and support rights of children currently fos-
tered in Massachusetts under the state's IV-D program.~
1. We assume that couples who continually separate and reconcile do so pri-
marily for economic reasons, viz, in order to become eligible for welfare
benefits or while the father undertakes employment search. The decision to
reconcile may occur as a result of enforcement action against the father or
because either spouse has found employment. Reconciliations occuring imme-
diately after an enforcement initiative are assumed to be in response to the
perceived reduction in net welfare benefits by the otherwise intact couple.
2. The subordination of support rights of children to state rights to re-
cover welfare costs is evidenced by the recent pronouncements of Governor
Edward J. King of Massachusetts who has characterized the IV-D program as a
"$130 million welfare debt owed by fathers of families on AFDC (Boston
Sunday Globe 3/4/79, pp. 1, 12).
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Two basic assumptions underlie the goal of welfare indenendence. The
first is that welfare independence measures some absolute level of economic
achievement for the family, a level which may be readily identified in
dollar terms. Instead, the goal of welfare independence is both relative
and variable. The average AFDC -grant level for a family with two dependents
during 1976 was approximately $272 per month. in Massachusetts, but only
$36 per month during the same year in Texas. Cost-of-living differences
between the two states could not account for this substantial difference in
AFDC grant levels. In order for a family to become welfare independent
through the IV-D enforcement program, the father's support payments must
exceed the family's AFDC grant level. This will occur most easily where:
(a) the AFDC grant level of the family is relatively low (determined by
state welfare policies governing benefit levels, as well as by the relative
availability of alternate sources of income for the family, such as the
mother's earnings); and where
(b) the father himself can afford to pay support levels commensurate with
his family's AFDC grant level.
In states with large welfare populations, such as in Massachusetts, AFDC
cases are subject to frequent monitoring and grant level reviews so that
adjustments are continually being made to the family's AFDC grant. As the
family's grant level changes, so too does the relative importance of paternal
support payments in determining the future welfare status of the family.
We would expect paternal support payments to more easily exceed AFDC
grant levels in states with low relative benefit levels, and vice versa.
We would also expect the impact of paternal support payments on family welfare
status to be relatively low in depressed regions, those with low income and
high unemolovment levels. In the New Bedford region, the AFDC grant levels
of families are among the highest in the nation, while the ability of fathers
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to pay support is very low. In sum, the impact of the IV-D program with
respect to welfare independence will vary substantially by state, region,
and individual circumstances. It is important to recognize this fact as
we evaluate the welfare rollback effects of the Child Support Enforcement
Program in the New Bedford region. 1
The second basic assumption underlying the goal of welfare independence
is that the welfare-independent family is, by definition, self-sustaining
upon termination of its welfare grant. Aside from the fact that each state
has developed its own standards of what constitutes "reasonable" and "ade-
quate" family support, there is also the fact that, even if adequate, there
-is no guarantee of continuing economic support to the family. For example,
in Massachusetts, state enforcement services are withdrawn immediately
following the termination of the family's AFDC grant. In the event of later
paternal delinquency, the non-welfare family must rely on costly private
enforcement through the courts. If, as in the case of Massachusetts, the
courts are not reimbursed for administrative costs incurred in the pursuit
of payments for non-welfare families, there is little incentive for diligent
enforcement in these cases. Rates of recidivism are known to be high among
fathers participating in the IV-D Drogram, particularly when the state is no
longer involved in the enforcement process. High rates of unemployment in
1. In the 1979 Annual Report of the Office of Child Support Enforcement,
it was reported that 19,000.from 29 states had been made ineligible for
continued public (AFDC) assistance as a- direct result of the enforcement
of child support payments from delinquent fathers (Washington Post 2/12/79,
p. 5; cf. Boston Globe 2/12/79). Greatest welfare rollbacks were recorded
by states with relatively low AFDC grant benefit levels. We might also find
highest representation of rollback cases in regions with low unemployment
and high income levels.
2. A poor family receiving AFDC in Massachusetts may not be judged eligible
for public assistance in some other state (for example, Texas) where AFDC
benefit levels are low. Similarly, family laws governing the amount of
"reasonable" support required from a father vary in each state.
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low income regions of the state reduce the ability, and willingness, of
fathers to pay support. Local employment opportunities will also determine
whether the mother of a non-welfare family may earn sufficient wages to
maintain her family following the termination of the AFDC grant. The
notion that 'welfare independence' marks the entry of the family into a
new level of economic security may be groundless. The high turnover rates
associated with AFDC families in general give lie to this interpretation,
or at least suggest that sulf-sufficiency is temporary.I The indeterminacy
of paternal support, and remedy for nonsupport, for the non-welfare family
serve to further weaken the notion of 'welfare independence' as an appro-
priate goal of the Child Support Enforcement Program. In neneral, welfare
independence is short-lived for families of fathers participating in the
IV-D program.
Research Summary
Almost without exception, the AFDC grant to families in the New Bedford
region exceed child support payment levels by such a wide margin that few
families are made ineligible for welfare assistance by means of direct
payments. We identified three factors which could contribute to a reduction
in the support amount. The level of support paid by fathers is determined
1. Michael J. Boskin and Frederick C. Nold, "A Markov Model of Turnover in
Aid To Families With Dependent Children", J. Human Resources, vol.X , no. 4
(1975) pp. 467-481.
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primarily by: (i) the willingness of IV-D workers and court judges to adher
to HEW national support guidelines based on family size and level of income;
(ii) the ability of fathers to pay support commensurate with HEW guideline
levels; and (iii) the willingness of fathers participating in the program
to pay support. In the following Sections B and C of this Chapter, we
measure the relative impact of each of these factors in reducing support
levels. In Section B, we present support orders levels established in New
Bedford, measured as a proportion of paternal earnings, noting the difference
between HEW levels and order levels for fathers with varying numbers of
dependants and levels and earnings. In Section C, we examine the support
payment levels of fathers in the New Bedford IV-D program, noting discrep-
ancies with support order levels established for fathers of various earnings
levels and family size. Throughout the analyses Ve have assumed that the
support order levels established by IV-D and the courts are commensurate
with at least minimum ability-to-pay on the part of program patticipants.
Particular attention is drawn to the regressive application of HEW support
guidelines, requiring excessive support from fathers with demonstrated low
ability-to-pay, while favoring fathers with relatively high earnings.
Assuming that support orders levels describe minimal payment ability,
support payment levels will then indicate the compliance of fathers with
those orders. Discrepancies observed between support order and support pay-
ment levels will similarly describe the level of paternal support delinquency.
-Preliminary analysis.of the data suggested that ability-to-pay support was
severely reduced by unemployment experience, particularly among low-earning
fathers. On the other hand, it appeared that willingness-to-comply with a
support order was independent of level of earnings, or ability-to-comply.
A primary assumption of previous studies of child support enforcement has
been that the strict application of enforcement measures would result in
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full compliance and non-delinquent behavior in the future. Consequently,
most studies of child support enforcement have concentrated on the develop-
ment of appropriate support standards together with administrative struc-
tures, mechanisms, and procedures for the most cost-effective enforcement of
these standards.2 However, we know very little about the determinants of
delinquent behavior. Preliminary analysis has suggested that willingness-
to-pay may be even more important than ability-to-pay in determining the
future welfare status of AFDC families.
In order to illuminate some of the factors associated with support de-
linquency, we will ask several questions. First, does delinquency behavior
vary with mode of enforcement? That is, do fathers paying support under
informal, voluntary and verbal agreements tend to be more delinquent, while
those under court orders for support, both civil and criminal, tend to be
more compliant? We will also ask whether fathers change their support be-
havior following a change in the mode of.enforcement (ile. from non-court to
court and vice versa). Second, does delinquency behavior vary with level of
enforcement? That is, do fathers tend to pay less than the full amount of
support under original orders/agreements, responding to subsequent enforce-
ment actions by becoming progressively more compliant? Or is the reverse
1. For example, Isabel V. Sawhill, "Developing Normative Standards For
Child Support and Alimony Payments", The Urban Institute (February 1977);
Community Council of Greater New York, "Guide For Determining Child Support
Payments From An Absent Parent", OSCE Report, Section 1110 (April 1977);
Arthur Young & Co., "Developing State Standards For Child Support Legislation",
OCSE Report, Section 1110 (1974). OCSE also plans to fund a study during
1979 entitled "Determinants in Setting the Amount of Child Support Obliga-
tions".
2. For example, Arthur Young & Co., "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Absent Parent
Support", SRS Report 74-56 (December 1975); New York State Department of
Social Services, "Cost-Effectiveness of Enforcing Title IV-D Related Family
Court Support Warrants", OCSE Report, Section 1110 (September 1978).
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true, that fathers become progressively more delinquent with subsequent
enforcement?
In Section D, we summarize our findings concerning the direct impact
of support payments on the welfare status of female-headed families (FHFs)
in the New Bedford region, comparing the results obtained in Massachusetts
with the expected results in other states with relatively low AFDC benefit
levels assuming comparable court practices and sample of fathers. We then
project the expected impact of the IV-D program on welfare dependency
assuming a strict adherence by the courts to HEW support guidelines and full
compliance by fathers with support orders established.
In Section E, we examine the indirect effects of the IV-D program in
terms of discouraging welfare dependency among marginal welfare families.
The incidence of "instant reconciliations" following initial enforcement
actions will be recorded, together with rates of re-separation among those
couples who do reconcile. The New Bedford sample will then be subdivided
into two groups: families which have not had their AFDC grants terminated
at any time during the study period (so-called "hard-core" welfare dependent
families), and those families which have undergone several AFDC case openings
and closures due to multiple "separations" and "reconciliations" by the
parents (or marginal welfare families). The support order and payment levels
of both groups will then be compared to test for significant differences
which might account for their relative dependency on welfare assistance. We
also ask whether a higher proportion of fathers associated with hard-core
AFDC cases have been unemployed or marginally employed during the study period.
The implications of our results for family structure among couples parti-
cipating in the IV-D program will then be discussed.
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B. CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ESTABLISHED IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
Ability-To-Pay
In this Section, we examine support levels established in the New
Bedford region by IV-D workers and the courts. We assume that support
levels established by IV-D personnel and court judges are commensurate
with at least minimum ability-to-pay. We also assume that where there is
evidence of inability-to-pay, both IV-D and the courts will respond by
modifying an earlier support order.2 Thus, where discrepancies exist be-
tween HEW and support order levels, we conclude that IV-D and the courts
3
are unwilling to adher to HEW standards for support.
Support Enforcement in the Courts
We do not distinguish in this analysis between informal (verbal and
voluntary) and court orders for support. However, based on the fact that
IV-D workers are generally successful in establishing support at levels
closely approximating HEW guidelines, taking to court those fathers refusing
to pay full support, we would expect major discrepancies observed between
HEW and support order levels to be attributable to laxity in court enforce-
ment. There is considerable evidence suggesting that judges may be re-
luctant to apply the full force of the available law against nonsupporting
fathers.
1. IV-D unit workers establish both verbal and voluntary agreements. They
also recommend levels of child support to the judges in both probate and
district courts.
2. Both assumptions appear to be justified by the fact that many low-earning
fathers manage to pay up to, and even exceed, suppo-rt levels recommended by
HEW.
3. Such a conclusion would be particularly justifiable in the event that
there appeared to be some pattern of lax enforcement of support.
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Although we did not examine specifically the New Bedford court system,
it is useful to point out here some of the problems that have been tradi-
tionally associated with the enforcement of support obligations in the
courts. In the:past, when the family was not represented by the state
agency for Child Support Enforcement in court,1 the mother could face high
enforcement costs, while overcrowded courts and the low priority assigned
enforcement cases could result in delays which favored the nonsupporting
father. The reluctance of many judges to use the full panoply of remedies
available for insuring regular support (viz. garnishment of wages, security
binds, and weekend sentencing) very often necessitates repeated investments
in legal actions by the mother. Moreover, as pointed out by Blank and Rone,
"the attitude of the predominantly male judiciary... is
one that presumes the obligor will comply with the
court's order of support (encouraging defaults as the
court allows the obligor one, or more than one, more
chance]... There is [also] the fear that obligors will
flee the jurisdiction or cease being productive members
of society if harsh remedies...[or full support obli-
gations] are used. The attitude of many male judges
is that alimony and child support awards are punitive
(rather than rights to be exercised by children and
spouses]."3
Finally, in bringing an action for the collection of arrears owed under a
prior order for support, there is no assurance that the father will not
4
apply for, and receive, a retroactive reduction of his support order.
1. As is the case for all non-welfare families in Massachusetts at present.
2. In a study of Connecticut courts, it was found that the average cost of
private enforcement was $750, and even then the chances of successful
collection were low (Cox Spaulding, op.cit.). However, the attorney's fee
for an enforcement action can run into several thousands of dollars (Blank
and Rone, op.cit., p.14, note 14).
3. Blank and Rone, op.cit., p.14 .
4. In only a few states does the right to each support payment vest as it
becomes due, so that no retroactive modification is possible (Ibid.).
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In a study of court enforcement in Massachusetts,1 it was found that
roughly half the appeals against prison sentences resulting from nonsupport
convictions were successful. In almost two-thirds of all county courts,
2
criminal nonsupport was prosecuted at lower rates than other crimes, even
though it ranked fifth out of twenty-five in order of frequency of prose-
cution.3 Similarly, in Connecticut it was found that while 80% of court
workload was associated with family matters, only 20% of judges were
1 4
assigned to these cases. Moreover, nonsupport matters outnumbered divorce
cases by four to one. The chances of successful collection in nonsupport
cases are lov. In-state collection chances were about 60%, taking approxi-
mately one year to accomplish, Out-of-state-collections took on average
two and a half years to process, with only a 30% chance of obtaining just
5
one payment. Until the passage of P.L.93-647, nonsupporting fathers were
treatedwith extreme tolerance and even sympathy by many court officials.
State involvement in the enforcement process was expected to result
in higher support levels, stricter enforcement through the use of dormant
legal remedies for nonsupport, and closer case monitoring. It was also
assumed that traditional attitudes of many judges toward the granting of
alimony and child support would be overcome through state involvement in
1. Massachusetts Advisory Council on Home and The Family, og.cit., p. 11.
2. Ibid. p.13, Table X.
3. Ibid. p.11, Table IV.
4. Cox Spaulding, oPg.c it., p.5.
5. Ibid.
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nonsupport cases, Although traditional attitudes may be changing, several
new problems have arisen with the advent of state IV-D programs,
In the absence of cooperative agreements between the state IV-D agency
and various local agencies and enforcement bodies, many courts in Massa-
chusetts are reluctant to enforce support in non-welfare cases. 1 Without
the incentive of 75% reimbursement for administrative costs incurred-in-
the pursuit of fathers associated with these clients, facilitated by co-
operative agreement, there may be little change in traditional attitudes
toward support enforcement. In AFDC cases, where the state IV-D agency
assumes all rights to support, the action at law is between IV-D and the
absent father. Recognizing that the AFDC grant of the family is in no way
jeopardized by the establishment of a low order for support, and that the
family receives no payments from the father, many court judges lean toward
lax enforcement of support. Some judges have stated their positive oppo-
sition toward a program designed to recover welfare costs under the auspices
of restoring the support rights of children, In many cases, where arrears
are owed the Department of Welfare under a prior support order, judges will
remit the father's debt or designate a small proportion of the existing
support order as arrears payment. Very often the process is one of bar-
gaining with the judge and the father to assess feasible compromise in pay-
1. At the time of this writing, cooperative agreements have been drawn up
between local district courts and probate courts and the IV-D agency.
2. Given that arrears can often reach thousands of dollars, and the fact
that $5 per week payments toward reduction of arrearages would take years
to repay in full, we can only assume that judges are attempting to appease
Welfare Department officials and enforcement workers.
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ment levels.
Finally, it is important to note that there is substantial variation
between courts in the Commonwealth with respect to the procedure and ad-
ministration of enforcement cases, the attitude of local judges toward
nonsupport, the welfare mother, IV-D court worker, and father. Foreshadowing
our later findings that few AFDC families attain welfare independence solely
through support enforcement efforts, little court rhetoric is devoted to
the notion of advancing the support rights of the children. Considerably
more attention is given to the parental support obligation, to evidence of
paternal ability-to-pay support, and to the father's history of delinquent
behavior. Court sympathy is rarely extended to the father with a past
criminal record, On the other hand, judges still give consideration to
the father who has re-married, although his primary support obligation is
toward his first family. It would be unfair to state that all judges view
support enforcement as punitive. Nonsupport is considered a major problem-
by most court personnel. . But, as we have suggested is the case in Massa-
chusetts, state involvement in the enforcement process, exclusively in the
interests of state recovery of welfare costs, may only serve to further
alienate court interests in support enforcement.
Paternal Support: "Appropriate" vs "Adequate"
Although we know that a majority of intact families1 rely almost ex-
clusively on paternal support for their maintenance, the contribution of
1. i.e. Two-parent families. Unfortunately, use of this term implies a
judgement regarding the relatively benefit of single versus two-parent
families, a case which has not been proved.
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alternate sources of income1 to the family budget has increased substan-
tially in recent years. For example, maternal support, generally consid-
ered an optional source of income for the family, is often necessary to
maintain a standard of living above poverty level. Since we do not have
reliable estimates of the relative contribution of paternal support to the
family budget, it is difficult to establish the actual dollar impact of
the partial or total withdrawal of that support on the family. Similarly,
any attempt -to establish "appropriate" paternal support levels, based on
family size and level of paternal earnings, will be subject to wide varia-
tion and interpetation. Suffice it to say that paternal support levels
are rarely "adequate" for the female-headed family (FHF). If paternal
support level estimates take into account maternal income, they will often
fall short of adequate, given the realities of the job market2 for women,
particularly those who have been out of the labor force for several years.
The institutionalized dependency inherent in the role of motherhood and
family caretaker insures economic hardship for the mother and family in the
3
event of marital dissolution or paternal desertion. For the low-income
4
family, welfare dependency is almost inevitable.
Although it has been widely recognized that "appropriate" and "reason-
able" support is often inadequate for a family's needs, several studies have
1. Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater, "Sources of Family Income and the Deter-
minants of Welfare", Working Paper, Joint Center For Urban Studies - M.I.T.
and Harvard University (May 1976).
2. With its typically low wages and high job turnover.
3. Sally Bould, "Female-Headed Families: Personal Fate Control and the
Provider Role", J. Marriage and the Family, vol. 39 (1977) pp. 339-349.
4. Although the problem is not limited to low-income families, as shown
by Marion P. Winston and Trude Forsher, "Nonsupport of Legitimate Children
By Affluent Fathers As a Cause of Poverty and Welfare Dependency", P-4665,
The Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, December 1971).
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been undertaken in an attempt to establish standards in the setting of
11
support levels. Following the passage of P.L,93-647 in 1975, the Office
of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare developed new guidelines for determining minimum acceptable
child support levels, based on family size and level of earnings of the
2parent without custody of the children. Unfortunately, in attaching the
family's financial future to paternal ability-to-pay, the continued depen-
dency of poor families is assured, while the larger problem of parity can
be safely ignored as policy analysts evaluate alternate support standards. 3
The assumption that paternal support enforcement at "appropriate" levels
will insure the long-term economic security of the family is nowhere more
transparent than in the case of low-income families.
For example, if we assume that AFDC grant levels define minimum levels
of "adequate" support, then it is interesting to note that, based on the
HEW schedule, no father earning less than $185 net per week could afford
to pay support which would effect the family's release from welfare in
the state of Massachusetts.4 In fact, Massachusetts has no explicit cri-
teria by which to measure indigency and relative ability-to-pay support,
and so wide latitude is given to judges and probation officers in deter-
mining "appropriate" and "reasonable" levels of paternal support.
1. For example, Sawhill, op.cit.; Arthur Young & Co., op.cit.
2. The current support schedule from HEW is presented in Table IT-5 of
Chapter III.
3. This is not to say that fathers should be expected to pay "adequate"
support levels beyond their financial capability. Rather, we suggest that
the development of a support schedule for "adequate" family support would
force policy-makers to concentrate on more fundamental issues regarding
economic dependency among FHFs, in addition to the enforcement of child
support.
4. The monthly AFDC grant for a family with two dependents was $270 in 1976.
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HEW Support Guidelines
In order to simplify the comparison between HEW and New Bedford support
order levels, we first collapsed the categories of Table III-5. Although we
maintained all categories of family size, earnings levels were aggregated
into five groups, as shown in Table V-1a. Average support levels recom-
by HEW, shown as a percentage of earnings, is provided in Table v-1b.
Overall support level averages for fathers of various earnings levels or
with the same number of dependents are depicted at the end of each row and
at the base of each column. Ideally, we would obtain these averages by
weighting each category by the number of fathers in the U. S. participating
in the IV-D program who fell in each cell. National statistics on IV-D
2fathers are nat yet. available.. Instead, we weighted each cell entry by the
3number of fathers represented in that group from the New Bedford sample.
This procedure was considered more appropriate for it assured that HEW levels
1. In aggregating earnings levels, we first obtained the average support as
a percentage of earnings for each particular family size. For example, in
order to obtain the average support percentage across all fathers earning be-
tween $76 and $100 net per week with one dependent, we averaged the support
percentages shown in parentheses in Table 111-5, On average 16% of earnings
would be required under the HEW schedule from fathers falling into this cate-
gory. Percentages for all categories are shown in Table V-7b. We then cal-
culated the average dollar support for each category by dividing the average
income of each category, (in this case $88), by the average support percent
for that group (16%), to obtain an average support level ($14.08). Each
successive set of five earnings categories were collapsed using this method.
2. However, two Special Censuses have been proposed for 1979 which will
for the first time provide data on absent parents, nonsupport, and support
enforcement in the U. S.
3. The number of New Bedford fathers represented in each category is pro-
vided in Table V-Zc.
222
-TABLE V-a., HEW SCHEDULE OF RECOMMENDED SUPPORT LEVELS
(in dollars)
Level of Earnings Number of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4 5 6+ x
$ 76 - 100 $14.08 14.96 15,84 16,72 17.60 18,48 14.84
101 - 125 29.15 32.77 35.26 36.61 37.74 38.87 31.58
126 - 150 38.92 44.44 49.96 55.20 59.34 62.38 44.66
151 - 175 48.90 56.40 63.24 69.76 76.23 81.50 57.36
176 - 200 .6.40 65.80 75.20 8422 92.50 94.00 52.57
28.38 40.50 34.80 56.53 43.87 48.34 $35.95
TABLE v-lb. HEW SCHEDULE OF RECOMMENDED SUPPORT LEVELS
(as a % of net weekly earnings)
Level of Earnings Number of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+ X
$ 76 - 100 16.0% 17,0 13.0 19.6 17.7
101 - 125 25.8 29.0 31.2 33.0 29.3
126 - 150 28.2 32.2 36.2 41.6 34.6
151 - 175 30.0 34.6 38.8 44.9 37.1
176 - 200 30.0 35.0 40.0 A6.8 38.0
X = 26.0 29.6 32.8 37.2 31.4%
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would be more representative of our sample, important for future compari-
sons between HEW and New Bedford support order levels. Since relatively
few cases in the New Bedford sample involved families of more than four
dependent children, we also decided to collapse family size categories
into just four groups, the last consisting of all cases involving fathers
with four or more dependents. We used the same weighting procedure des-
cribed above.
Support levels recommended by HEW vary between one-sixth and one-half
of paternal earnings, from a low of 16% for a father in the lowest earnings
category with just one dependent to 47% for the father in the highest
earnings level with four or more dependents. Support levels increase fairly
uniformly across family size and income level, though we note that rel-
atively lower amounts are required from lower earning fathers. (Average
support totals shown in Table V-la vary non-uniformly due to non-uniform
weighting.) Maintaining a one-third support level standard for all fathers
would be regressive because one-third of earnings represents a substantially
greater reduction in the amount of net disposable income for a father in
the lowest level than for a father in the highest level of earnings. Thus,
the HEW schedule provides a relatively progressive set of guidelines to
local support enforcement agencies, requiring higher support percentages
1. Most fathers with more than four dependent children had had these
children by more than one mother, comprising an additional case on the
study file.
2. Note that the average level of support recommended in New Bedford
by the HEW schedule would be approximately $35.95 per week, or an average
of 31.4% of earnings.
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from fathers with higher earnings, and lower support percentages from
fathers with least ability-to-pay, If support enforcement officials in
the New Bedford region are establishing support order levels commensurate
with these HEW levels, we may assume they are applying this progressive
standard. Where differences occur between support order levels and HEW
recommended levels, we will examine the data to see whether there is some
pattern to observed discrepancies. A test of significance will then be
applied to our results.
Support Order Levels in New Bedford
In order to evaluate local enforcement of HEW recommended support
standards, we compared HEW support amounts and support percentages (shown
in Tables la and b) with actual support order levels and percentages
found in the New Bedford region. These are presented in Tables 2a and b,
depicting dollar amounts of support orders, and support order levels as a
percentage of earnings, respectively, for various earnings levels and
family sizes.1 We did not differentiate between types of support orders,
including both probate and district court orders, as well as verbal and
voluntary agreements, in this analysis. 2
In creating Tables 2a and b, we first created a subfile of all cases
in which a support order had been established since 1975 and the development
1. Note that data on fathers earning less than $76 net per week, and in
excess of $200 net per week, was available from our New Bedford sample.
Although there were no comparable statistics from the HEW Table, we re-
corded them for later comparison with support payments made by New Bedford
fathers, discussed in Section C of this Chapter (see Tables 4a and b).
2. In Section C of this Chapter, we compare the various levels of support
established for different types of support orders and agreements.
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TABLE V-Za. SUPPORT ORDER LEVELS ESTABLISHED IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
(in dollars)
Level of Earnings Number of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4 5 6+ x
$ 1 - 75 $19.03 24.50 24.00 b b 30.00 20.84
76 - 100 14.73 23.11 23.30 31.60 40.60 25.00 19.63
101 - 125 20.71 22.92 31.60 50.00 30.50 - b 23.53
126 - 150 26.91 34.19 39.77 37.60 46.67 30.00 33.20
151 - 175 31.29 38.91 43.67 41.67 48.33 - b 38.27
176 - 200 43.25 42.83 47.22 40.67 -b 6.00 44.25
200+ 56.67 35.46 40.00 43.00 47.50 50.00 43.50
X = 22.12 30.44 36.10 39.83 43.47 36.67 $28.83
-b No cases fell in this category
TABLE v-2b. SUPPORT ORDER LEVELS ESTABLISHED IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
(as a % of earnings)
Level of Earnings Number of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+ x
$ 76 - 100 16.5% 26.4 25.1 38.9 26.7
101 - 125 18.2 20.2 27.4 37,1 25.7
126 - 150 19.7 24.7 28.8 29.0 25.6
151 - 175 19.5 23.8 27.4 27.2 24.5
176 - 200 21.9 22.9 25.5 23.5 23.3
X = 19.2 23.6 26.8 31.1 25.2
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of the HEW guidelines, Similarly, we included only those cases for which
a post-1974 wage report, providing net weekly earnings of the father, was
available, 1 Support order levels and support percentages (of earnings)
of cases in the subfile would thus be more appropriate for comparison with
HEW guidelines. No attempt was made to average support order amounts or
wage earnings in cases where more than one order2 or wage report was avail-
able since 1975. In these cases, we included only the first appropriate
order for support and/or wage report. The new subfile was comprised of
479 cases from our original file of 682 cases. The number of subfile
cases in each category of earnings and family size is provided in Table
V-Zc.3
Differences Between HEW and New Bedford Support Levels
Support order levels established in New Bedford show a fairly uni-
form pattern of increase across earnings and family size, with one major
exception: support orders established for fathers earning less than
$100 net per week are relatively higher than corresponding HEW levels.
Actual dollar amounts of New Bedford support orders are, for the most
part, lower than HEW support levels. The most striking differences occur,
1. We also excluded all cases in which the only post-1974 order and/or wage
report entries available had been coded as "999" (unknown amount) or "000"
(no support was established or the father was unemployed without compensa-
tion), A total of 203 cases from the original study file were excluded from
the support order subfile.
2. 41% of all cases in the complete study file showed more than one order
for support established against the father.
3. Given the low numbers of fathers in larger family size categories, we
aggregated cases into a single category comprising all fathers with four
or more dependents (see Table V-Zb, fourth column). In aggregating the
data, we used the weighting procedure described above.
4. The average support order established in New Bedford was approximately
$29. This represented an average of about 25% of earnings, compared with
31% recommended by HEW.
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TABLE v-2c. SUPPORT ORDER LEVELS ESTABLISHED IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
(number of cases per category)
Level of Earnings Number of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4 5 6+ TOTAL
$ 1 - 75 29 10 2 0 0 1 42 (9%)
76 - 100 56 18 10 5 5 2 96 (20%)
101 - 125 56 49 15 2 2 0 124 (26%)
126 - 150 34 43 17 5 3 1 103 (21%)
151 - 175 14 23 6 6 3 0 52 (11%)
176 - 200 4 12 9 6 0 1 32 (7%)
200+ 6 11 3 5 4 1 30 (6%)
TOTAL = 199 166 62 29 17 6 479 (100%)
(42%) (35%) (13%) (5%) (4%) (1%) (100%)
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however, when we examine the New Bedford support orders as a percentage of
earnings. Note that HEW support percentages increase with earnings and
family size, as can be seen from the averages computed in the final row
and column of Table V-1b. On the other hand, although New Bedford support
percentages increase with family size in similar fashion,1 they actually
decrease with higher levels of earnings. This is shown in the fifth col-
umn of Table V-2b, where the average support required of lowest-earning
fathers is about 27% of their income, while only 23% is required on average
from highest-earning fathers. 2
Differences observed between HEW and New Bedford support order levels
are summarized in Tables V-3a and b. Differences in the dollar amount of
support are provided in Table V-3a, while Table V-3b shows differences in
support as a percentage of earnings. A positive sign indicates that the
local New Bedford support order levels established by IV-D workers and the
courts were actually in excess of HEW recommended levels. Conversely, a
negative sign indicates that New Bedford support order levels were lower
than those recommended in the HEW schedule. That is to say, IV-D workers
establishing verbal and voluntary agreements, and judges establishing sup-
port orders, did not adher strictly to HEW guidelines for support.
As we had observed already, the support orders established for fathers
in lowest earnings groups in New Bedford exceeded HEW recommended levels.
1. If we compare low earners with high earners, however, we note that the
percentage of support required from low-earning fathers increases quite sig-
nificantly with family size. On the other hand, for fathers earning in the
range of $126 to $200 net per week, increases with family size are relative-
ly small. In fact, support percentages required of fathers in the two high-
est earning groups with four or more dependents actually decrease.
2. Similar results were found in the California study (Arthur Young & Co.
Study, o.cit.) Although average earnings of fathers were between $155 and
$176 per week, the average percent of income required in support was only in
the range of 14% to 21% (pp. 6 0, 62).
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TABLE v-3a. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HEW AND NEW BEDFORD SUPPORT ORDER LEVELS
(in dollars)
Level of Earnings Number of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+
$ 76 - 100 $ + 0.65 + 8.15 + 7.46 +17.09
101 - 125 - 8.44 - 9.85 - 3.66 + 3.06
126 - 150 -12.01 -10.25 -10.19 -17.58
151 - 175 -17.61 -17.49 -19.57 -29.35
176 - 200 -13.15 -22.97 -27.98 -44.66
TABLE v-3b. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HEW AND NEW BEDFORD SUPPORT ORDER LEVELS
(as a % of earnings)
Level of Earnings
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+
$ 76 - 100 + 0.5% + 9.4 + 7.1 +19.3
101 - 125 - 7.6 - 8.8 - 3.8 + 4.1
126 - 150 - 8.5 - 7.5 - 3.4 -12.6
151 - 175 -10.5 -10.8 -11.4 -17.7
176 - 200 - 8.1 -12.1 -14.5 -23.3
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Moreover, as the number of dependents of the low-earning father increases,
the degree by which- local order levels exceed HEW levels is even greater,
so that a father earning between $76 and $100 net per week with four or
more dependents will be required to pay on average $17 more than is recom-
mended by HEW, At the same time, higher earning fathers are required to
pay relatively less than amounts recommended by HEW as family size increases.
With very few exceptions, the pattern of strict enforcement against low-
earning fathers and of lax enforcement against higher-earning fathers occurs
across all earnings groups and family sizes. When viewed as a percentage
of earnings, support level differences between HEW and New Bedford show
2
the same results. The lowest earning group of father is required on aver-
age to pay 1% more toward support if he has one dependent than is recommended
under HEW guidelines. If he has four or more dependents, he is required
on average to pay 19.3% more. Convers-ely, the more a father earns per week,
the lower will be his percentage of income required for support, relative
to HEW standards. The increasingly strict application of HEW support stan-
dards with family size for low earners, contrasting with the increasing re-
laxation of standards across family sizes for higher earners, lends credence
to the theory that different support enforcement standards are consciously
applied against poor and non-poor fathers.
The pattern of application of HEW support standards in New Bedford is
1. Only two cell entries deviate from this pattern of strict enforcement
of support against low-earners and relatively lax enforcement in terms of
support order levels for higher earning fathers.
2. We applied a two-way analysis of variance to the data to test for
significant differences across earnings levels and family sizes. Dis-
crepancies observed between HEW and New Bedford support orders as a per-
cent of earnings were confirmed as significant. F-statistics for earnings
were significant at the 99.9% level, and for family size at the 95% level.
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distinctly regressive, To summarize, those fathers who are least able to
support their families are generally required to pay the highest, even
excessive, levels of support.1 This trend becomes so exaggerated with
increases in family size that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
support enforcement against poor fathers is punitive, At the same time,
fathers with the highest ability-to-pay support are required to pay the
least. Particularly favored are those higher-earning fathers with large
families.
Discussion
If we consider that fully 30% of all fathers participating in the
New Bedford IV-D program were subject to irregular employment during the
study period, we might have expected local support order levels in New
Bedford to be uniformly less than levels recommended by HEW. In parti-
cular, we would expect lowest-earning fathers to be under orders which
are less than HEW order levels. In fact, the reverse is true. While it
is true that most order levels established in New Bedford fall short of
HEW levels, in the case of poorest fathers, they exceed HEW levels.
Several reasons have been suggested to explain the discriminatory
application of support orders against poor and non-poor fathers. Proba-
bly the most common explanation is that judges are reluctant to demand
1. The HEW schedule provides minimum support guidelines to IV-D enforcement
workers. Where support orders exceed HEW levels, we would expect order
levels to still he commensurate with ability-to-pay, although not neces-
sarily with minimum ability-to-pay. If support orders exceed HEW levels by
a wide margin, as in the case for low-earning fathers, particularly those
with larger families to support, we might expect instead that order levels
exceed ability-to-pay. It would therefore not be surprising to find low-
earning fathers paying relatively small proportions of their support orders.
Differences between support orders and support payment levels in New Bedford
will be discussed in Section C of this Chapter.
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full support up to HEW levels from higher-earning fathers for fear they
may become discouraged and "skip town", Judges have also voiced the fear
that "high"1 support orders may act as a disincentive to employment.2
Similar fears may be experienced by IV-D support workers who are eager
to establish voluntary agreements and avoid court action against the father.
If the father appears unwilling to pay up to HEW support levels, the IV-D
worker may be tempted to compromise in order to obtain sure and regular
payments at lower amounts.3
A majority of nonsupport cases which reach the New Bedford courts
involve fathers who can afford to pay in the range of $15 to $45 per week
in support. No doubt there is some inertia in the system which dis-
courages a judge from establishing support amounts greatly in excess of
these norms, even where the IV-D workers has demonstrated that a father
is able to pay substantially more. IV-D workers also fall prey to this
inertia. The general rule of thumb among support workers is to attempt
to establish support agreements (verbals and voluntaries) at the one-third
level. If the father argues strongly against this order level, it will
usually be reduced. If agreement can be reached at, say, one-fifth or one-
sixth of earnings, no court action will be taken against the father. Com-
promising support order levels guarantees less courtwork for IV-D personnel
1. Judges and IV-D workers generally regard one-third of earnings as
the most "reasonable" and "appropriate" level of family support. One
reason for this hias is that a majority of HEW recommended levels approxi-
mate one-third of earnings. While the standard is easier to apply uni-
formly, there is the tendency to neglect the progressive elements of the
HEW guidelines, requiring relatively lower proportions of earnings from
poor fathers, and relatively higher proportions from non-poor fathers.
2. Although, in fact, the discouragement effect should be even greater
for poor fathers from whom a full one-third standard is applied.
3. Support workers are encouraged to enforce support even in cases where
order levels are very low (e.g. $5 per week is not uncommon). Given the
large caseload potential of the IV-D program, support levels are consid-
ered far less important than whether support is enforced at all.
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and, hopefully, higher levels of compliance from fathers, The situation
is much the same in the courtroom. If the IV-D worker recommends to the
court an order be established at more than one-third of paternal earnings,
it will often be rejected by the judge. Compromise may be reached at or
below the one-third level of support. The one-third standard is thus used,
somewhat arbitrarily, as a maximum support level in most cases.1 Unfor-
tunately, it is not generally recognized that a uniform one-third standard
for support may create real hardship for the poor father, while compliance
becomes progressively easier as earnings increase.2 The bias against esta-
blishing high support order levels seems to exit, in reverse, for low-
earning fathers. Although HEW recommends support order levels within the
range of one-quarter to one-sixth of earnings for fathers with net weekly
pay of $100 or less, it appears that both judges and support workers revert
to the familiar one-third standard in many cases.
A third reason has been suggested for the lax enforcement of HEW
support standards against'fathers of families on welfare. In establishing
support order levels, enforcement officals and judges concentrate primarily
on paternal ability-to-pay, to the virtual exclusion of family considera-
tions, such as level of need, desire to avoid or maintain contact with the
father, and so on.3 All participants in the court action are aware that
the family is receiving welfare benefits, and that the amount of the support
1. Whereas HEW support guidelines are presumed to establish a minimum
support standard. The one-third minimum approach presumes a father is
probably able to pay higher levels of support. In Section C we will show
that many low-earning fathers pay in excess of the this standard.
2. The higher the level of earnings, the greater is the amount of net
disposable income remaining after payment of one-third toward support.
3. Indeed, the action at law is between the father and the Welfare De-
partment, not between the mother or family and the nonsupporting father.
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order will in no way offset or affect their level of AFDC benefits. It
could affect the family's welfare status, however, If the support order
amount exceeds the family's AFDC grant, the AFDC case may be closed, and
future paternal support payments made directly to the family, Occasion-
ally, a judge may request information from the IV-D worker on the amount
of the family's AFDC grant, If the AFDC grant level is relatively close
to the father's potential for support, the judge may attempt to set the
support level slightly in excess of the family's AFDC grant level so as to
effect the family's release from future welfare dependency. Far more fre-
quently, however, judges are aware that fathers quickly revert to their
former support delinquent behavior in the absence of state involvement in
the enforcement process. They also recognize that the family no longer
on welfare faces an uncertain economic future. Paternal support payments
*may be irregular, and private enforcement too costly to pursue. Judges
may therefore choose to deliberately set the amount of the support order
at a level somewhat lower than the family's AFDC grant level in order to
prevent the closure of the AFDC case and in an effort to secure financial
security for the family.1
1. If a judge believes that the one-third standard is too high for, say,
a father earning $165 net per week who has re-married, he or she is in
effect giving legal sanction to the notion that earnings of $165 or less
per week are insufficient to support the children and maintain two resi-
dences. In a sense, such rulings on support level argue for some form
of public assistance payments as necessary to supplement paternal support
payments.
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C, CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
Willingness-To-Pay
In the previous- Section, we compared New- Bedford support order levels
with HEW support guidelines. We assumed that HEW support levels defined
a minimum level of ability-to-pay support. Thus, discrepancies between
HEW and New Bedford support order levels reflected an inability or un-
willingess on the part of IV-D workers and court judges to adher to HEW
guidelines, In this Section, we examine the support payments made by New
Bedford fathers in compliance with these orders. We assume once again that
support order levels are commensurate with at least minimum ability-to-
pay support. Thus, any discrepancies observed between support order
levels and support payment levels may be explained in terms of paternal
unwillingness-to-comply,
First, we will examine paternal support payments made in New Bedford
to see whether there are any significant differences in payment levels
between fathers of various earnings levels. We suspect that criminal non-
support is largely a problem of poverty. Fathers subject to occasional,
even frequent, bouts of unemployment may be discouraged from making support
payments.2 There could be another reason why we might expect low-earning
fathers to be more delinquent in child support payments than other fathers.
1. Given that a majority of New Bedford support orders fall below minimum
support levels recommended by HEW, this assumption is probably justified.
We will show, moreover, that many of the poorest fathers pay substantially
higher percentages of their earnings toward support than recommended by
HEW which suggests that HEW levels do represent a minimum level. We also
have assumed that where a real inability to pay support exists, IV-D
workers and court officials will have modified the support order amount
accordingly.
2. In the case of marginally employed fathers, it is not possible to
determine whether low compliance levels (or higher support delinquency)
is primarily a function of inability or unwillingness-to-comply.
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Recall from Section B that support order levels established for lowest-
earning fathers in New Bedford constituted substantially higher percen-
tages of earnings than those established for higher-earning fathers. In
fact, a majority of orders established for low-wage fathers actually
exceeded levels recommended by HEW for those groups, One result we might
anticipate from these findings is a lower level of compliance with support
orders among low-wage fathers, On the other hand, HEW support guidelines
were relaxed for higher earners. Thus, we might expect substantially
higher levels of support order compliance among these groups of fathers.'
We then compare differences between support order and support payment
levels for fathers of various earnings levels and numbers of dependents.
Differences are measured both in dollar terms (i.e. unadjusted for earnings
differences) and as a percent of earnings. Any discernible patterns of
difference will be examined, and an analysis of variance applied to test
for significant differences between groups,
A major assumption of many proponents of the Child Support Enforcement
Program is that the strict enforcement of support orders will result in
non-delinquent behavior on the part of absent parents. However, we know
very little about the causes of support delinquency itself. The problem
of paternal nonsupport is a source of daily frustration and concern for
those engaged in enforcement activity. A man's failure to provide support
1. All analyses of support payment levels are performed using the same
categories and intervals of earnings and family size as in Section B.
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for his family is not well understood, The overwhelming majority of
support enforcement officials have concluded that fathers are basically
prone to delinquent behavior or they are not, and they will invariably
add that there are no clues available as to the difference between these
"types" of fathers, In the following analyses, we do not seek to estab-
lish the determinants of willingness-to-pay, Instead, we measure levels
of compliance (and delinquency) associated with various types of enforce-
ment which may serve to illuminate particular aspects of the enforcement
process itself.
We distinguish first between alternate modes of enforcement, i.e.
types of support orders or agreements established with the father, We
then compare the payment levels of fathers in response to these various
types of enforcement action. Several further questions may be asked.
For example, do fathers tend to remain delinquent under more informal,
voluntary or verbal agreements, but tend to comply with formal court orders
for support? Preliminary analysis of the data suggested that support pay-
ment levels dropped following formal marital dissolution. We will there-
fore examine support payment responses both prior to, and following,
changes in the mode of enforcement. For example, do payment compliance
levels increase or decrease following the change from non-court to criminal
court action or to probate court action?
1. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the incidence of threat of court
action or criminal proceedings. Although we know that such actions can
encourage prompt support payments, we are unable to measure the impact of
threatened court action as a deterrent to delinquency.
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Finally, we examine the impact of alternate levels of enforcement on
paternal support payment levels, Level of enforcement is defined as the
total number of support enforcement actions taken against a father during
the study period. If we suspect that low-earning fathers may be more
delinquent in support payments, then it would be useful to compare the pay-
ment responses of both employed, and marginally employed, fathers to
various levels of enforcement, A test for significant differences between
these groups (ANOVA) will then be applied.
Recall that all child support payments collected under the Massa-
chusetts IV-D Program are directed to the State Treasury, in no way off-
setting or reducing the amount of the family's AFDC grant, Many fathers
may be reluctant to pay support to the Welfare Department knowing that such
payments do not affect.the welfare of their children. The family continues
to receive their full AFDC grant regardless of paternal support compliance
or delinquency with an order for child support. Another factor which could
contribute to unwillingness-to-pay is that many fathers resent the fact
that their wives or ex-wives are receiving welfare assistance while they
are required to pay support, If the father has re-married, his support
of the first family may create real hardship for his second family. We do
not know what impact these factors may have on the father's willingness-to-
pay support. However, if we assume that payment levels are relatively in-
dependent of family welfare status, then our conclusions regarding sup-
port delinquency may be extended to include fathers of non-welfare families
as well,
1. Viz. the father's level of compliance with a support order would be the
same whether or not his family was receiving welfare benefits.
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Estimating Support Payment Levels
Individual payments made by father in New Bedford were not re-
corded on the study file. Instead, we constructed a shorthand method
of estimating payment levels: we adjusted support order levels down-
wards by an amount judged to be equivalent to the father's level of
nonsupport or support delinquency. Judgements regarding compliance
(or delinquency) levels were made by examining the complete payments
records of the father following each support order established for
him.
First, we developed a set of codes to approximate most common
levels of compliance.1 Recall from Chapter IV that support payment
levels could be described in any one of six ways: (1) payments made
regularly up to the full amount of the support order; (2) payments
made regularly, but generally an amount less than the support order;2
(3) irregular support payments are made, or amounts paid are less
than half the amount of the support order; (4) support payments were
never made following this particular support order; (5) full and regu-
lar support payments were made for some months, but the father later
stoppped payments; and (6) the father initially refused to make any
payments, but later began paying regularly the full amount of the
1. Admittedly, the assignment of codes according to observed levels
of support provides only gross estimates of support payment behavior.
The alternative, however, was to record each payment, together with
date, amount, and associated support order, made by each father on
the study file. This would have been too time-consuming. Instead,
we made a best approximation of support compliance by recording
gross payment level changes.
2. Where a father regularly paid more than half of the support order
amount, his payment response level was recorded in this category.
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support order. Each support order on the study file was followed by
at least one of the above code indicating paternal payment response
to that order. A total of three possible codes could follow any indi-
vidual support order, each indicating changes which occurred in the
father's level of compliance with the order.
We then assigned weights to each of these compliance levels.
Full payment compliance was assigned a weight of 1.0. If support pay-
ments were regular, but slightly less than the order amount, a weight
of 0.8 was assigned. If the father paid irregularly, or amounts con-
siderably less than the order, we assigned a weight of .15. If no
payments were made by a father, a score of zero was applied. Support
order levels were then adjusted by multiplying the dollar amount of
the order by the appropriate weight for that order to obtain an esti-
mate of the actual payment level.1
Up to three such adjustments could be made2 to any particular
support order in estimating payments levels. A straight averaging
of the three weights would not account for the final payment response
of the father adequately. We therefore accorded triple weighting to
the final compliance code associated with a particular order for sup-
port. Consider the example of a support order for $30 per week,3
where the father was initially delinquent, graduating to regular but
1. Thus, a weight of 1.0 would mean that the level of payments was
equal to the level of the support order. Zero weighting resulted in
a zero support payment level. Regular payments less than the amount
of the support order would be listed at 80% of the order level, and
irregular payments or low payments at 15% of the order amount.
2. Representing changes in the father's payment level.
3. The average support order level established in New Bedford was
$27 per week.
241
low payments, then finally paying the full amount of the support order.
The weighting scheme would be applied as follows:
= (30*0)+(30* .8)+(30*l.0)+(30*l.0)+(30*l.0)
5
$22.8,
where y = estimated level of support payments. Conversely, if a father
was initially compliant, then began paying lesser amounts, and finally
stoppped payments- altogether, his support payment level would be cal-
culated as follows:
y = (30*1.0)+(30*.8)+(30*0)+(30*0)+(30*0)
5
= $10.8.
Note that if triple weighting was not applied, payment level esti-
mates for both these cases would have been identical, even though one
father became fully compliant while the other stopped support payments
altogether.1
Support Payment Levels in New Bedford
In estimating support payment levels in New Bedford, we followed
the same procedure as for support order levels in Section B, construct-
ing a subfile of all cases in which a post-1974 support order and wage
1. Although this scheme provides a reasonably accurate estimate of
support payment levels following any particular order, it tends to
lose its accuracy if multiple codes exist (38% of all orders). Payment
level estimates in these cases err by about ± 15%. In Appendix E,
we calibrate this method of es-timation. We also sensitize our payment
level results by applying alternate weights and by using a simple
averaging procedure, rather than triple weighting final entries.
Although we could not say that simple averaging resulted in better
estimates, we did find that a weight of .8 for code "2" entries was
more accurate. All payment estimates in this thesis, however, contain
a weight of .8 for code "2" entries, resulting in conservative estimates
of the difference between order and payment levels.
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report were available. Again we excluded all cases in which the sup-
port order or earnings amounts were either zero or unknown. Support
payment levels were obtained using the weighting scheme for adjusting
order levels for 480 cases from the study file. Cases were then dis-
aggregated by earnings level and family size. Tables V-4a and b show
New Bedford support payment levels in dollar terms and as a percent of
earnings, respectively. Refering to the range of earnings between
1$75 and $200, we find that the average level of payments made by New
Bedford fathers in the IV-D program increase with earnings as well as
with family size. A significant exception to this was fathers with four
or more dependents earning in excess of $150 per week. Recall from
Section B that these same fathers were required to pay relatively lower
support percentages than other fathers. It is interesting to note
that low-earning fathers pay higher percentages of their income toward
support than high-earning fathers.2 Overall, fathers in the middle
earnings ranges pay the highest percentages of their earnings toward
support, while low earners pay more and high earners pay less. In
fact, when viewed as a percentage of earnings, support payments are
highest among low-earning fathers (excluding the under $75 range)
with the greatest number of dependents, i.e. four or more. This group
1. Although data for categories below $75 and above $200 net per week
were provided also, not all payment estimates are significant due to
the low numbers of cases reporesnted in several of these cells. Table
V-4c shows the number of cases in each cell category.
2. Although fathers with three or more dependents, earning less than
$75 per week, pay very little toward support.
3. These findings agree with those obtained in the California study
(Arthur Young & Co., op.cit., p.67), except for our results concerning
low earning fathers, who are not only required to pay higher percen-
tages under support orders, but also show high levels of compliance.
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TABLE V-4a. SUPPORT PAYMENT LEVELS IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
( in dollars)
Level of Earnings Number of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+ x
$ 1 - 75 $ 8.50 16.15 0.34 1.13 9.76
76 - 100 7.73 12.43 15.47 25.59 11.65
101 - 125 11.03 13.07 22.00 14.58 13.35
126 - 150 18.45 21.00 23.32 31.12 21.43
151 - 175 22.73 27.12 34.17 28.86 27.05
176 - 200 33.77 29.48 44.44 40.74 36.69
200+ 30.62 28.82 11.75 35.12 29.54
x = 12.78 19.42 24.51 27.67 $18.46
TABLE v-4b. SUPPORT PAYMENT LEVELS IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
(as a % of earnings)
Level of Earnings Number of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+ x
$ 0 - 75 15.4% 23.9 0.5 1.5 10.3
76 - 100 8.6 13.9 16.7 28.8 17.0
101 - 125 9.7 11.5 19.2 13.3 13.4
126 - 150 13.5 15.3 16.9 22.7 17.1
151 - 175 14.2 16.5 21.6 18.0 17.6
176 - 200 17.1 15.7 24.0 22.0 19.7
200+ 11.5 12.2 4.6 13.7 10.5
X = 12.9 15.6 14.8 17.2 15.1%
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TABLE V-4c. SUPPORT PAYMENT LEVELS IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
(number of cases per category)
Level of Earnings Number of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+ TOTAL
$ 0 - 75 29 10 2 1 42 (9%)
76 - 100 45 18 10 12 96 (20%)
101 - 125 45 49 16 4 125 (26%)
126 - 150 34 1 43 17 9 103 (21%)
151 - 175 14 23 6 9 52 (11%)
176 - 200 4 12 9 7 32 (7%)
200+ 5 11 3 10 29 (6%)
TOTAL = 198 166 63 52 479 (100%)
(41%) (35%) (13%) (11%) (100%)
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paid approximately 29% of earnings toward support, compared with an
overall average of 15% among all fathers in the New Bedford program.
As in the case of support orders, support payment levels prescribe a
fairly regressive picture of support enforcement in New Bedford. It
is very interesting to note, however, that lower-earning fathers show
an ability to comply with support standards far in excess of HEW rec-
ommended levels. 1
Differences Between Order Levels and Payment Levels
Comparing support order and support payment levels in New Bedford,
we find that payment levels in all cell categories are lower than order
levels. Overall, the average level of support required in New Bedford
was about $29 per week, while the average support payment was only
$18 per week. Although an average of 25% of earnings was required in
support from New Bedford fathers, they actually paid only about 15% of
their earnings on average. In Tables v-5a and b, we show the net dollar
and support percentage differences between order and payment levels in
New Bedford. Note that all entries in these Tables are negative,
that is, payment levels of fathers were invariably lower than support
levels ordered by IV-D or the courts. Cell entries thus indicate the
dollar amount, or support percentage, by which support order levels
1. This lends credence to the theory that enforcement efforts are
concentrated, and generally most successful, against fathers who are
the most accessible if also the least able to support their families.
It also indicates that the application of the strict one-third support
standard, in lieu of the progressive HEW guidelines for support, may
not exceed even the poorer father's ability-to-pay.
2. From Tables V-Za and b, and 4a and b, respectively.
3. A positive entry would indicate that the payment level exceeded
the order level.
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TABLE V-5a. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUPPORT ORDER AND SUPPORT PAYMENT LEVELS
IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS (in dollars)
Level of Earnings
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+
$ 76 - 100 - $ - 7.00 -10.68 - 7.83 - 8.71
101 - 125 - 9.68 - 9.85 - 9.60 -25.72
126 - 150 - 8.46 -13.19 -16.45 - 8.68
151 - 175 - 8.56 -11.79 - 9.50 -15.04
176 - 200 - 9.48 -13.35 - 2.78 - 2.66
TABLE v-5b. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUPPORT ORDER AND SUPPORT PAYMENTS LEVELS
IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS (as a % of earnings)
Level of Earnings
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+
$ 76 - 100 -7.9% -12.5 - 8.4 -10.1
101 - 125 -8.5 - 8.7 - 8.2 -23.8
126 - 150 -6.2 - 9.4 -11.9 - 6.3
151 - 175 -5.3 - 7.3 - 5.8 - 9.2
176 - 200 
-4.8 - 7.2 - 1.5 - 1.5
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were reduced due to paternal delinquency. Absolute dollar differences
appear to vary somewhat independently of earnings and family size.1
When viewed as a percent of earnings, however, we see a clear trend
toward higher delinquency levels among low-earning fathers, and low
levels of delinquency among high-earning fathers. Family size does
not seem to be related to delinquency levels for low-earners, but
payment compliance appears to be highest among high-earning fathers
with largest families.2
Recall from Table V-3a that New Bedford support order levels
exceeded HEW recommended levels by as. muck as 19% for low-earning
fathers with the largest families. At the same time, support orders
established for high-earning fathers with large families, those whom
we might consider as most able-to-pay support, were only required
to pay a fraction of HEW recommended levels for their group. Order
levels for these fathers were actually 23% lower than HEW levels.
We therefore should not be surprised to find that low earners exhibit
the highest levels of support delinquency, while high earners are
the least delinquent. The problem is that any conclusions regarding
paternal support delinquency will vary depending upon the standard
used. If payment levels of low-earning fathers are compared with
1. Note that thehighest level of delinquency was recorded for fathers
earning between $101 and $125 per week with four or more dependents,
who paid on average $26 less per week that required under support
orders for that group. The lowest levels of delinquency occurred
among high earning fathers with largest families to support, paying
only $3 less than support order levels on average.
2. This was confirmed by results from a two-way analysis of variance,
testing for significant differences across earnings levels and family
sizes. Discrepancies observed between support order and support pay-
ment levels in New Bedford were significantly different across groups.
F-statistics for earnings were significant at the 99.9% level, but
did not vary significantly by family size.
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support order levels for that group, they appear to be more delinquent
than all other groups of fathers. If, however, we compare their pay-
ment levels with HEW support levels recommended, the same group of
fathers appears to he the least delinquent group.1 To illustrate this,
in Section D we will compare payment levels of fathers with both HEW
and New Bedford order levels. We will also provide graphs which show
the relative impact of lax enforcement and paternal delinquency on
support levels in New Bedford. Specifically, we will ask whether
support levels are low primarily as a result of lax enforcement or
unwillingness-to-pay on the part of fathers. The percentage reduction
in support due to each of these factors will also be presented.
Policy recommendations based on these results will be outlined in
Chapter VI.
Mode of Enforcement
In this subsection, we analyze the payment responses of New Bedford
fathers to alternate modes of enforcement, where mode of enforcement
refers to the type of court order or support agreement established
between the Welfare Department and the father. Enforcement actions
were aggregated into five main categories: Type 1, or verbal, unsigned
agreementsand modifications of such agreements; Type 2, or voluntary
2
signed affidavits of paternity and support, together with modifications
1. Note that all estimates of payment levels involving a compliance
code "2" (regular payments of amounts somewhat lower than order
amounts) were overestimated. Our weight of .8 was found to be less
accurate than a weight of about .6 for these codes (see Appendix E).
Therefore, differences observed between order levels and payment levels
provide a conservative estimate of the actual variation.
2. In 45 (or 7%) of all cases on the study file, there existed an older,
unidentified order for support. We assumed these were voluntary agree-
ments, assigning them to the Type 2 category of enforcement actions.
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of voluntary agreements; Type 3, or probate court actions involving
legal separations, divorces, or modifications of support decrees;
Type 4, or district court actions, involving criminal action against
the father for nonsupport, and modificiations of district court orders;
and finally, Type 5, or URESA (out-of-state) court actions, both
civil and criminal.1
The vast majority of enforcement actions in New Bedford involved
voluntary agreements to support (48%), verbal agrements comprising
just 7% of all actions. The remaining 45% of actions were initiated
in the courts: 28% in probate courts, 14% in district courts, and
slightly less than 3% in courts outside the Commonwealth (URESA cases).
The average level of support orders and support payments asso-
ciated with each particular type of enforcement action is presented
in Table V-6. The average level of support required under both court
and non-court actions was roughly the same, about $28. Dollar vari-
ations in support order levels were on the order of a few dollars
only. Payment levels under each type of enforcement action were also
roughly equivalent, although criminal actions appeared to result in
2
slightly higher payment levels. On average fathers paid about 60%
of the amount of their support orders. However, fathers against whom
1. A total of five possible enforcement actions could be recorded
in each case on the study file. 58% of all support enforcement cases
in New Bedford involved only one order or agreement to support, 32%
of fathers had two orders established, 8% had three actions brought
against them, and less than 1% had more than three actions. The re-
maining cases in the study file were excluded because the support
order amount was listed as zero or was unknown, leaving a total of
984 support actions for our subfile.
2. Refer to the fourth column of Table V-6.
TABLE V- 6 . AVERAGE ORDER AND PAYMENT LEVELS BY MODE OF ENFORCEMENT
(as a % of earnings)
a Average Support Level % %
Type of Action # Cases % Order Payment Payment/Order Order Reduction
1 66 7 $28.24 $16.69 56% 44%
2 474 48 27.51 15.99 57 43
3 278 28 29.91 17.21 57 43
4 140 14 28.11 20.79 73 27
5 26 3 27.62 15.67 56 44
TOTAL 984 100%
a Type
Type.
Type
Type
Type
1:
2:
3:
4
5:
Verbal agrements and modifications
Voluntary agreements and modifications
Probate court orders (legal separations/divorces) and modifications
District court orders (criminal nonsupport) and modifications
URESA (out-of-state) court orders
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criminal action had been taken tended to pay about 70% of the amount
of the court order for support.I
Table V-6 showed the average percent of orders paid under differ-
ent types of enforcement actions. In Table V-7c, we examine the differ-
ences between order and payment levels across earnings groups for each
particular type of enforcement action.2 The question we posed was
this: are observed differences primarily a function of earnings level
(i.e. ability-to-pay support) or of enforcement mode (e.g. non-court
versus court)? From Table V-7c, we first noted that probate orders
for support were associated with slightly higher levels of delinquency,
while verbals and district orders seemed to have relatively low levels
of delinquency. Even more striking, however, were differences across
earnings groups. Observe that higher earning fathers appear to be
less delinquent across all types of enforcement, with the exception
of URESA enforcement cases. Low-wage fathers, on the other hand,
showed higher levels of delinquency across all order types. 3 A two-
way analysis of variance confirmed that differences in levels of
support delinquency were explained primarily by differences in earnings
as opposed to mode of enforcement.4
1. A two-way analysis of variance confirmed these results: levels of
payment compliance were shown to be significantly different, primarily
due to the effects of criminal (Type 4) actions on payment levels. The
F-statistic for enforcement mode was significant at the 99.9% level.
2. Tables V-7a and b show both orders and payments as a percent of
earnings, respectively.
3. The number of URESA cases in each cell category was too small to
establish significant differences, as shown in Table V-7d.
4. The F-statistic obtained for earnings was significant at the 99.9%
level, while the F-statistic for enforcement mode was significant only
at the 73% level.
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TABLE V-7a. SUPPORT ORDER LEVELS BY MODE OF ENFORCEMENT
(as a % of earnings)
a
Level of Earnings Type of Enforcement Action
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4 5
b
$ 1 - 75 21% 31 49 26
76 - 100 22 19 27 24 11
101 - 125 19 21 21 22 17
126 - 150 27 23 20 26 25
151 - 175 20 26 20 22 19
176 - 200 20 21 23 22 26
200+ 29 18 13 14 13
X = 22% 23% 25% 22% 19%
a Type 1: Verbal agreements and modifications
Type 2: Voluntary agreements and modifications
Type 3: Probate orders (divorces/legal separations) and
modifications
Type 4: District court orders (criminal nonsupport) and
modifications
Type 5: URESA (out-of-state) court orders
b No cases fell into this cell category.
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TABLE V- 7b. SUPPORT PAYMENT LEVELS BY MODE OF ENFORCEMENT
(as a % of earnings)
a
Level of Earnings Type of Enforcement Action
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4 5
b$ 1 - 75 21% 14 25 13
76 - 100 13 11 16 17 11
101 - 125 7 11 14 15 10
126 - 150 18 13 9 22 20
151 - 175 18 19 13 18 4
176 - 200 11 17 12 22 21
200+ 26 11 9 12 1
X - 16% 14% 14% 17% 11%
a Type 1: Verbal agreements and modifications
Type 2: Voluntary agreements and modifications
Type 3: Probate court orders (divorces/legal separations) and
modifications
Type 4: District court orders (criminal nonsupport) and
modifications
Type 5: URESA (out-of-state) court orders
b
No cases fell into this cell category.
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TABLE V- 7c, SUPPORT DELINQUENCY BY MODE OF ENFORCEMENTa
Level of Earnings Type of Enforcement Actionb
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4 5
c
$ 1 - 75 0% -17 -24 -13 *
76 - 100 -7 -8 -11 -7 0
101 - 125 -12 -10 -7 -7 -7
126 - 150 -9 -10 -11 -4 -5
151 - 175 -2 -7 -7 -4 -15
176 - 200 -9 -4 -11 0 -5
200+ -3 -7 -4 -2 -12
X = -6% -9% -11% -5% -6%
a Level of delinquency is defined as average difference between
support order and support payment
earnings.
levels, each as a percent of
Type 1: Verbal agreements and modifications
Type 2: Voluntary agreements and modifications
Type 3: Probate court orders (legal separations/divorces) and
probate modifications
Type 4: District court orders (criminal nonsupport) and modifications
Type 5: URESA (out-of-state) court orders
c No cases fell into this cell category.
b
TABLE V- 7d. SUPPORT DELINQUENCY BY MODE OF ENFORCEMENT
(number of cases per category)
Level of Earnings Type of Enforcement Action a
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4 5
$ 1 - 75 1 33 14 5 0
76 - 100 11 82 18 15 1
101 - 125 16 114 35 16 4
126 - 150 8 86 35 7 3
151 - 175 12 27 13 2 2
176 - 200 4 25 13 3 1
200+ 2 22 19 2 3
TOTAL = 654 54 389 147 50 14
(100%) (8%) (59%) (22%) (8%) (2%)
a
Type 1: Verbal agreements and modifications
Type 2: Voluntary agreements and modifications
Type 3: Probate court orders (divorces/legal separations) and
modifications
Type 4: District court orders (criminal nonsupport) amd
modifications
Type 5: URESA (out-of-state) court orders
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Change in Mode of Enforcement
To this point, analysis of payment compliance by mode of enforce-
ment suggests that higher levels of compliance are associated with only
one category, that of criminal action against nonsupporting fathers.
We also suspected, however, that specific mode changes could affect
paternal willingness-to-pay. For example, if a father is unable to
comply with an established support order, he may request a reduction
be made in the amount of the support order. Order modifications of
this nature should therefore result in higher level of support com-
pliance. It has also been assumed that fathers making irregular pay-
ments under an informal (verbal or voluntary) non-court agreement
will become less delinquent if they are threatened with criminal court
action. From preliminary examination of the New Bedford data, we
also suspected that levels of support delinquency increased following
a divorce or legal separation. In order to evaluate these various
theories regarding support delinquent behavior, we decided to analyze
changes in support compliance levels prior to, and following, changes
in the mode of enforcement.
First, we developed a list of eight (8) types of enforcement mode
change: Types 1 through 4 describe modifications to verbal agreements,
voluntary agreements, probate court orders, and district court orders,
1. Unfortunately, we do not have statistics on the payment level
changes associated with threat of court action, only realized court
action.
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respectively; Type 5 represents changes from all non-probate types of
orders to a probate order; Type 6 includes changes from all non-
criminal enforcement actions2 to those involving criminal action for
nonsupport (district court orders); and finally, Types 7 and 8 describe
changes which occur from non-court to court enforcement action, and
vice versa.
We then created a subfile of all such order changes which oc-
curred during the study period. For each case on the file, we located
all pairs of sequential orders corresponding to a particular category.
We then measured the levels of payment compliance of each support
order in a pair, calculating the difference between the two levels.
A positive entry in the final column of Table V-8 indicates an in-
crease in support payment level following the change in enforcement
mode. A negative entry indicates a drop in support payment level sub-
sequent to the change in mode of enforcement. Numbers appearing in
the second column of Table V-8 refer to the total pairs in each cate-
gory, not to the number of cases represented in any category.
For the most part, results obtained in the analysis confirmed
our theories. First, we consider those changes in enforcement re-
sulting in a net decrease in support payments. Referring to the final
1. i.e. verbal or voluntary agreements or district court orders.
2. i.e. verbal or voluntary agreements or probate court orders.
3. Non-court actions involve verbal and voluntary agreements, court
actions may involve either civil or criminal proceedings.
4. Defined as the percent of the support order paid by the father.
Results of the analysis appear in Table V-8.
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TABLE V- 8. COMPLIANCE LEVELS FOLLOWING CHANGE IN MODE OF ENFORCEMENT
(average % of order paid)
Average
Type of Order # Order Compliance Level Net
Change a Changes % 1st Order 2nd Order Change
1 3 41 88% 40% -48%
2 68 17 62 66 +4%
3 24 6 79 70 -9%
4 16 4 88 97 +9%
5 85 21 75 59 -16%
6 60 15 54 74 +20%
7 134 33 67 65 -2%
8 16 4 72 59 -12%
TOTAL = 406 100%
Type
Type
Type
Type
Type
Type
Type
Type
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
Modification of verbal agreement
Modification of voluntary agreement
Modification of probate court order
Modification of district court order
Change from non-court agreement to probate court order
Change from non-court agreement to district court order
Change from non-court agreement to court order
Change from court order to non-court agreement
a
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column in Table V-8, we observe that the highest net decrease in pay-
ment levels occurred following modification of verbal agreements, a
net drop of -48%. Note, however, that this category is represented by
only three cases. We therefore cannot conclude that this result is
significant.1
Next, we observe that a change from a non-probate to a probate
court order for support results in a net decrease in the average level
of paternal support of -16%. Note also that probate court order modi-
fications are associated with a decrease (-9%) in support payments.
Although we might have expected probate order modifications to result
in higher levels of compliance among fathers, it appears that there
are other, stronger influences on willingness-to-pay in the probate
context. It seems likely that the substantial net decreases in pay-
ments associated with probate actions can be explained only by the
nature of these proceedings. That is to say, lower willingness-to-
pay tends to occur with final marital dissolution.2
On the other hand, we find that the institution of criminal pro-
ceedings against nonsupporting fathers results in an average net in-
crease of +20% in the level of support payments. Similarly, modifi-
cations to district court orders for support result in higher levels
of compliance, representing on average a +9% increase in support
1. This was confirmed later using a two-way analysis of variance.
2. These results run counter to those of the California study, where
the analysis "shows no association between the type or duration of the
prior relationship and the percent of support obligation paid by the
absent parent" (Arthur Young & Co., o.cit., p.67).
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payment levels.1
Finally, we examined payment levels associated with changes from
non-court to court enforcement, and vice versa. As we had expected,
changes from formal, court enforcement to non-court (verbal and volun-
tary) enforcement were accompanied by an average decrease of -12% in
support payment levels. Interestingly enough, although we would expect
the reverse case to hold also, no significant increase in payments
occurred with a transfer from non-court to court enforcement. The
reason for this may be that we do not differentiate between probate
and district court orders in the category of "court" enforcement.
From the results obtained earlier, we know that criminal actions tend
to produce higher levels of compliance, while probate actions produce
higher levels of support delinquency. The inclusion of both civil
and criminal actions in the same category could well cause offsetting
results, so that no impact is apparent. With the exception of the
results obtained for verbal modifications, all other results were con-
firmed when we applied a two-way analysis of variance to test for
significant differences in payment compliance level changes across
categories of enforcement change.2 Significant differences observed
were primarily due to the negative impact of civil actions and the
positive impact of criminal actions for enforcement.
1. Recall from our earlier discussion that criminal action for non-
support was the sole category of enforcement action producing sig-
nificantly higher levels of compliance (see Table V-6).
2. The F-statistic for enforcement change groups was significant at
the 99.9% level.
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Level of Enforcement
The level of enforcement is defined as the total number of support
enforcement actions taken against a father. In this subsection, we
ask the following question: does paternal willingness-to-comply with
a support order change with the level of enforcement? That is, do
fathers tend to become less delinquent with subsequent enforcement
initiatives?1  It has been suggested that stricter levels of enforce-
ment are applied against those fathers who are most "accessible" for
purposes of enforcement,2 often the most desitute who are least able
to comply with support orders. We will therefore examine payment
levels of fathers who have been classified as marginally employed
(refer to Table IV-3), comparing these levels with those obtained
for employed fathers in New- Bedford. In particular, we are concerned
with the payment response of both.groups to different levels of en-
forcement. Although we would expect low-wage fathers to be more
delinquent in support payments overall, we may also find that they
comply more readily with stricter levels of enforcement. This result
would tend to reinforce the notion that highest levels of enforcement
are applied against the most "accessible" fathers with the least sup-
port potential.
1. The implication is that some cases are subject to higher levels
of case monitoring. When the enforcement worker notices that a
father's payment level has dropped, or stopped altogether, she or
he will initiate further support enforcement action, generally
criminal, against the father. We do not propose here to establish
the reasons for higher case monitoring among certain groups of
fathers, but rather to determine whether higher levels of enforcement
appear more effective.
2. i.e. those fathers who are themselves occasional recipients of
public assistance in the New Bedford region, or those who have
"separated" from their wives in order that their families become
eligible for AFDC assistance.
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All cases in the New Bedford study file were aggregated into
groups representing the total number of support actions taken against
the father during the study period. Up to five such actions per case
were-recorded. The average support compliance levels 2 for fathers
with different numbers of enforcement actions are shown in Table V-9.
Changes which occurred in the average level of payments with subse-
quent enforcement actions are provided in the 2nd through 5th columns
of this Table. Overall net changes in support levels across all orders
are recorded in the final column. A positive entry indicates an overall
rise in payment levels with subsequent enforcement initiatives, a
negative entry indicates a net decrease as subsequent orders are esta-
blished against the father.
From Table V-9 we see that cases with the lowest level of support
compliance are those involving a single support order, even though
we would have expected highest levels of enforcement to be applied
in these cases. Conversely, cases which had the highest initial levels
of compliance are those in which strictest levels of enforcement have
later been applied. In sum, the decision to initiate subsequent en-
forcement actions does not appear to be justified if we compare ini-
tial compliance levels of fathers. The decision to initiate further
1. We excluded all court actions involving orders which were zero
(e.g. probate actions providing for Care and Custody of children only)
or- in which the amount of the support order was unknown. As a result,
we found no cases involving five actions for support enforcement in
the file, leaving a total of 677 cases in the subfile.
2. Defined as the percent of the support order actually paid by the
father.
TABLE V-9. LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE BY LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT
(average % of order paid)
# Support Actions Support Actions Net
Per Case # Cases % 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Change
1 394 58% 50.9 - - - - -
2 218 32 67.5 63.3 - - - -4.2%
3 56 8 66.3 72.1 66.8 - - +0.3%
4 9 1 85.0 84.4 73.9 67.1 - -6.0%
5 0 0 - - - - - -
TOTAL = 677 100%
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support action appears to be less related to punitive measures than
to a conscious policy to pursue those with the highest support poten-
tial.
Note, however, that although initial levels of support are high
among these fathers, they fall off substantially with subsequent en-
forcement. In fact, levels of compliance decrease uniformly in all
categories of enforcement level with each succeeding enforcement action.
This suggests that father who may initially be cooperative with the
enforcement effort become discouraged by subsequent enforcement. A
second reason for the reduction in payment levels may be that fathers
become inured to the threat of court action.
It has also been suggested that strictest levels of enforcement
are applied against fathers who are least able to support their
families. We decided to test this theory by comparing the payment
levels of fathers who were employed throughout the study period with
those who experienced irregular employment (the so-called marginally-
employed)1 across various levels of enforcement. The results are
2
shown in Table V-10a. First, we found that higher levels of enforce-
ment were generally employed against employed, rather than marginally-
employed, fathers: 43% of employed fathers had more than one order
for support, compared with 38% of marginally-employed fathers. This
1. A full list of marginal employment categories appears in Table
IV-3 of Chapter IV.
2. Table V-70b provides the number of cases in each cell category.
TABLE V-10a. LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE
(average % of order
BY LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF FATHER
paid)
a A complete list of marginal employment categories is provided in Table IV-3.
L\)
Level of Earnings Employed Marginally Employed
(net weekly) 1 order 2 orders 3 orders X 1 order 2 orders 3 orders X
$ 1 - 75 46.1% 60.3 57.6 54.7 25.1 64.5 50.4 46.7
76 - 100 49.4 63.6 72.0 61.7 45.1 56.4 79.4 60.3
101 - 125 55.2 62.4 65.9 61.2 49.9 49.9 82.8 60.9
126 - 150 47.2 75.2 73.3 65.2 56.2 57.3 67.1 60.2
151 - 175 67.3 72.7 83.6 74.9 41.9 90.0 75.0 69.0
176 - 200 66.8 84.5 33.3 61.5 39.9 52.3 68.3 53.5
200+ 55.8 64.5 81.1 67.1 56.2 61.0 32.5 49.9
X - 55.4 69.2 66.7 63.8 44.9 61.6 65.1 57.2
TABLE v-0b. LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE BY LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF FATHER
(number of cases per category)
a
Level of Earnings Employed Marginally Employed
(net weekly) 1 order 2 orders 3 orders TOTAL % 1 order 2 orders 3 orders TOTAL %
$ 1 - 75 19 10 7 36 8 28 9 2 39 19
76 - 100 42 19 9 70 15 33 12 6 51 25
101 - 125 76 34 12 122 26 31 20 3 54 27
126 - 150 59 31 11 101 21 17 9 3 29 14
151 - 175 26 24 3 53 11 2 2 1 5 2
176 - 200 22 15 1 38 8 3 3 2 8 4
200+ 23 25 4 52 11 11 4 1 16 8
SUBTOTALS = 267 158 47 125 59 18
(57%) (33%) (10%) (62%) (29%) (9%)
TOTAL 472 202
(70%) (30%)
a A complete list of marginal employment categories is provided in Table IV-3.
W'
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tends to refute the theory of punitive enforcement against those least
able to pay support, while it reinforces the theory that highest levels
of pursuit are employed against those with the highest support poten-
tial Ci.e. higher earning fathers). Indeed, higher-earning fathers
who are employed are more likely to have two or more order for support
than high-earning marginally-employed fathers. Second, we find that
marginally-employed fathers tend uniformly, across all categories, to
be more delinquent following support orders than employed fathers.
Third, it was nevertheless clear that stricter levels of enforcement
yielded higher levels of compliance among both employed and marginally-
employed fathers. Average increases in support were roughly propor-
tional for both groups. A two-way analysis of variance was used to
test for significant differences in compliance between employed and
marginally-employed fathers. F-statistics were significant at the
99.9% level. The effect of earnings, however, is to increase the
likelihood that a father will be subject to strict enforcement, which
we assume is related to his higher ability-to-pay, and therefore
support potential.
1. These results are not incompatible with results obtained in Table
V-9. Column entries in Table V-10a correspond with row entries in
Table V-9. Both Tables show that fathers with just one order for
support are typically less compliant than fathers with more than one
order for support. Although fathers may gradually become less com-
pliant with subsequent orders, overall levels of support compliance
among those with more orders are higher on average.
2. In the California study, it was found that fathers who were most
difficult to locate were among those with the highest support potential
(Arthur Young & Co. op.cit., p.67).
268
D. PATERNAL SUPPORT AND WELFARE DEPENDENCY
Enforcement and Welfare Status in New Bedford
Paternal support payments may have a direct impact on the welfare
status of the family if, and only if, they exceed the family's AFDC
grant amount. The average level of AFDC benefits received by a family
of two in 1976 in Massachusetts was $272 per month. At the same time,
the average support payment made by fathers participating in the New
Bedford IV-D program was only $115 per month. Unless the family has
some alternative sources of income, which serve to reduce the AFDC grant
amount, there is very little chance that paternal support payments will
effect the family's release from welfare. In approximately one-third
of all New Bedford AFDC families, the mother is employed at least part-
time. AFDC grant levels may also be adjusted by the amount of public
assistance received by the family from other sources, e.g. Unemployment
Compensation, Medical Assistance, Disability or Old-Age Insurance, etc.).
The mechanism of AFDC case closure generally works in the following way:
maternal wage earnings or other income reduce the overall level of
benefits received per month, so that paternal support amounts may more
readily exceed the family's AFDC grant amount.
In this subsection, we will briefly analyze the direct impact of
IV-D enforcement on the welfare status of New Bedford families.
1. The relative contribution of alternate sources of income to the
family budget has been analyzed by Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater,
"Sources of Family Income and the Determinants of Welfare", Working
Paper, Joint Center For Urban Studies - M.I.T. and Harvard University
(May 1976).
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Although many families in Massachusetts receive AFDC grant amounts that
are lower than the average levels of monthly assistance, substantial
reductions are less likely in a low-income region with high levels of
unemployment, such as New Bedford. In any event, the AFDC grant levels
of families do undergo frequent revisions according to the relative
availability of income from other sources.
There are several ways of measuring the impact of support enforce-
ment on welfare status. One way would be to examine the rate of AFDC
case closure both prior to, and following, the inception of the Child
Support Enforcement Program. Even more accurate an approach would be
to follow- the AFDC histories of individual families before, and after,
enforcement proceedings against the father. Both methods would pro-
vide only gross estimates of AFDC turnover, however, with little guaran-
tee that observed discrepancies were due solely to the strict enforce-
ment of paternal support obligations. Moreover, we have no data on
AFDC cases prior to the establishment of paternal support orders. All
cases on the New Bedford study file became active for support purposes
immediately following the family's first application for AFDC. A second
approach to the problem would be to obtain full details of each family's
budget, noting all changes in both AFDC grant and paternal support
levels, in order to relate these to welfare status changes. This task
was considered too costly and time-consuming. Moreover, it was un-
necessary, because the New Bedford files contained full records of all
AFDC status changes together with the dates and primary reason for the
change in eligibility. Although we recognize that case closures are
often the result of multiple factors, including paternal support payments,
the following statistics provide strong evidence that enforcement of
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support has very little impact on welfare dependency in a low-income
region.
Only eight cases out of a total 682 on the New Bedford study file
were closed primarily because the support payments of the absent father
exceeded the family's AFDC grant amount. In another six cases, both
paternal support and maternal wage earnings were listed as primary
reasons for the case closure. A further 6.3% of cases were closed
solely due to maternal wage earnings in excess of the family's grant
amount. And finally, in 5.4% of cases, the case was closed at the
request of the mother. IV-D support workers in New Bedford affirmed
that a majority of mothers who request a case closure do so because
she has received a wage increase or found a higher-paying job. We may
assume that in all cases where the mother is working, the family's AFDC
grant level is lower than average, and therefore the likelihood of
paternal support payments exceeding the AFDC grant are higher. If
paternal support is not listed as the primary reason for case closure,
however, we must assume that the mother's earnings were responsible
for case closure, because even in the absence of paternal support, her
wages would have exceeded the AFDC grant amount. These statistics pre-
sent a bleak picture of welfare dependency and family poverty.
Even more disturbing is the fact that the vast majority of these
cases later re-open due to subsequent loss or reduction in paternal sup-
port or maternal earnings.1 Since non-welfare families in Massachusetts
1. This problem has been examined by Bennett Harrison, "How American
Households Mix Work and Welfare: The Work-Welfare Tradeoff", (Unpub-
lished Discussion Paper, M.I.T., February 1978).
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are forced to rely on costly private means of support enforcement, the
chances of remaining independent of welfare where the father has revert-
ed to support delinquency are slim. To summarize, the problem of non-
support is closely associated with levels of family poverty. For the
destitute family on AFDC, the chances of achieving welfare independence
solely through the enforcement of paternal support obligations are very
low. The propects for maintaining independence are just as low, given
the high rates of recidivism among nonsupporting fathers and the poor
employment prospects of both parents.
The Impact of Lax Enforcement and Non-Compliance
In the previous subsection, we found that very few families in New
Bedford achieved lasting welfare independence through the enforcement
of paternal support. These support levels are determined primarily by:
(a) the willingness of IV-D unit workers and the court judges to adhere
to HEW support guidelines;2 and (b) paternal willingness-to-comply with
support orders. In this subsection, we summarize our earlier findings
from Section C in graphic form to illustrate the relative contribution
of both factors toward the low levels of support in New Bedford.
The histogram in Figure V-a shows the differences between HEW
1. In five of the eight cases where paternal support payments exceeded
the family's AFDC grant amount, the fathers reverted to total nonsupport.
2. Assuming HEW levels prescribe minimum ability-to-pay.
FIGURE V-a.
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support levels, New Bedford support order levels, and paternal payment
levels in New-Bedford.1 All support levels are depicted as a percentage
of earnings. The number of cases represented by each earnings group
appears at the base of each column in the histogram. In each column,
the shaded area represents the level of child support recommended by
HEW, the adjacent unshaded area the level of support established against
New Bedford fathers, and the opaque section below represents the average
level of support payments made by New Bedford fathers. Support levels
were obtained by weighting support percentages (available from Tables
v-16, 2b, and 4b)by the number of cases in that category of earnings.
Note the progressive trend in the HEW support guidelines (shaded
columns in Figure V-a), where progressively higher percentages of
earnings are recommended for support as ability-to-pay increases.
If a one-third support standard was recommended instead, the height of
these columns would be approximately the same. Referring to the adjacent
unshaded columns, we find that this is indeed the case for support
order levels established in New Bedford. There are two outstanding
exceptions to the uniform pattern in support orders, however: sub-
stantially higher levels are required from lowest-earning fathers, while
substantially lower levels are required from high-earning fathers. 3
1. Figure V-a, based on statistics from Table V-11, provides a graphic
representation of these support levels across various levels of earnings.
In Figures V-b through e, support levels are disaggregated by family
size.
2. Standard levels of earnings used throughout this thesis are also
provided here, although we include also the lowest ($1-75) and highest
($200+) categories as well, for which corresponding HEW levels are not
available.
3. Refer to first and last columns of Figure V-a.
TABLE V-71. AVERAGE SUPPORT LEVELS
(as a % of earnings)
a
a Statistics used in Figure V-a.
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Level of Earnings HEW Recommended New Bedford New Bedford
(net weekly) Guidelines Support Orders Support Payments
$ 76 - 100 16.8% 22.1 13.0
101 - 125 28.0 20.8 11.7
126 - 150 32.4 24.1 15.6
151 - 175 25.6 23.6 16.7
176 - 200 38.4 23.6 19.6
X = 30.2% 22.8% 15.3%
COMPARISON OF SUPPORT LEVELS IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
FOR FATHERS WITH ONE DEPENDENT
(as a % of earnings using Tables V-7b,
40%.
2b, and 4b)
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FIGURE V-c. COMPARISON OF SUPPORT LEVELS IN NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
FOR FATHERS WITH TWO DEPENDENTS
(as a % of earnings using Tables V-1b, 2b, and 4b)
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Note that support order levels required from fathers earning less than
$l0O net per week actually exceed HEW levels. The histogram shows a
markedly regressive pattern in the application of support standards in
New Bedford.
This observation is confirmed when we disaggregate by family size,
shown in Figures V-b through e. New Bedford fathers are required to
pay relatively lower support levels as the number of their dependents
and their level of earnings increase (i.e. the height of unshaded
columns falls). Highest levels of support are required from poor fathers
with largest families, while lowest levels are sought from non-poor
fathers with large families. This can be seen in Figure V-e, where
we find the regressive trend in support order levels has sharply accel-
erated, and the differences between HEW levels and New Bedford order
levels in outlying categories even greater.
Turning now to payment levels in New Bedford, we find that levels
are fairly uniform across earnings groups (see Figure V-a), although
higher earning fathers tend to pay slightly higher levels of support.
Conversely, low-earning fathers pay somewhat lower percentages of their
support orders. However, when payment levels are viewed in relation
to HEW, rather than New Bedford, order levels, low-earning fathers
appear to be the least delinquent group. Disaggregating by family size,
1. Although we find the same regressive trend in all categories of
family size, order levels for fathers with one dependent may be slightly
progressive. However, if we include in our consideration the two out-
lying categories (i.e. the highest and lowest earners), we find the
progressive trend dominates.
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we see. that most fathers pay higher percentages of their earnings toward
support as family size increases. This is not true, however, for high-
est earners. On the other hand, low-earning fathers manage to pay high
percentages of their earnings toward support of large families. This
suggests that, in spite of the relatively high orders established for
these fathers, they are in fact able to comply. Conclusions regarding
the delinquency levels of New Bedford fathers depend to a large extent
on the standard used for appraisal (viz. HEW or local order levels).
A simpler way to view the relative impact of lax enforcement1 and
paternal delinquency on support levels is shown in Figure V-i, where
we have graphed the percentage reduction in support caused by both fac-
tors. The horizontal line represents HEW support levels across all
earnings groups. The height of any column above this line shows the
departure from the HEW standard for any earnings group. The shaded
portion of each. column represents the percent by which HEW support
levels for that group were reduced by paternal delinquency. The clear
section of each column shows the additional reduction due to lax en-
forcement of HEW support guidelines. 2
First, observe that lax enforcement is responsible for at least
50%, and up to 70%, of support level reductions for higher-earning
groups. The graph also shows that the compliance levels of low-earners
1. Defined as non-adherence to HEW minimum support guidelines.
2. Opaque and clear sections of each column, representing payment
delinquency and lax enforcement respectively, have been assumed in-
dependent of each-other in our analysis. We know, however, that pay-
ment levels are affected by mode and level of enforcement. It also
seems- clear that paternal payment levels determine to some extent future
levels set by IV-D and the courts.
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is sufficiently high. that they approach.more closely than any other
group the HEW guidelines levels for support..1 From the point of view
of the family on welfare, particularly those with high-earning fathers,
the major cause of their continuing dependency on welfare may well be
the fact that IV-D and the courts have not established order levels
commensurate with their ability-to-pay.
If we assume full paternal compliance and strict adherence to HEW
standards for dupport, what is the likelihood of achieving a welfare
rollback? In order to answer this question, we refer the reader back
to Figure V-c, where we have included with support level estimates the
average AFDC grant levels of families in relation to support. We ob-
tained average weekly grant levels in the following way. First, we
recorded the monthly AFDC grant levels in three states: in Massachusetts,
where the level of benefits is among the highest in the nation, and
in Louisiana and Texas, where the level of benefits is lower than in
most other states.2 We then estimated weekly grant levels, dividing
by 4.1. This amount was then calculated as a percent of the mid-point
in each earnings category to obtain the average percent in each state
which would be required in support from a father to effect his family's
release from welfare.
1. Payment levels tend to be higher for those groups required to pay
higher percentages of their earnings. It is possible that the higher
levels of delinquency observed among low-earning fathers is a function
of the inflated (viz. beyond HEW) levels of support required of these
fathers. On the other hand, while high-earners may pay relatively
high percentages of their total orders, these amounts represent a rela-
tively low proportion of their earnings.
2. As of July 1976, the AFDC monthly grant level for a family of two
in Massachusetts was $272, in Louisiana $96, and in Texas $86. Weekly
grant levels were $61.20, $23.40, and $21.00 in Massachusetts,
Louisiana, and Texas, respectively.
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For example, a father earning between $76 and $100 per week (second
column) would have to pay approximately 75% of his earnings toward sup-
port in order to effect his family's release from welfare in Massachusetts.
However, the same father in Louisiana would be required to pay only 27%
of his earnings, while a father in Texas would have to pay just 24%.
Assuming that the support order levels established in Louisiana and
Texas courts are approximately the same as in Massachusetts, we see that
fathers in both. these states would have been ordered to pay amounts in
excess of their families' AFDC grant levels. If we also assume that
fathers in Louisiana and Texas are as delinquent in support as their
brothers in Massachusetts, we would find, however, that most families
remained on welfare.
If we perform the same exercise for fathers earning in excess of
$150 per week, we find that paternal payment levels would be high enough
to force families in Texas and Louisiana off welfare. On the other
hand, the average level of support (as a percent of earnings) required
to release a family from AFDC in Massachusetts is so high that only
fathers earning in excess of $176 per week could afford to pay sufficient
amounts. Note, moreover, that this would still be impossible if enforce-
ment officials refused to adhere to HEW support standards.
To summarize, we would expect significant rollback in the welfare
populations of states in which the level of AFDC benefits is lowest.1
1. OCSE recently reported that a rollback of 29,000 AFDC families had
occurred in 29 states as a direct result of the IV-D Program. Pre-
liminary analysis of this data is expected to reveal that most signi-
ficant rollbacks were achieved in states which had lowest relative
levels of AFDC benefits.
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Similar rollbacks appear highly unlikely in states with high benefit
levels, such as Massachusetts, given the average earnings level of
fathers participating in the IV-D program. If HEW standards for sup-
port were strictly applied for fathers earning in excess of $200 net
per week in Massachusetts, their families might achieve welfare inde-
pendence. The greatest potential for welfare independence thus exists
in the future willingness of IV-D and the courts to adhere to HEW stan-
dards for high-earning fathers. 1
1. We stress, however, that welfare independence may be short-lived
for those families who do achieve it through- paternal support enforce-
ment.
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E. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND FAMILY STRUCTURE
Poverty and Family Instability
Family instability tends to be higher in areas with high unemploy-
ment. It has been shown that financial problems strain family relation-
ships as parents face prolonged bouts of unemployment and an uncertain
economic future. Although family dissolution is caused by several inter-
related factors, when the effects of education, occupation, and income
are considered together, the critical factor is generally income, and
income, rather than earnings level per se, is heavily dependent on employ-
ment stability, job duration, and lack of employment experience. Rates
of family dissolution are particularly high among poor families facing low
regional wages and lack of employment opportunities.5 Fathers often leave
1. Gary S. Becker et al., "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability",
J. Pol. Econ. (December 1977) vol. 85, no. 6, pp. 1141-1188; Hugh Carter
and Paul C. Glick, Marriage and Divorce: A Social and Economic Study.
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1976).
2. P. Cutright, "Income and Family Events: Marital Instability",
J. Marriage and the Family (May 1971) vol. 33, pp. 291-306; Michael
Hannan, "Income and Marital Events", Amer. J. Sociol. (May 1977) vol. 82,
pp. 1186-1211; Greta Miao, "Marital Instability and Unemployment Among
Whites and Non-Whites. The Moynihan Report Revisited - Again", J. Marriage
and the Family (1974) vol. 36, no. 1, pp, 77-86.
3. Cutright, op..ci.
4. Robert Hampton, "Marital Disruption: Some Social and Economic Conse-
quences", Ch. 4 of Vol. III, Five Thousand American Families - Patterns
of Economic Progress, (Eds.) Greg J. Duncan and James N. Morgan (Institute
For Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1975).
5. Virginia A. Hiday, "Parity and Well-Being Among Low-Income Urban
Families", J. Marriage and the Family (November 1975) vol. 37, pp. 789-
797.
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home in search- of employment outside the region. Unemployed fathers,
unwilling or unable to obtain unemployment compensation from the Depart-
ment of Employment Security, leave their families in danger of becoming
welfare-dependent.
In high unemployment areas, we therefore also find that welfare
dependency is greater: more families apply and are eligible for benefits,
AFDC turnover rates are lower,1 and the family tends to stay longer on
AFDC.2 A major requirement for AFDC eligibility is that no "able-bodied
male" is present in the home.3 It is not surprising to find, therefore,
that maritally-intact families in desperate need of some form of public
assistance "separate" in order to become eligible for AFDC. The incentive
for family dissolution (informal), inherent in welfare policies governing
eligibility, has been well documented.4 It would be erroneous to con-
clude that these couples are obtaining welfare aid under a false pretext
of "separation". Physical separation does occur in most cases, even
though many such fathers prefer to remain close to their families, living
with relatives or friends. In addition to the high costs of maintaining
separate residences and/or of undertaking a job search, we should not
1. The pattern of turnover among AFDC cases is typically high. See
Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater, "Patterns of Welfare Use", Working Paper,
Joint Center For Urban Studies - M.I.T. and Harvard University (1978).
2. Michael J. Boskin and Frederick C. Nold, "A Markov Model of Turnover
in AFDC", J. Human Resources (1975) vol. X, no. 4, pp. 467-481.
3. Hiday, o2.cit., p. 792.
4. Piven and Cloward, o.cit., pp. 224-225; Marjorie Honig, "AFDC Income,
Recipient Rates, and Family Dissolution", J. Human Resources (Summer
1974) vol. 9, p.304; Catherine S. Chilman, "Families in Poverty in the
Early 1970's: Rates, Associated Factors, Some Implications", J. Marriage
and the Family (February 1975) vol. 37, p. 53; Miao, o.cit., p. 84;
Michael Hannan et al., The Impact of Income Maintenance on the Making and
Breaking of Marital Unions: Interim Report. Research Memo #28 (Stanford
Research Institute, June 1976).
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underestimate the high. psychic and emotional costs associated with sepa-
ration, particularly among couples who for all other purposes are mari-
tally intact. Most AFDC workers will agree that the decision to sepa-
rate is a response on the part of the parents to economic stress and
perceived economic opportunities. We can therefore only assume that these
couples decide to "separate" because the benefits provided under AFDC
.2
exceed the costs of separation, Unfortunately, for destitute couples,
the separation may become semi-permanent or even permanent as the couple
finds they are unable to maintain themselves on wage earnings alone.
The "Discouragement" Effect
In the previous Section of this Chapter, we showed how the welfare
status of families was rarely affected through support payments in excess
of the families' AFDC grant amounts. In this Section, we examine the in-
direct impact of enforcement on welfare-dependent families. Preliminary
evidence suggests that marginal welfare families may be discouraged from
welfare dependency by the enforcement of support. These "discouragement"
effects associated with enforcement of support would be particularly
1. The language describing marital states is far too simplistic. We
recognize the inadequacy of terms which have developed out of the need
to distinguish between eligibles and ineligibles for purposes of public
assistance. Unfortunately, no alternatives are available at present.
2. Hampton, op.ci., p. 172; Honig, op.cit., p. 316.
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evident among those couples who had previously decided to "separate" in
order to obtain welfare grants, i.e. those couples who have not effected
final and permanent marital dissolution. The substantial number of
"reconciliations" occurring immediately following enforcement initiatives
against the father reinforces the notion that many reconciling couples
had originally separated in order to obtain welfare benefits.
We argued above that the decision to "separate" may be entirely
founded in economic necessity for the destitute couple, Similarly, the
decision to "reconcile" may well be determined by the level of AFDC
benefits available to the family, as these are weighed against the costs
of separation. In the case of the maritally-intact couple who have
separated in order to obtain welfare, the new costs of child support
enforcement required from the father may force a reassessment of the
relative benefits of remaining on welfare. That is to say, the level of
AFDC benefits is effectively reduced for these couples by the amount of
child support required of the father.
Indeed, the decision to "reconcile" does appear to be closely related
to the initiation of support enforcement proceedings against the father.
Frequently a mother will request the closure of her AFDC case within
48 hours following IV-D notice to the father of impending support en-
forcement action.1 Almost invariably, the reason given by the mother for
1. Some of these "reconciliations" (and case closures) occur so rapid-
ly that the event is not recorded in the IV-D office files. In other
cases, the mother may request case closure because the family is moving
out of the region. AFDC workers suspect some of these cases may involve
families who intend to re-apply for welfare outside the region in the
hope that enforcement proceedings will be dropped. In other cases, the
mother will offer no reason for her decision to terminate the family's
grant. Occasionally, the father has threatened physical, or psychological,
harm to the mother or children if enforcement proceedings continue.
IV-D workers generally assume that if the mother is truly destitute she
will cooperate with enforcement efforts in order to obtain her grant.
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following the establishment of the support order, 70% occured in the
first nine months following the order for support. The remaining recon-
ciliations occured more than a year after the order, and were considered
unrelated to support enforcement.
Recall that AFDC cases typically show high turnover. We were in-
terested to see whether these cases involving enforcement-related recon-
ciliations stayed off welfare. This would show that IV-D enforcement
had not only effected a rollback among marginal welfare couples, but
had also discouraged applications and re-applications among marginal wel-
fare families. Of those couples who reconciled, 19% remained off welfare
permanently. However, fully 78% of reconciled couples later re-applied
for AFDC on the grounds that they had re-separated. This evidence strong-
ly suggested that a majority of marginal welfare couples are unable to
maintain themselves adequately in the absence of some form of public
assistance. Of those couples who re-separated, one-third remained sepa-
rated, while the remaining two-thirds of couples underwent multiple
separations and reconciliations throughout the study period.
We wondered whether fathers of families who were "hard-core" welfare-
dependent1 were in some discernible way different from those who continu-
ally entered and exited from AFDC. Specifically, we asked whether the
support payment levels of fathers of marginal welfare families were rela-
tively higher than for families who stayed on welfare. At the outset,
we knew that a majority of single mothers were in the category of "hard-
1. i.e. those families who remained on AFDC throughout the study period.
Note, however, that we did not adjust our subfile in any way for cases
which only recently entered AFDC, and therefore might well be assigned
to another category (for example, mulptiple movers) if we observed them
over a longer period of time. We later compiled a subfile of cases ex-
cluding those which had first opened subsequent to 1976. The adjustment
did not result in any significant chinges in category size or compliance
levels obtained in the following analysis.
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case closure is that she and her husband have "reconciled". In 46% of
all case closures (representing 29% of all cases on the study file),
the reason for case closure provided was the "reconciliation of the couple".
If reconciliation occurs simultaneously with support enforcement
initiatives, we would strongly suspect that the couple was discouraged
from continued dependency on welfare. If the couple reconciles several
months after the establishment of a support order, a similar conclusion
might be reached. However, if a couple reconciles many months or years
after a support order has been established, we would assume that the
decision to reconcile was made relatively independent of whether support
was being enforced against the father. The histogram provided in Figure
V- g shows the percentage of reconciliations occuring in the months
following the establishment of a support order against New Bedford
fathers.2 57% of all post-order reconciliations occured within six months
FIGURE V-9. PERCENTAGE OF RECONCILIATIONS OCCURRING SUBSEQUENT TO
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPPORT ORDER
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core" welfare dependants. Possibly the fathers associated with these
families tended to pay lower support, contributing to their continued
dependence on welfare. Conversely, payment levels might be lower among
fathers of families forced to frequently separate from their families
because of irregular or inadequate wage earnings.
We disaggregated cases into: (1) cases involving "hard-core" welfare
families (i.e. those who never moved off welfare subsequent to their
first application); (2) cases: which remained closed following the ter-
mination of the grant; (3) cases with multiple AFDC case openings and
closures due to multiple separations and reconciliations by the couple;
and (4) cases which involved multiple AFDC entries and exits which were
not due to changes in marital structure. Each category was then further
subdivided by marital status into those involving single mothers, those
couples who were married and informally separated, and those couples who
had obtained a legal separation or divorce, or in which the mother was
married to a man other than the father.
We then obtained the average order level, payment level, and pater-
nal earnings level associated with each group. In brief, we found that
the average earnings level of fathers associated with single mothers was
relatively low, as was the order level for these fathers as a percent of
earnings. However, since single mothers were represented fairly uniform-
ly across all categories of welfare, the poverty of these fathers did not
seem to force single mothers into, for example, permanent welfare depen-
dency. Conversely, fathers who are married and have separated from their
wives tend to have slightly higher earnings and support order levels.
As their distribution across all categories of welfare groups listed above
is also fairly even, we cannot infer that marital status affects welfare
status from these statistics.
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Disregarding marital subdivisions of each welfare category, we then pro-
ceeded to compare the four groups of welfare recipients with respect to
the earnings, support, and payment levels of the fathers to test for sig-
nificant differences between groups. Observed differences might account
for the fact that one group tends to remain on welfare, while another is
continually moving on and off AFDC.
The results of this analysis are presented below in Table V-12.
TABLE V- 12. COMPARISON OF EARNINGS, SUPPORT, AND PAYMENT LEVELS OF
FATHERS BY WELFARE STATUS OF FAMILIES
Welfare Earnings Order/Earnings Payment/Order
Groupa ($) (%) (%) # Cases
1 $125.74 22% 60% 342
2 $137.85 24% 49% 86
3 $131.18 22% 56% 90
4 $123.99 26% 59% 153
a Type 1:
Type 2:
Type 3:
Type 4:
Non-movers, so-called "hard-core" AFDC families
Moved off AFDC permanently following support enforcement
Multiple Movers (not due to marital change)
Multiple Movers due to multiple separations and reconcilia-
tions by couple
There appears to be no major difference between fathers with respect to
support enforced, compliance levels, or ability-to-comply, with one ex-
ception: Group 2 shows that fathers of families who exited from AFDC
permanently following the enforcement of support (12.8% of all cases)
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had somewhat higher levels of earnings, but paid relatively lower amounts
of support than other fathers. The vast majority of these cases in-
volved families in which the couple had informally separated, and in
which "reconciliation" was recorded as the primary reason for the closure
of the AFDC case. The results strongly suggest a discouragement effect
associated with the enforcement of support. 79% of these couples rec-
onciled within the first six months after the establishment of support
proceedings which appears to confirm our conclusion regarding these cases.
Although we could not confirm any significant differences between the
fathers of these groups, which might explain their welfare status, we
suspect that for Group 2, the enforcement of support was related to the
decision to reconcile and terminate the welfare grant. The evidence is
circumstantial, however, and further research is needed to determine
the strength of the relationship which we have inferred between enforce-
ment and welfare status.
To summarize, our earlier conclusions foreshadowing substantial
"discouragement" effects through support enforcement efforts, based on
the numbers of couples who reconciled (30%), required revision. Almost
four-fifths of couples who had purportedly been discouraged off welfare,
and who had reconciled, would later re-apply for AFDC. We can only con-
clude from this that the welfare "discouragement" effects of enforcement
are, for the most part, short-lived. Couples who are unable to maintain
1. An analysis of variance performed on these data showed no signifi-
cant differences with respect to earnings, support order, or support
payment levels between groups.
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themselves in the absence of some form of public assistance will tend to
separate and reconcile, getting on and off welfare, as often as they
deem necessary. For the family which needs welfare, support enforcement
will probably not serve to discourage welfare application.
Enforcement and Marital Dissolution
We also discovered some disturbing new evidence suggesting that
child support enforcement may actually be encouraging couples toward
final marital dissolution. More than 50% of cases on the study file in-
volved couples who were informally separated during the study period.1
Two-fifths of these cases remained separated, while the remaining three-
fifths reconciled, as we have shown above, at least once. In Figure
V-g, we identified those couples. who reconciled subsequent to the estab-
lishment of support proceedings against the father. At the same time,
we noticed there were many couples who reconciled once or several times,
but who did so prior to the establishment of the support order. Subse-
quent to the first enforcement initiatives, no further marital status
changes were evidenced. In fact, 17% of all New Bedford couples re-
mained separated following the establishment of the first support order,
although previous to enforcement the couple had shown a willingness to
reconcile at least once. These results suggest a second, quite different,
impact of the IV-D program on family structure: an "encouragement" to-
ward final marital dissolution.
1. That is, they were not legally separated or divorced from the mother.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. PATERNAL SUPPORT AND WELFARE DEPENDENCY
Few fathers in New Bedford were able to pay support amounts in excess
of their families' welfare grant levels, thereby releasing them from
welfare dependency. As shown in Section D of Chapter V, only those fathers
earning more than $200 net per week in Massachusetts are likely to be
able to exceed the average AFDC grant level for a family of two dependants.
However, even if the father showed ability and willingness-to-pay up to
HEW guideline levels for support, it appeared likely that the courts and
IV-D enforcement officials would not require the father to pay up to HEW
levels. Enforcement officials have applied a decidedly regressive stan-
dard of support among New Bedford fathers, demanding highest levels of
support from low-earning fathers, while relaxing HEW support standards con-
siderably for higher-earning fathers. The fact that low-wage earners have
shown an ability-to-pay support at levels exceeding even HEW guideline
levels suggests that average support levels required under orders and
agreements are not excessive. Our findings suggest that new directives
be made to both IV-D and court personnel handling enforcement cases which
would establish stricter standards for support for higher-earning fathers.
It appears that the reluctance to apply progressive standards may simply
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reflect the desire for more straightforward procedure. Enforcement workers
may also establish lower levels in order to discourage fathers from
"skipping" town or because they believe higher order levels will act as a
work disincentive. These issues need to be discussed among those who
apply support standards at the local level. The notion of regressive
versus progressive standards should be examined, not strictly in relation
to the high-earning father's circumstances, but also in relation to the
family's needs.
Although we found few fathers in New Bedford capable of paying support
sufficient to result in welfare independence for their families, we might
expect very different results in areas which have low unemployment and
relative high income. Similarly, we could examine the impact of support
payments in states which have relatively low AFDC grant levels, where
far lower levels of support would be required to effect a rollback in
local welfare populations. A comparative study of New Bedford statistics
with data from another, high-income region in Massachusetts would yield
interesting results.
Even if the father gets his family off welfare, it is likely he will
become delinquent in support when he realizes the state is no longer in-
volved in the enforcement process. Of the eight AFDC cases which Closed
solely due to paternal support payments in excess of the family's grant,
five later re-applied for aid. This suggests the state should consider
a continuing role in enforcement beyond the termination of the family's
AFDC grant. The father may also become delinquent again because he faces
irregular employment. We know that fathers participating in the IV-D
program experience far higher levels of unemployment than fathers not
associated with AFDC families. Fully 30% of fathers in the IV-D program
were unemployed, marginally employed, or on public assistance themselves
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at some point during the study period. The problem of nonsupport
among fathers of AFDC families cannot be considered in isolation from
the problem of paternal poverty and lack of employment opportunities,
at least -in the case of low-income regions.
In the event that the courts apply strict enforcement standards,
and the father is able to pay support in excess of the family's AFDC
grant amount, he may still be unwilling-to-pay. Unwillingness-to-comply
may be related to marital status: fathers under probate court orders for
support generally pay lower amounts of their support orders and are more
delinquent overall. Many of these fathers showed high levels of compliance
prior to the obtaining of the divorce decree or legal separation, which
strongly suggests that compliance (and delinquency) may be related to
family relationships, in particular that of the spouses. The attitudes
of various family members to state involvement in the divorce proceedi-ngs
are not known. It may well be that both parents prefer separate support
proceedings on an informal basis, or, as is often the case, the mother
may view support proceedings as a punitive measure against the father.
On the other hand, criminal support actions tend to result in some-
what higher levels of support payments from fathers. It is not known to
what effect the threat of court action might have on paternal support
compliance. Court workers involved in enforcement believed that threat
of court action resulted in relatively higher numbers of compliant fathers
under voluntary and verbal agreements to support, but actual numbers were
not available. A study of this phenomenon could reveal some very interest-
ing results, pertinent to the establishment of support agreements in the
future. The higher levels of compliance associated with criminal court
action was presumed to be related to the probation requirement in most
cases involving nonsupport, and considered an excellent way of monitoring
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cases.
The impact of higher levels of enforcement, defined as the total
number of support enforcement actions taken against a father, showed that
fathers under just one order tended to pay on average less than fathers
on more than one order. Interestingly enough, the highest levels of
enforcement were applied against those fathers who initially showed high-
est levels of compliance with their original support order or agreement.
The criteria for case monitoring may be such that where payments are
regular, the father is subject to closer scrutiny. Many cases involving
total support delinquency "get lost" in the files. Weekly caseloads are
sufficiently high, and the number of local IV-D workers low, that these
cases may not re-surface for many months. Reliance on computerized esti-
mates of support delinquency have proved inaccurate. Many such cases on
record have been either closed for support purposes, or were considered
inappropriate for further action.
Basically, we know little about the real causes of support delin-
quency. No doubt much is due to the perpetuation of social attitudes
regarding the value of family caretaker work. Fathers of families on
welfare may also regard support payments as an unnecessary burden, given
that their families are supported by the state. We could discern no
significant patterns to delinquent behavior other than those noted above.
The subject certainly warrants further research.
Finally, we note that the enforcement of support may have a serious
second order effect among second families of the fathers participating
in the program. Many fathers have formed new families subsequent to
their divorce. Some fathers, still married, have formed new alliances.
In general, they show reluctance to divulge information on their current
families, fearing posssible increased payments particularly if the second
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family is also on AFDC. If strict enforcement measures are taken against
fathers in low-income regions, we can only assume their second families
will bear the burden of those support payments. It has been argued that
poor couples should not have children they are unable to support. By the
same token, may society deny poor couples the right to have children
simply because they are poor? The dimensions of new family formation
among fathers in the IV-D program should be documented. A new file will
soon become available in Massachusetts, which lists all IV-D participants
alphabetically, associating each father with families receiving AFDC.
If support is enforced for the first family, as required under the law,
the net effect may be merely to spread poverty to another family, placing
it in danger ofbecomingwelfare-dependent. It is hoped that the file on
multiple family formations will provide new evidence of the relative in-
ability of many fathers associated with AFDC families to escape their
poverty.
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B. SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND FAMILY STRUCTURE
30% of all couples on the New Bedford study file, more than two-
thirds of all informally-separated couples, reconciled at least once
during the study period. We have suggested that these couples, parti-
cularly those experiencing multiple separations and reconciliations, are
maritally intact, but forced to "separate" in order to obtain welfare
benefits. 43% of fathers in these families were marginally employed or
unemployed or on welfare themselves at some point during the study period.
We noted in Section E of Chapter V that reconciliations appeared closely
related to the establishment of support orders against fathers. In fact,
a majority of reconciliations took place within six months following the
support order, most during the early months. We hypothesized that these
couples experienced a net decrease in support from AFDC as a result of
the enforcement of support against the father. They may have decided
that the costs of remaining on welfare exceeded the benefits. Little is
known about the decision to separate and reconcile among these families.
We have assumed it is in direct response to perceived economic opportuni-
ties. The high turnover indicates families who do reconcile are unable to
maintain themselves in the absence of some form of public assistance.
Certainly, they exhibit no higher levels of support which might discourage
continued welfare dependency, nor do these fathers show a greater reluc-
tance to pay support than other fathers. The results show that the
"discouragement" (indirect) impact of enforcement is short-lived.
Certainly welfare independence is achieved by these couples, if only
temporarily. It is unfortunate that in many cases of marginal welfare
families, the father himself does not qualify for some form of public
assistance, thereby allowing the couple to remain together. The costs
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of separation are high for these couples. Perhaps the costs of enforcing
support are also excessive. We are again forced to the conclusion that
too little is known about the problem of nonsupport as it relates to
poverty and unemployment among parents.
A second, quite different, effect on family structure may be in evi-
dence. 17% of all New Bedford couples showed a willingness to reconcile
(sometimes frequently) prior to the establishment of the first support
order against the father. We found that none of these couples reconciled
after enforcement proceedings were begun against the father. Enforcement
of support may have forced a final marital dissolution among these couples.
Future research could be undertaken to determine whether formal (court)
marital dissolution was sought by the couple in these cases. This would
reinforce our theory that enforcement may effect permanent separation in
many cases.
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C. SOME, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
One can view the findings of this reseach from many standpoints:
(i) that of the state, acting primarily in the interests of taxpayers,
eager to minimize welfare costs and maximize support revenues; (ii) the
IV-D state agency, eager to justify its demands for increased budget
allocations by evidencing (even inflating somewhat) its IV-D collections
from fathers of AFDC families; (iii) the AFDC family, required to cooperate
in the enforcement effort but standing to gain nought unless the father
is both able and willing to pay support amounts greater than their AFDC
grant amount, in which event they face an uncertain economic future if
he decides to stop paying support once again; and (iv) the non-welfare
family, for whom private enforcement through the courts is too costly,
while state enforcement services are denied them. Policy considerations
should first and foremost reflect the interests of the family, but in the
case of support enforcement, the rights of children to support have been
superseded by state rights to recovery. Although non-welfare families
are not considered specifically in this research, many of our recommenda-
tions are made with them in mind.
The House recently passed a vote discontinuing funding for enforce-
ment in non-welfare cases. Denial of state enforcement services to non-
welfare families is a direct denial of the support rights of these child-
ren. At the same time, it affirms the notion that state rights to recover
support payments areparamount in the current IV-D program. Denial of
services to non-welfare applicants cannot be justified on the grounds
that private enforcement remedy is available through the courts, because
families would not need to apply for assistance from the IV-D agency if
they had sufficient funds to pursue private enforcement and/or if private
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enforcement through the court system had proved effective. The major,
and only, justification for distinguishing between the support rights of
these children and those on AFDC is that the state stands to recover
payments in the AFDC case while expenditures designed to reduce welfare
costs may be justified to the taxpayer. Our findings suggest, however,
that the amount of support collected from fathers of families on AFDC is
very low, and the chances of effecting a rollback in welfare population
remote.
The most fundamental question raised by this thesis remains un-
answered: how do support problems arise? Those whose primary concern is
the high cost of welfare will point to welfare dependency among female-
headed families as the visible result of nonsupport. But we know that
nonsupport occurs regularly among fathers of different earnings groups.
Many poor fathers pay suppert, but inadequate to provide for their fami-
lies. We find we cannot separate nonsupport among poor fathers from
considerations of employment and poverty. Guaranteeing regular, adequate
wages to poor fathers would undoubtedly reduce welfare dependency among
FHFs. If our goal is welfare independence for these families, then these
policies would be sufficient. But they will not solve the problem of
wilful delinquency unresponsive to enforcement measures.
We cannot consider the problem of nonsupport in isolation from the
institutionalized dependency of women within the family. Focusing ex-
clusively on enforcement of support to some extent assumes we cannot
change the inequalities between traditional family sex roles. The assump-
tion of motherhood carries with it a substantial financial liability.
In the event of marital dissolution, wives, with little access to caDital
of the means of obtaining it (emoloyment opportunities), are least able
to support the children, but invariably gain custody. Until there is some
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guarantee of economic parity during a marriage, certainly prior to
marital dissolution, the problem of poverty and welfare dependency among
female-headed families will remain. The remedial approach to these prob-
lems is that of support enforcement subsequent to marital break-up. A
better alternative would be to concentrate on policies designed to protect
the children, and parent with custody, in the event of dissolution. If
parents are unwilling to enter into contractual agreement along these
lines, the children will remain the ultimate losers.
To summarize, the problem of nonsupport and welfare dependency cannot
be separated from the larger issue of the institutionalized dependency of
women in our society on a provider (viz. father, husband, or the state).
To argue for enforcement of support solely on the grounds that it may
result in welfare independence for the family -- rather than their long-
term financial security -- is to take a very limited view of children's
support rights. If we accept this limited view, support enforcement be-
comes a program of state welfare cost recovery. The primary research need
generated by this research is the development of new criteria by which to
judge the relative effectiveness of child support enforcement.
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APPENDIX A
MAJOR CASE RULINGS IN MASSACHUSETTS
In this Appendix, we have listed all major case rulings made in
Massachusetts courts which apply to the development of parental support
obligations at common law. Prior to the Statutes of 1882 Providing For
The Better Protection of Children (Ch, 270), there was negligible deve-
lopment in those obligations at common law. In the event of marital
dissolution, fathers invariably gained custody of their children
(Taunton v. Plymouth (1818), 15 Mass. 203). More importantly, laws
governing support obligations of parents were enforceable only if a child
became dependent on public relief. At that time, various laws ensured
that the state could recover support from a parent commensurate with
public support payments and assistance made to the family on relief.
Consequently, this list includes case rulings occurring after the 1882
legislation. We have not included rulings which apply to enforcement
of the support obligation at common law (e.g. court procedure, rights
of the defendant, civil versus criminal actions, etc.). In each case,
we have provided a brief summary of the court's finding regarding the
support obligation. To date, there have been no case rulings resulting from
the 1977 legislation which extended full support liability to the mother
of the child. The ruling has been applied primarily in cases where a
father and child(ren) are on welfare. All case rulings below apply to
fathers' support obligations, and a significant number concern families
on relief (viz. actions brought by the Commonwealth against the father).
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1883 Commonwealth v. Burkner F. Burlington, 136 Mass. 435.
(Complaint of neglect to provide support for a minor child was
held sufficient, The stated intention of the father that he
would "leave the country first [before providing support]" was
admissable evidence of intentional neglect.)
1892 Commonwealth v. Foster Ham, 156 Mass. 485,
(On a complaint of neglect to provide support for wife, the
defendant claimed his nonsupport was not unreasonable in view
of her conduct in breaching the marriage contract by not living
with him. In her petition for separate maintenance, the court
held that the wifets living apart was justified on the basis of
drunkenness and cruelty by the husband.)
1892 Commonwealth v. Theodore G. Graham, 157 Mass. 73.
(On a complaint of nonsupport by the wife of a minor husband,
the court held that the husband's father could not withhold all
wages, that the husband might retain wages from the father
sufficient to support himself, his wife and children. The
parental support duty superseded, and were to be distinguished
from, parental rights to a child's services.)
1896 Commonwealth v. Edwin H. Simmons, 165 Mass. 356.
(On a complaint of unreasonable neglect to support by a wife for
herself and her minor children, the court found the defendant
guilty of criminal nonsupport, Support had earlier been denied
the family by the Superior Court in pendente lite hearing in the
divorce case of the couple. The police court ruled that the
wife's complaint was independent of divorce proceedings by the
husband against the wife. Payment of alimony pendente lite
(pending litigation in divorce court) does not determine [marital]
status nor settle the question of the support duty of the father.)
1915 Tornroos . R. H. White Co., 107 N.E. 1015/220 Mass. 336.
(Court upheld a wife's right to claim damages against the father
for support in case of loss of child's services due to injury.)
1921 Commonwealth v. Dornes, 132 N.E. 363/239 Mass. 592.
(Court held there was no obligation at common law for a putative
father to support his illegitimate child.)
1929 Commonwealth v. Booth, 165 N.E. 29/266 Mass. 80.
(Court ruled that where the wife resides in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, but the husband lives in another state, the order
to support does not affect his constitutional rights.)
1935 Commonwealth v. Pouliot, 198 N.E. 256/292 Mass. 229.
(Court held that the involuntary labor required of a father in
payment of support for his family on relief was valid at common
law.)
1940 Cameron's Estate, 27 N.E. 2d 696/306 Mass. 138.
(Court held that support arrears could not be taken through in-
heritance from the father's estate.)
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1940 Commonwealth v. Whiston, 27 N.E. 2d 703/306 Mass. 65.
(Court ruling that punishment for unreasonable neglect to
support could be used as sanction for performance of periodical
payments under court orders for support.)
1948 Vivori v. Fourth District Court of Berkshire, 23 N.E. 2d 9/
323 Mass. 336,
(Court ruled putative father had support obligation at common
law for illegitimate child. Justification for upholding support
duty based on desire to lessen public burden of support of the
mother and child on relief.)
1956 Goddard v. Folsom, 145 F, Supp. 307 (Washington D.C.).
(Court held that a support order was not an entitlement to in-
heritance if father dies outside Massachusetts.)
1960 Alexander v. Alexander, 20 Mass. App. Dec. 20.
(The paternal duty to support upheld no matter where the mother
takes the child.)
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APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONS BY ORGANIZATION
A. PARENT LOCATOR SERVICE DIVISION
Systems Operations Branch
-- Develop, operate, and maintain the PLS
-- Specify manner and form for requesting information from PLS
(hardcopy, punched cards, magnetic tape, and terminal-to-terminal)
-- Design automated systems to support PLS
-- Establish and maintain communication network between states and PLS,
and between PLS and other Federal agencies
-- Perform data conversion for input to PLS and output to states
-- Technical assistance to states on use of PLS
-- Maintain billing records on non-welfare cases
-- Assist in development of program policy and regulations relevant to PLS
-- Answer telephone enquiries from public
-- Maintain statistics on use of PLS
State Coordination Branch
-- Evaluate state applications for Federal financial participation for
purchase or design of IV-D information systems
-- Evaluate state PLS needs and plan improvements of state systems
-- Develop and encourage use of model systems
-- Provide technical assistance to states on IV-D systems
B. POLICY AND PLANNING DIVISION
Policy Branch
-- Develop and coordinate all regulations implementing title IV-D and
related legislation
-- Develop standards for effective state programs
-- Develop minimum state organizational and staffing requirements
-- Develop and maintain procedures for Internal Revenue Service collections
-- Develop and maintain procedures for enforcement by Federal courts
-- Provide policy interpretation to regional offices
- Develop and coordinate training for Federal and state personnel
-- Provide technical assistance to regions, and occasionally to states on
all aspects of program except PLS and systems
-- Review and develop proposed legislation
-- Develop procedures for state plan review and approval by regional offices
-- Review regional office recommendations of state plan disapproval
-- Evaluate effectiveness of state programs
-- Monitor and coordinate activities of regional offices
-- Provide in-house legal capability and liaison with Office of General
Counsel
-- Coordinate preparation of annual report to Congress
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Planning and Evaluation Branch
-- Develop long and short-range plans and objectives
-- Develop the annual OPS plan and track milestones
-- Design statistical reporting requirements and methods for obtaining
data
-- Conduct statistical research studies and analysis, trend and cost pro-
jecting and reporting
-- Recommend program and legislative changes based on research and analysis
-- Develop research and demonstration projects
-- Provide liaison to SRS Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation
-- Participate in development of annual audit plan
-- Evaluate deployment of resources for achievement of objectives and
operational goals
-- Develop program budget
C. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
Office of Division Director
-- Prepare salaries and expenses budget
-- Coordinate all OCSE budget matters
-- Coordinate financial reporting requirements with appropriate SRS offices
-- Prepare background and justification material for OMB and Congressional
hearings
-- Control annual and quarterly obligations and expenditures
-- Issue, review, and control travel authorizations
-- Review and control travel vouchers
(Budget officer and assistant)
Audit Support Branch
-- Develop standards and requirements for annual audits
- Coordinate regional office activities related to annual audit
-- Provide interpretations to regions and states concerning audit procedures
and standards
-- Review penalty recommendations made by regional offices and recommend
approval or non-approval to Director
-- Review audit reports from GAO and HEW Audit Agency
Administrative Support Branch
-- Personnel management (staff planning, position descriptions, recruitment,
performance evaluations)
-- Labor-management relations
-- Liaison with SRS Division of Personnel
-- Control manpower authorizations
-- Space management
-- Procurement of property and supplies
-- Maintain property records
-- Liaison with SRS Division of General Services
- State plan control and filing
-- Control all incoming correspondence such as regional and Congressional
inquiries
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-- Coordinate preparation of issuances within OCSE
-- Edit proposed issuances and regulations for formal requirements
(e.g., Federal Register requirements)
311
APPENDIX C
DESCRIPTION OF CODED DATA
Place of Birth:
1 - New Bedford
2 - Local, adjoining counties
3 - Nonlocal counties, Massachusetts
4 - Other New England states and New York state
5 - All other states in the U.S.
6 - Non-U.S. Portuguese (Portugal, Cape Verdes Islands, Azores)
7 - Puerto Rico
8 - Canada
9 - All other non-US.
Marital Status:
1 - Married
2 - Separated
3 - Legally separated
4 - Divorced
5 - Reconciled
6 - Mother married, but not to father of child
7 - Mother married, or re-married, father of child
8 - Mother single
9 - Parents had multiple separations and reconciliations
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AFDC/IV-D Case Openings (by reason):
01 - Parents separated, father absent from home, and/or father's
whereabouts unknown
02 - Father in prison, an institution, or hospital, able to pay support
03 - Mother no longer receiving wages, or has lowered wage earnings
04 - Mother no longer receiving U.C., M.A., or other grant higher than
AFDC
05 - AFDC case transfered in from another county welfare office
06 - Mother single
07 - Mother divorced or legally separated from father, or married and
separated from a man other than father of child
08 - Mother disabled, living in home but not on MA., SSI, or OASDI
09 - Child previously absent from home has been returned to mother's
care
12 - Father no longer in prison or otherwise unable to pay support
19 - AFDC case closed, but IV-D case open for child support arrears
66 - Father who previously assisted his family off AFDC through child
support payments has become re-delinquent
71 - Mother no longer in prison, institution, or hospital
77 - Multiple AFDC case openings and closures due to multiple separations
and reconciliations of parents
80 - Child eligible for AFDC grant under 21 years of age has returned
to school or entered WIN program
88 - Unknown reason for AFDC case openings, or mother applied for grant
more than three months after separation, divorce, etc.
89 - Mother was on AFDC grant as a child herself prior to pregnancy
96 - Father no longer in home and AFDC budget of family or on other
grant allowing him to remain in home while family receives AFDC
grant
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AFDC/IV-D Case Closure (by reason):
10 - Per request of mother, voluntary withdrawal
11 - Mother receiving wages precluding continued AFDC eligibility
13 Mother refuses to cooperate with IV-D unit in locating father,
or obtaining child support payments from father
14 - Mother has married, or re-married, man who is not father of child
15 - Mother has died
16 - Mother has married, or re-married, father of child
17 - Mother in hospital, prison, institution, etc.
18 - Mother receiving U,C., MA., or other grant exceeding AFDC grant
19 - AFDC case closed, but IV-D case open for arrears
20 - Parents have reconciled
23 - Absent father's support payments have exceeded AFDC grant level
24 - Father living in home, welfare not notified
25 - Father has died (AFDC case remains open, but IV-D case closed)
26 - Father living in home, receiving U.C., M.A., OASDI, SSI (IV-D case
closed)
27 - Father formerly in home in family's AFDC budget, now employtd
(AFDC and IV-D case closure)
28 - Father living in home, unemployed (AFDC case open, IV-D case closed)
29 - Employed father has returned home
31 - Dependent child now 18 years of age, not in school, employed, or
refuses to register for WIN program; or eligible child no longer
living in home of mother
32 - Eligible child living with father or other relative
33 - Child living in institution (state)
34 - Child adopted by mother's husband
35 - Child has died
40 - "excess assets", "wage resources", or "excess income"
41 - AFDC case transfered to higher grant (e.g. Medical Assistance)
42 - AFDC case transfered out of New Bedford county to another welfare
office
43 - New Bedford Welfare office unable to locate mother
44 - Fraudulent welfare case
69 - AFDC case transfered to father, living in home and receiving grant
(IV-D case closed)
91 - Arrears remitted, AFDC and IV-D cases closed
99 - Unknown reason for AFDC case closure
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Support Orders:
01 - Verbal agreement (unsigned)
02 - Voluntary agreement (signed affidavit of paternity and support)
03 - Separate support order (pendente lite, or legal separation, probate)
04 - Divorce order (probate or family court)
05 - Criminal order (district court)
06 - Reciprocal (out-of-state, URESA) court order
07 - Modified voluntary agreement
08 - Modified probate court order
09 - Modified district court order
10 - Probate court order dismissed
11 - District court order dismissed
12 - Older, unlisted support order or agreement established
13 - Fraudulence order (district court)
14 - Paternity denied in court by putative father
15 - Father defaulted, charged with contempt on earlier court order
16 - Modified verbal agreement .
19 - Arrears order
20 - Child legally adopted by mother's husband
70 - Voluntary agreement dismissed
91 - Arrears order dismissed
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Support Payment Compliance Levels:
1 - father not delinquent, pays regularly full amount of support order
2 - father pays support regularly, but an amount less than required
under support order or agreement
3 - father pays irregularly, or made only a few payments ever under
a particular support order
4 - father stopped paying support altogether (followed by month/year)
5 - father never paid child support under this order
6 - father paid arrears sum in bulk
7 - father paid support regularly, but later stopped payments
8 - father did not pay support for some period, then began or resumed
support payments
Support Payment Status of Open Cases:
1 - non-delinquent
2 - arrears order in effect in addition to regular support order
3 - arrears order dismissed, regular support order in effect
4 - father stooped support payments (month/year)
5 - father never paid support
6 - father paid support under previous order, but not current order
7 - father did not pay support under prior order, but pays under
current order
Support Payment Status of Closed Cases:
2 - AFDC case closed, but arrears owing (IV-D in effect)
3 - arrears dismissed
4 - father stopped support payments more than one month prior to AFDC
case closure
5 - father never paid support
6 - father paid support under previous order, but not current order
7 - support order dismissed, therefore father stopped support payments
8 - father stopped paying support at date of AFDC case closure, not
before
316
Occupation/Industry of Father:
01 - accountant
02 - architect
03 - armed forces
04 - bartender, waiter
05 - bellhop
06 - boat builder
07 - cab driver
08 - carpenter, furniture/cabinet maker
09 - CETA, Manpower, WIN, other New Bedford Consortium
(public employment programs)
10 - clerk
11 - cook, chef, baker
12 - electrician, technician
13 - engineer
14 - factory worker (assembly line, general)
15 - farm worker (cranberry bogs, nursery)
-16 . firefighter
17 - fishing industry (cutter, fisher)
18 - supervisor, inspector, foreperson
19 - guard (security, coast, prison)
20 - hairdresser, barber
21 - home construction and repairs (roofer, plumber, fencer, painter)
22 - hospital (nurse, orderly)
23 - laborer (general construction, dockworker, longshore)
24 - landscaper
25 - machine operator (factory presser, tool cutter, thermograver)
26 - maintenance worker (general custodian, janitor)
27 - manager
28 - mechanic (auto)
29 - musician
30 - police work (corrections or corps officer)
31 - prisoner (state or federal)
32 - professional (miscellaneous)
33 - civil service employee (e.g. postal, city)
34 - real estate worker
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35 - salesperson
36 - service worker (personal and repairs)
37 - teacher, instructor
38 - transport, public (brakes, conductor, dirver)
39 - transport, private (truck driver, delivery)
40 - unemployed, or receiving Unemployment Compensation under DES
(Department of Employment Security)
41 - welfare recipient (AFDC, G.R., OASDI, SSI, M.A., other non-CETA)
42 - retired receiving insurance or pension (including G.I. Bill, V.A.)
43 - student
44 - hospitalized, incapacitated, alcoholic
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DATA FORMAT
Field Description of the Data
1 Card number (#1)
2 Total number of IBM punched cards in this case (0 = 3; 4 = 4)
3 - 5 Case number (1 through 682)
6 - 9 Birthdate of father (month and year)
10 Birthplace of father
11 Total number of AFDC families associated with this father in
the New Bedford region
12 Total number of AFDC children associated with this father in
the New Bedford region
13 Total number of children in this particular AFDC family
14 Sex of children in this AFDC family (total children less males)
15 - 46 Birthdates of children in this AFDC family (month and year) up
to eight possible entries
47 - 49 blank spaces
50 9 denotes mother of AFDC family is caring for additional
children from a prior alliance of the father and that all
children are included in the family's AFDC grant (0 = blank)
51 - 80 Marital status changes of the parents of this family including
dates (month and year) of all changes up to a total of 12
possible entries
1 Card Number (#2)
2 blank space
3 - 5 Case number (1 through 682)
6 - 77 AFDC status changes of the family including dates of all changes
(month and year) up to a total of 12 possible entries
78 Child support payments status of closed AFDC cases
79 Child support payments status of open AFDC cases
1 Card number (#3)
2 blank space
3 - 5 Case number (1 through 682)
6 - 32 Employment status changes of father, including occupation, net
weekly earnings, and date (month and year) of entry,.up to a
total of three possible entries
33 - 80 Child support orders for father, including type of order, dollar
support per week established under the order, and date of order
(month and year), up to a total of 3 possible entries
Denotes that all entries appear in chronological order. Approximately
0.2% of all entries showed status changes occurring in the same month and
year. In these cases, entries which occurred in the earlier half of a month
retained that date, those occurring in the latter half were assigned to the
following month. Where both entries occurred in the same half of a month,
that occurring closest to mid-month retained that date, while the second
entry was assigned to either the previous or following month, thereby pre-
serving chronological integrity.
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1 Card number (#4)
2 blank space
3 - 5 Case number (1 through 682)
6 - 37 Child support orders for father (cont.), including type of
order, dollar support per week established under the order,
and date of order (month and year), up to a total of 2 possible
entries or 5 possible entries per case
38 - 55 Arrears (or fraud) orders for support established in court,
including amount of order and date (month and year), up to
a total possible two entries
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APPENDIX E
Payments Estimation Procedure
In order to calibrate our estimation procedure, we compiled a sub-
sample of 58 orders, representing 35 cases from the study file, to com-
pare estimated payment levels with actual.payment levels following each
order. Table V-13 sumarizes the actual, estimated, and projected pay-
ment levels under a different set of assumed weights and weighting system.
Three types of estimation procedures were compared with actual payment
levels: (a) the estimation procedure used in this thesis research, apply-
ing appropriate weights to each coded compliance value; (b) using the
same weights for compliance codes, we derived estimates without triple
weighting the final compliance entry where more than one was recorded;
(c) estimates were obtained without the triple weighting procedure, and
substituting .6 for .8 in all compliance codes "2". This third estimation
procedure was added because we found that our estimates, using .8 for
code "2", were generally too high.
The final three columns show the difference between each estimate
per case and the actual payment per case as a percent of the support order
established. We then computed the average absolute difference for each
estimation procedure. On average, the estimation procedure used in this
thesis research erred by ±8% across our subsample of support orders (n=58).
1. Recall that the following weights were applied to the various compliance
codes: 1 = 1.0,(regularly paid full amount of support order)
2 = .8 (regularly paid an amount lower than the support order)
3 = .15 (paid irregularly and/or much less than the support order)
4 = 0 (stopped paying)
5 = 0 (never paid support under this order)
6 = 1.0 (paid arrears in bulk)
7 = 1.0 (paid full amount regularly, at least initially)
8 = 0 (did not pay initially, but later changed)
If more than one compliance code followed an order, the final compliance
code was triple-weighted on the assumption that its duration was longer on
average than other compliance responses recorded following an order.
TABLE V-13. COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED PAYMENT LEVELS FOR 57 NEW BEDFORD CASES
Case Date of Amt.of Compliance Av Wkly Paynent Payment/Order( ) % Diff. ( st-AcE)
# Order Order Code(s) Actual Esta Est Est Actual Esta Est Este Esta Est Est
1 8-76 $10 2 $ 2.59 8.00 8.00 6.00 25.9% 80,0 80.0 60.0 54.1 54.1 34.1
2 8-73 60 5 2.27 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8
6-74 30 3,4 1.39 1,13 2.25 2.25 4.6 3.7 7.5 7.5 -0.9 2.9 2.9
3 4-76 10 1 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10-77 12 1 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 5-73 100 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 6-77 15 1 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 12-73 40 2,4 13.19 8.00 16.00 13.33 33.0 20.0 40.0 30.0 -13.0 13.0 -3.0
7 6-77 35 1 28.33 35.00 35.00 35.00 80.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 19.1 19.1 19.1
7-77 35 1 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 2-68 12 1 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9-75 20 2 12.00 16.00 16.00 12.00 60.0 80.0 80.0 60.0 20.0 20.0 0.0
10-75 30 2 18.21 24.00 24.00 18.00 60.7 80.0 80.0 60.0 19.3 19.3 -0.7
9 8-75 25 1 25.00 25.00 -25.00 25.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
11-76 25 1 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5-77 25 1 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 11-76 75 2 58.19 60.00 60.00 45.00 77.6 80.0 80.0 60.0 2.4 .2.4 -17.6
11 6-74 50 1 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 100.0 1oo.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7-76 38 1 36.59 38.00 35.00 50.00 96.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 3.7 .3.7 3.7
12 4-72 70 2 39.33 56.00 56.00 42.00 56.2 80,0 80.0 60.0 23.8 23.8 3.8
12-74 50 1 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6-77 45 1 45.00 45.00 45.00 45.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
13 1.0-68 15 2 8.86 12.00 12.00 9.00 59.1 80.0 80.0 60.0 20.9 20.9 0.9
9-69 30 2,4 1.35 6.00 12.00 9.00 4.5 20.0 40.0 30.0 15.5 35.5 25.5
14 8-75 60 2 28.62 48.00 43.00 36.00 47.7 80.0 80.0 60.0 32.3 32.3 12.3
9-76 60 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15 6-77 10 2,4 4.83 2.00 4.00 3.33 48.3 20.0 40.0 30.0 -28.3 -8.3 -18.3
a Estiniates using triple weighting procedure
b Estimates using simple averaging procedure (no triple weighting)
c Estimates without triple weighting and using .6 (not .8) for code "2"
TABLE V-13 (cont.)
Case Date of Amt. of Compliance Avg. Weekly Payment($) Payment/Order(%) % Diff (.Est-Act)
# Order Order Code(s) Actuall Esta jEstb jEste lActualI Esta Estb jEstc Esta Estb Estc
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
10-71
5-77
7-74
1-76
8-75
12-74
11-69
7-77
6-76
7-76
3-69
9-72
12-76
3-75
5-75
6-73
8-73
1-76
2-76
10-77
7-77
8-77
1-74
9-75
2-76
7-77
2-75
10-76
12-76
4-77
1-64
$10
15
10
10
25
30
20
20
35
15
10
10
30
15
15
20
50
50
35
45
10
10
15
10
10
25
40
42
20
15
12
7
1
1
1
3,1
5
7
1
2
1
7
5
7
2
3,4
7,2,1
1
1
1
1
2
2
7,4
7,4
5
3
1
7,2
7,4
1
1
$10.00
15.00
10.00
10.00
19.35
0.0
18.43
17.69
25.51
12.86
8.83
0.0
27.50
11.21
1.94
14.56
50.00
50.00
35.00
45.00
8.86
6.42
7.07
5.00
0.0
4.40
38.62
32.08
9.29
14.66
10.97
10.00
15.00
10.00
10.00
19.69
0.0
20.00
20.00
28.00
15.00
10.00
0.0
30.00
12.00
0.56
19.20
50.00
50.00
35.00
45.00
8.00
8.00
3.75
2.50
0.0
3.75
40.00'
35.70
5.29
15.00
12.00
40.00140.00
37.80
10.00
15.00
12.00
33.60
10.00
15.00
12.00
10.00
15.00
10.00
10.00
14.38
0.0
20.00
20.00
28.00
15.00
10.00
0.0
30.00
12.00
1.13
18.67
50.00
50.00
35.00
45.00
8.00
8.00
7.50
5.00
0.0
3.75
10.00
15.00
10.00
10.00
14.38
0.0
20.00
20.00
21.00
15.00
10.00
0.0
30.00
9.00
1.13
17,33
50.00
50.00
35.00
45.00
6.00
6.00
7.50
5.00
0.0
3.75
100.0%
100.0
100.0
100.0
77.4
0.0
92.2
88.5
72.9
85.7
88.3
0.0
91.7
74.7
12.9
72.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
88.6
.64.2
47.1
50.0
0.0
17.6
96.6
76.4
46.5
97.7
91.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
78.7
0.0
100.0
100.0
80.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
80.0
3.7
96.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
80.0
80.0
25.0
25.0
0.0
15.0
100.0
85.0
25.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
57.5
0.0
100.0
100.0
80.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
80.0
7.5
93.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
80.0
80.0
50.0
50.0
0.0
15.0
100.0
90.0
50.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
57.5
0.0
100.0
100.0
60.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
60.0
7.5
86.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
60.0
60.0
50.0
50.0
0.0
15.0
100.0
80.0
50.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.3
0.0
7.8
11.5
-7.1
14.3
11.7
0.0
8.3
5.3
-9.2
23.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-8.6
15.8
-22.1
-25.0
0.0
-2.6
3.4
8.6
-21.5
2.3
8.4-
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-19.9
0.0
7.8
11.5
7.1
14.3
11.7
0.0
8.3
5.3
-5.4
20.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-8.6
15.8
2.9
0.0
0.0
-2.6
3.4
13.6
3.5
1.3
8.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-19.9
0.0
7.8
11.5
-12.9
14.3
11.7
0.0
-8.3
-14.7
-5.4
9.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-28.6
-4.2
2.9
0.0
0.0
-2.6
3.4
3.6
3.5
2. 3
8.4
'Av. Abs. Diff. = 8.2% 7.4% 5.5%
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If we use the same weights, but apply simple averaging instead of triple
weighting the final compliance code where more than one code is recorded,
we tend on average to err by ±7%. Finally, if we maintain simple averag-
ing, and change compliance code "2" weighting to .6, instead of .8, our
estimates will on average vary from actual payment levels by +5.5%. The
results obtained for each estimation procedure do not suggest a signifi-
cant difference between the estimation procedure used and the two alter-
native procedures (b and c).
We decided to check these results in two ways. First, we ran three
least squares regressions comparing the R2 obtained for each estimation
procedure relative to actual payment levels. The results were as follows:
(a) y = 5.5 + .88(x) , R2 = .88
(b) y = -1.95 + .95(x) , R2 = .89
(c) y = 2.51 + .95(x) , 2 = .93
where y = actual payment level
and x = estimation procedures (a), (b), and (c) respectively.
Similar R2's were obtained whether we used the estimation procedure followed
in this thesis research, or we used simple averaging across compliance code
weights rather than triple weighting for the final coded entry. However, a
somewhat higher R (.93) was obtained when we assumed a weight of .6 for
compliance code "2". Recall from Table V-13, however, that this observed
improvement in prediction quality for procedure (c) may be represented by
a difference an average of only a few percentage points.
We noted that most deviations from actual payment levels were caused
by code "2" (generally too high on average) and by orders followed by
multiple coding. On the other hand, all estimation procedures including
that used in this research proved very accurate in estimating payment
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levels where a single code of "1", "7", or "5" was recorded. We therefore
examined the larger study file of 682 cases to determine the proportion
of cases involving single and multiple compliance codes. Of a total of
1154 support orders, 62% were single coded for compliance, of which 33% were
codes "1"or"7, 12% were code "2", 2% were code "3", and 15% were code "5".
The remaining 38% were coded with mulptiple (two or three) compliance
weights. If we return to the results obtained in Table V-13, we find the
distribution of single and multiple codes closely appraximates that of
our study file sample C61% and 39% respectively).
With the exception of code type "3", for which our subsample provided
only one entry, we could say that 49% of all study file orders were coded
appropriately, that is, our weighted adjustments provided payment levels
almost exactly the same as actual payment levels. With only one case
single-coded with "3" (a weight of .15), we could not infer our estimation
procedure was correct. However, these cases constituted only 2% of all
orders in the study file. Orders coded with "2" (or a weight of .8) rep-
resented 12% of all study file cases. Payment estimates in these cases
were improved somewhat by a reduction of the weight assigned from .8 to
.6. While such an adjustment would change individual payment percentages
by 20%, when we average cases within a subsample of 58 orders, we find
the estimation procedure improves by only a few percentage points over
that used in the research.
Finally, approximately 38% of orders were followed by multiple comp-
liance codes. Most of the difference observed between our estimates and
the actual payment levels in the subsample was due to variations in cases
involving multiple codes. In Table V-14, we examine these multiple-code
orders more closely, comparing actual payment levels with the estimation
procedure used in this research and with the two alternate procedures
TABLE V-14. COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED PAYMENT LEVELS FOR CASES WITH -MULTIPLE COMPLIANCE CODES
Payment/Order (%) % Difference (Est-Act)
Case # Order Codes Actual Esia EstEb ste Esta Estb Este
2 2nd 3,4 4,6% 3.7% 7.5% 7.5% -0.9% 2,9 2,9
6 1st 2,4 33.0 20.0 40.0 30.0 -13.0 7.0 -3,0
13 2nd 2,4 4.5 20.0 40.0 30.0 15.5 35.5 25.5
15 1st 2,4 48.3 20.0 40.0 30.0 -28.3 -8.3 -18.3
18 1st 3,1 77.4 78.7 57.5 57.5 1.3 -19.9 -19.9
24 2nd 3,4 12.9 3.7 7.5 7.5 -9.2 -5.4 -5.4
25 1st 7,2,1 72.8 96.0 93.3 86.6 23.2 20.5 13.8
28 1st 7,4 47.1 25.0 50.0 50.0 -22.1 2.9 2.9
29 1st 7,4 50.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 -25.0 0.0 0.0
32 2nd 7,2 76.4 85.0 90.0 80.0 8.6 13.6 3.6
33 1st 7,4 46.5 25.0 50.0 50.0 -21.5 3.5 3.5
Avg. Abs. Diff.= 15% 11% 9%
a Estimates using triple weighting procedure
b Estimates using simple averaging (no triple weighting)
c Estimates without triple weighting using ,6 (not .8) for compliance code "2"
"3
Lfl
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noted above. The average absolute percentage differences in payment
levels is shown at the base of the Table. Estimates of payment levels
in cases involving the estimation procedure used in this research tend
to vary from the actual payment level by ±15% on average. If we do not
apply triple weighting, the estimates are slightly improved, varying on
average by + 11% on average from actual levels. If we also apply a
weight of .6 to code "2" entries, our estimates again improve just slightly
to + 9% of actual payment levels on average. Although the results show
some improvement in multiple code estimates, percentage differences bet-
ween estimation procedures overall are slight.
To summarize, we concluded from our calibration that two-thirds of
all orders were coded with appropriate weights, yielding on average pay-
ments which were very close to actual payment levels. In one-third of
orders, we found a variation on average of between 9% and 15% between
actual and estimated'support payment levels. The use of simple averaging
instead of triple weighting does not seem to provide an overall improve-
ment in our estimates. However, a weight of .6 in lieu of .8 applied
to compliance code "2" yields a slightly better payment level estimate.
If we assumed that various types of compliance codes were distributed
fairly uniformly across categories of family size and earnings level, we
would expect only slight changes in payment level estimates provided in
Table V-4a and b in Chapter V. We therefore sensitized our results,
applying a simple averaging procedure (not triple-weighted) as well as
a reduced (to .6) weight to code "2". The results are shown in Tables
V-15a and b.and.16a and b, respectively. In Tables V-15a and b, we
provide payment-level estimates using a weight of .6 for code "2" entries
as well as the difference between the new estimates and those obtained in
Chapter V. Those estimated in this research, using a compliance code
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TABLE V-15a. PAYMENT LEVELS AS A PERCENT OF ORDER LEVELS ASSUMING
A WEIGHT OF .6 FOR COMPLIANCE CODE "2"
Level of Earnings No. of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+
$ 0 - 75 14.2% 21.3 0.5 1.5
76 - 100 8.0 13.6 16.0 27.3
101 - 125 9.1 10.6 17.6 13.0
126 - 150 12.5 14.4 15.8 21.0
151 - 175 12.1 15.8 20.4 17.1
176 - 200 13.5 15.1 22.4 20.5
200+ 10.0 12.0 3.5 12.8
_ _ _ _ _ _ 1_ _ _
TABLE V-15b. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CALCULATED AND PROJECTED ESTIMATES
ASSUMING A WEIGHT OF .6 FOR COMPLIANCE CODE "21"
(calculated-projected)
Level of Earnings No. of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+
$ 0 - 75 1.2% 2.6 0 0
76 - 100 0.6 0.3 0.7 1.5
101 - 125 0.6 0.9 1.6 0.3
126 - 150 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.7
151 - 175 2.1 0.7 1.2 0.9
176 - 200 -3.6 0.6 1.6 1.5
200+ 1.5 0.2 1.1 0.9
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weight of .8, are slightly higher as we would expect. More important,
however, is the fact that our overall results do not change dramatically.
This suggests that the distribution of alternate types of compliance codes
is relatively uniform across all categories of earnings and family size,
Thus, although a weight of .6 improves our payment estimates slightly,
these are on the order of only a few percentage points in each cell.
Our conclusions made in Chapter V concerning the trend toward relatively
lower payments by low-wage and high-wage fathers with large families, and
higher payment levels among middle-earning fathers, has not been affected
by these results.
We also examined payment levels assuming a weight of .6 as well as
simple averaging across weights where more than one compliance code was
used for an order. The results of this exercise are shown in Table V-16
a and b. Differences between calculated and projected payment levels are
shown to be within a few percentage points in most cases. Again, our
conclusions are unaffected by the change in estimation procedure.
A similar exercise was performed using Table V-8. Changes in compliance
levels following changes in the type of enforcement action were similar
using our estimation procedure and those which assume a code "2" compliance
weight of .6 and simple averaging procedure across multiple code weights.
The results of the comparison are shown in Tables V-17a and b. As expected,
there was little change in compliance levels in each category of enforce-
ment mode change, with the exception of Category 1. However, these results
had been discarded as insignificant due to the few cases represented in the
category. In all other categories, our conclusions were reinforced using
the sensitivity analysis for a weight of .6 applied to compliance code "2"
and simple averaging.
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TABLE V-16a. PAYMENT LEVELS AS A PERCENT OF ORDER LEVELS ASSUMING
A WEIGHT OF .6 FOR COMPLIANCE CODE "2" and SIMPLE
AVERAGING OF WEIGHTS
Level of Earnings No. of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+
$ 0 - 75 15.6 22.9 1.0 3.0
76 - 100 8.7 14.7 16.8 27.7
101 - 125 9.9 11.2 18.2 17.9
126 - 150 12.9 15.5 16.6 21.6
151 - 175 12.6 16.8 20.4 18.3
176 - 200 12.9 16.4 22.4 20.5
200+ 10.2 12.0 4,2 12.9
TABLE V-16b. COMPARISON OF CALCULATED AND PROJECTED ESTIMATES OF PAYMENT
ASSUMING .6 WEIGHT FOR CODE "2" and SIMPLE AVERAGING
(calculated-projected)
Level of Earnings No. of Dependents
(net weekly) 1 2 3 4+
$ 0 - 75 -0.2 1.0 -0.5 -1.5
76 - 100 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 -1.1
101 - 125 -0.2 0.3 -1.0 -4.6
126 - 150 0.6 -0.2 0.3 1.1
151 - 175 1.6 -0.3 1.2 -0.3
176 - 200 4.2 -0.7 1.6 2.5
200+ 1.3 -0.2 0.4 0.8
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TABLE V-17a. COMPLIANCE
(average %
LEVELS FOLLOWING A CHANGE IN MODE OF ENFORCEMENT
of order paid) using .6 for COMPLIANCE CODE"2"
Abs.Difference Between
Type of Order Change Compliance Level Change Calculated and Projected
-43.0% +5%
2 + 5.0 -1
3 -11.0 
-2
4 +13.0 
-4
5 -17.0 -1
6 +21.0 -1
7 - 2.0 0
8 -12.0 0
TABLE V-17b. COMPLIANCE LEVELS FOLLOWING A CHANGE IN MODE OF ENFORCEMENT
USING SIMPLE AVERAGING (not triple weighting) and .6 weight
for COMPLIANCE CODE "2"
Abs. % Difference Between
Type of Order Change Compliance Level Change Calculated & Projected
-38.0% 10% -
2 + 4.0 0
3 - 8.0 +1
4 +12.0 -3
5 -16.0 0
6 +18.0 +2
7 - 2.0 0
8 -15.0 -3
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